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ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS OF 
RENEWABLE RESOURCES 
Erwin Bülte 
Stellingen 
1. Het verbieden van de handel in ivoor zal op längere termijn niet leiden tot grotere 
aantallen olifanten (dit proefschrift). 
2. Het verbod op de commerciële walvisvaart kan met economische argumenten prima 
verdedigd worden (dit proefschrift). Het afschaffen van dit verbod ook (Bülte and 
van Kooten (1997), Environmental valuation and declining marginal Utility of 
preservation: the case of the minke whale in the Northeast Atlantic, University of 
British Columbia, Discussion paper). 
3. Omdat er nog veel onduidelijkheid bestaat over de "optimale hoeveelheid" tropisch 
regenbos, is de voortdurende klaagzang over het tempo waarmee dit bostype 
verdwijnt op zijn minst voorbarig. 
4. Investeren in teakhout-plantages doet men met name voor de gemoedsrust; de 
portefeuille en tropische regenbossen hebben er minder baat bij (Bülte en van Soest, 
ESB 4093, bit. 132-134) 
5. Als het hoofdstuk over de "No-Ponzi-game condition" tijdig in het Albanees was 
vertaald, dan had men veel narigheid kunnen voorkomen (Blanchard and Fisher 
(1989), Lectures on Macroeconomics, Cambridge: MIT Press) 
6. Gegeven het feit dat per defmitie de steady state van een niet-lineair systeem nooit 
bereikt wordt, is alle aandacht voor dit fenomeen in de tekstboeken wat overdreven. 
7. Risico-aversie is aanmerkelijk ingewikkelder dan economen over het algemeen 
veronderstellen; dit kan afgeleid worden uit de observatie dat promovendi soms 
geen back up van het proefschrift maken, terwijl ze zieh wel zorgen maken over 
eventuele gevolgen van de aantasting van milieu en natuurlijke hulpbronnen. 
8. De Nederlandse overheid heeft met de overgang van een "rationeel" naar een 
"biologisch visstandsbeheer" in 1993 een kortzichtig beleid gevoerd, waarmee 
zowel vissers als natuurbeschermers een siechte dienst is bewezen. 
9. Intelligentie is voor 50% het denkvermogen dat iemand heeft, en voor 50% dat wat 
men denkt dat die persoon heeft. 
10. Het huidige AIO-systeem is er beter in geslaagd om intelligente dan om slimme 
Studenten aan te trekken. 
11. Veel economen bakken lucht, niet in de laatste plaats omdat de schoorsteen moet 
roken. 
12. Ondanks de rake typering van Paul Theroux ("toeristen weten niet waar ze geweest 
zijn, reizigers weten niet waar ze heen gaan") is het verschil tussen toeristen en 
reizigers vele malen kleiner dan laatstgenoemden ooit willen toegeven. 
13. De oude Patagonische geneeswijze van schapenschurft (als volgt beschreven door 
Bruce Chatwin "stop een suikerklontje in het schaap zijn bek en zuig hem onder 
zijn staart tot het zoet smaakt") zal in Nederland eerder op verzet van dierenartsen 
dan van tandartsen stuiten. 
14. Niets is zo kleingeestig als het coûte que coûte vermijden van elke schijn van 
burgerlijkheid. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Renewable resource management has received ample attention in 
recent years, stimulated by growing awareness that many natural resources 
are wasted, unsustainably exploited or deteriorating because the environment 
in which they regenerate gets increasingly polluted. For example, it is 
estimated that tropical forests disappeared at a pace of approximately 15 
million hectares per annum, corresponding to about 0.8% of the stock per 
year, during the eighties (FAO 1993). Many people believe this to be a cause 
of great concern for a variety of reasons, among which potential loss of 
biodiversity and (local) climate regulatory functions, and the threat it implies 
to the way of life and survival of those millions of people who traditionally 
depend on forests for food and shelter. While tropical deforestation is mainly 
a matter of agricultural conversion and much less of commercial logging, 
logging does have an important impact on loss of forest habitat in temperate 
zones. Harvesting big trees in old growth forests in, for example, Canada and 
the U.S. , is hotly debated. 
The national and international conflicts over dwindling fish stocks are 
another example of a highly-valued resource under pressure. The estimated 
herring stock in the North sea in 1996 amounts to approximately 500 thousand 
tons, which is way below optimum biological and economic stock levels 
(Bjorndal 1988), and may be in the vicinity of the rninimum viable population 
(the mimmum stock that is required for long-run population survival for 
biological reasons). The North sea herring stock serves as an illustrative 
example for many more species at many more locations. With ongoing 
depletion of marine resources the way of life and incomes of many people and 
communities that historically depend on fisheries will be affected in the near 
future (see, e.g. Weber 1995). 
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While all of this may seem dramatic, it should be recognized that 
refraining from consuming an overexploited renewable resource for a long 
enough period of time implies (under some conditions) that this stock or 
population is allowed to recover. History provides us with some examples of 
successful resource recuperation after extensive periods of overexploitation. 
These examples include some severely depleted whale populations, harvested 
for meat, blubber and tradition (see chapter 6) and the African elephant, 
hunted in the seventies and eighties mainly for ivory (see chapter 5). A 
moratorium on commercial whaling and a trade ban on elephant products 
were implemented in 1986 and 1990 respectively, and triggered off recovery 
of the resources. On the other hand, one should not count on the regenerative 
abilities of nature. Recovery may be impossible or extremely slow in a 
deteriorated environment or if the stock is depleted to a level below the 
minimum viable population, as noted above. An additional problem may arise 
when recovery does not constitute mere biomass increment (as in commercial 
fisheries) but restoration of the original ecosystem and all of its complexities. 
For the latter reason, it is sometimes assumed that harvesting primary tropical 
forests and old growth forests in temperate regions basically boils down to 
exploiting a non-renewable resource: even though new trees will soon take the 
place of those harvested, it may take a long time before nature has shaped the 
ecosystem to its original form. 
In this thesis I will discuss some economic aspects of renewable 
resource management, among which the rationale behind overexploitation and 
what economic wisdom suggests to overcome these problems. In general, 
economics is concerned with the question how to allocate scarce resources 
among competing uses, where such uses may be identical activities temporally 
separated. Traditionally, economists have regarded natural resources as 
factors of production with some characteristics (e.g. they must be "produced" 
and yield productive services over time), which make them rather similar to 
capital. More recently, it is recognized that in situ stocks of natural resources 
may also be sources of non-use values, or use values not directly related to 
exploitation, such as recreation. This has made economic models more 
complex, but richer. Before I turn to a discussion of some of these models in 
chapter 2, I will introduce in this chapter the concepts of efficiency, 
sustainability and social discounting. First, however, a brief introduction to 
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the classical theory of exhaustible resource management will be provided in 
the next section. The reasons for this digression are twofold. First, concept-
ually, exhaustible resource exploitation provides a natural starting point for 
the economic analysis of renewable resource management. Second, many of 
the relevant conclusions and insights derived from studying non-renewable 
resource utilization spill over to renewable resource management. 
1.2 Hotelling style models 
Natural resources are commonly divided into resources capable of 
regenerating themselves, such as fish populations and trees as referred to 
above, and those that are not, such as oil and coal. The distinguishing feature 
here is the time required for reproduction of the resource. Non-renewable (or 
exhaustible) resources may be produced by geological processes measured at 
an evolutionary time scale, whereas renewable resources reproduce and grow 
at a rate that enables sustainable exploitation by humans. The distinction 
between renewable and exhaustible resources is blurred because the first 
category is easily over-exploited and depleted, such that actual renewal is no 
longer possible. 
In addition to these two types of natural resources, there are resources 
such as solar radiation and the ability of the environment to absorb non-
persistent pollution, that may be assumed constant flow resources. The main 
feature is that use of the resource at one particular point in time will not 
affect the amount that can be used in the future (that is, as long as possible 
critical loads are not exceeded). In contrast, with exhaustible resources, 
current exploitation implies foregoing benefits of exploitation at any future 
time, and with renewable resources, current exploitation of a unit of biomass 
rules out future harvesting of this unit and possible offspring or growth. This 
issue is at the core of the field of natural resource economics, where natural 
resources are considered capital assets. Allowing a renewable resource stock 
to grow is investing in future harvesting possibilities, whereas decreasing the 
stock size is interpreted as disinvesting. Rational decision making with respect 
to resource management requires an intertemporal comparison of marginal 
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costs and benefits of exploitation. For the case of non-renewable resources, 
the economic approach will be discussed in this section. 
In his seminal paper, Hotelling (1931) mathematically solved the 
question of how to allocate a stock of a non-renewable resource over time, 
such that social welfare from exploitation is maximized (see also Heijman 
1991). After decades of negligence, renewed attention in the 1970s and 1980s, 
that was partially provoked by the oil crises and the linkages between resource 
extraction and environmental problems, further developed the depletion 
theme. This has resulted in more general models with less stringent assump-
tions. 
As mentioned above, the implication of extracting and consuming a 
unit of a limited stock of a non-renewable resource today implies that less of 
the resource is available for future consumption. This means that current 
extraction involves an opportunity cost; that is the value that might have been 
obtained at some future date. Efficient use of exhaustible resources implies 
that this cost, which is usually referred to as rent, is taken into account. This 
implies that to maximize welfare, society should consume its stock of non-
renewable resources in a way that is more conservative than consumption of 
ordinary goods, where marginal utility should equal marginal production 
costs. 
The central issue of intertemporally efficient allocation of a stock of a 
non-renewable resource concerns the development of rent over time. Under 
the standard Hotelling assumptions, notably (i) a given and known stock X, 
(ii) extraction costs independent of the stock size, and (iii) marginal extraction 
costs independent of the extraction rate, the optimal control problem for 
society as a whole can be written as: 
(1) 
subject to: 
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X(t) = F(X(t),y{f),t) = -y(t) (2) 
and 
y(t) > 0 , X(t) > 0. (3) 
where £/(•) is the instantaneous utility of consumption of the resource; 1 y(t) 
represents exploitation (and consumption) at t; C is (fixed) exploitation costs; 
r is the discount rate; and X(t), as mentioned above, indicates the size of the 
resource stock at time t. The dot over any variable (here over X) indicates a 
change in time, hence F(-) is a function that describes the change of the state 
variable over time. The current model specification without "growth" of the 
resource or new discoveries implies that the change of the stock is due to 
exploitation only. Finally, it is obvious that neither extraction rates nor the 
total stock in situ can take negative values. 
The current value Lagrangian is defined as (see Chiang 1992; Kamien 
and Schwartz 1994): 
This current value Lagrangian includes the inequality constraints and is an 
augmented version of the current value Hamiltonian [Hc = ï/(y(r))-C-X(0;y(r)] 
that will mainly be employed in successive chapters. The necessary conditions 
for a maximum solution are as follows: 
It is quite well possible to question conventional, mainstream economics for its naive 
assumption of maximizing simple utility functions or discounted social welfare functions. Taylor 
(1996) and many others have pointed out that there is no such thing as societal consensus on 
either environmental or economic questions - the degree of class and distributional conflict in any 
real economy rules out such accord: "The state itself may be autonomous, a creature of conflict-
ridden civil society, or something in between. In none of these cases is the "objective" of state 
policy likely to resemble a neoclassical social welfare function" (Taylor, 1996). This matter is 
further developed in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
Le = U(y(t)) - C - \(t)y(t) + ^(t)X(t) + ix2(f)y(t). (4) 
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(y(0) X(f) + ii2(f) 0 (5) 
X(f) = r\(t) (6) 
0 , n2(t)y(t) 0, (7) 
and the equation of motion [i.e., eq. (2)] again. The subscript y or X indicates 
a partial derivative with respect to that variable. First, equation (7) is the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions. For an interior solution [i.e., y(t) and x(t) positive], 
it follows from (7) that the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers ^ and n2 should be zero 
(Kamien and Schwartz 1994). In what follows in these introductory chapters it 
is assumed that an optimal interior solution exists, hence these multipliers are 
neglected. 
Equation (5), the first condition of optimal depletion, is that the rent 
(or opportunity cost) X(?) equals marginal utility of current consumption plus a 
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. \(t) is the co-state variable that reflects a shadow 
price; the change in the optimal value of the objective function corresponding 
to a small change in the constraint. The interpretation of this condition is that 
the Lagrangian is maximized if the rate of extraction is such that the net 
current gain in utility from extraction is just balanced by the discounted future 
losses. 
The second optimality condition, equation (6), describes the efficient 
rent path over time. For an interior solution (n: = 0), it states that the 
shadow price should grow at the rate of interest, or equivalently that the 
present value of a unit extracted must be the same in all periods. This makes 
economic sense. Resources in the ground can be considered capital assets, and 
efficient use of assets implies that there can be no gain in shifting from one 
asset to another. Hence, the return must be the same for all. Therefore, rent 
should rise at the rate of interest in order for producers to be indifferent to the 
timing of extraction and in order for in situ reserves to be competitive asset 
holdings (Solow 1974). 
The Hotelling rule thus implies that the shadow price increases expo-
nentially over time. Hence, if demand is stable, exploitation declines 
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monotonically over time and, ultimately, declines to zero. 2 Differentiating 
(5) yields \=U"y. Combining this result with the Hotelling rule gives: 3 
m = _ £ (8) 
y(t) V 
where t\ is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (indicating the 
curvature of the utility function), which equals -(ylf'/U1) > 0. Hence, along 
an optimal depletion path satisfying the optimal conditions for optimal 
depletion, the rate at which consumption y falls over time is equal to the ratio 
of the discount rate and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (Heal 
1993). The higher the discount rate and/or the lower the elasticity of marginal 
utility, the more unequal the distribution of the given stock over different 
generations. 4 
To check whether the maximum principle conditions are both necess-
ary and sufficient for a maximum solution, the Arrow sufficiency theorem can 
be applied [see Chiang (1992) for a discussion, and Kamien and Schwartz 
(1994) for a proof]. This comes down to checking whether the maximized 
Hamiltonian [substitute the optimal values of the control variable y in the 
2 But only asymptotically if the demand curve does not intersect the price axis at a finite 
price. Then exhaustion does not occur in finite time. 
3 Assume that U(y) is strictly concave. 
4 The relationship between the interest rate and extraction may be not as simple as assumed 
in this model, because other than pure asset management considerations may play a role. In these 
models capital costs, capacity investment and adjustment costs are not explicitly included. As 
argued by Toman and Walls (1995) this is an unfortunate omission since resource industries are 
highly capital intensive. Lassere (1985) demonstrated that relaxing the assumption of fully 
malleable and costlessly, instantaneously adjustable capital may considerably alter the predictions 
of the standard model (Toman and Walls 1995). In particular, output may grow and rents may 
decline when extraction capacity is being built up. Capital costs can also affect marginal 
extraction costs. If capital is a necessary input in the exploitation process, high discount rates can 
well be expected to increase extraction costs and hence reduce extraction rates (Sweeney, 1993). 
Finally, Farzin (1984) developed a resource-substitute model that explicitly allows for the need of 
capital in both extraction of the resource and production of a substitute. He showed that the 
allocative effect of a change in the discount rate depends on capital requirements for the 
development and production of the substitute, on capital costs in resource extraction, and on the 
size of the resource stock. 
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(current value) Hamiltonian: H*(x,\,t)] is concave in x for any given X (i.e., 
the second derivative of the maximized Hamiltonian with respect to x should 
be non-negative). When the objective function [/(•) and the right hand side of 
the equation of motion F(-) are both concave in (x,y) and X > 0 , then the 
current value Hamiltonian f/+XF is also concave in {x,y), and the conditions 
of the maximum principle are sufficient for a global maximum. However, the 
(current value) Hamiltonian can be concave in x even if U and F are not 
concave in (x,y). 
Explicitly solving for optimal depletion paths implies that starting and 
end-point conditions should be specified. For this purpose transversality 
conditions are employed (see Chiang 1992 for an overview of different 
conditions reflecting different assumptions with respect to the problem at 
hand). In this thesis and elsewhere in the literature on renewable resource it is 
often assumed that the terminal time can be fixed at infinity. This eliminates 
the transversality condition and allows the solution to reach a steady state 
(Hanley et al. 1997). 
Hotelling demonstrated that the optimal rate of exploitation for firms 
with perfect foresight in a competitive industry is the same as the optimal rate 
of exploitation for a benevolent social planner. The reason is that the marginal 
utility curve applied by the planner is the demand curve that the industry 
faces. The market forces of supply and demand ensure that Hotelling's rule 
will apply. If, for instance, current supply were excessive, prices would go 
down and resource owners would be reluctant to supply until future periods, 
thereby restoring equilibrium (for details and intuition, see, for instance, 
Hotelling 1931; Solow 1974; Fisher 1981; or Hartwick and Olewiler 1986). 
Yet, there are at least three reasons to suspect why in practice optimal 
depletion may deviate for firms and society. First, the discount rate applied 
by firms and society as a whole may differ; second, extraction of resources 
may involve external effects; and third, property rights may be ill defined. I 
will return to these issues later. 
The assumptions of the basic Hotelling model (constant marginal 
extraction costs, a fixed resource stock etc.) are very restrictive, and the 
implications of relaxing them have been explored by many researchers in 
recent decades. It is beyond the purpose of this section to discuss these 
Economics of Renewable Resources 9 
extensions in detail. Instead, I will mention some major findings in a non-
technical manner. 
A first and obvious elaboration is incorporating the effect of cumulat-
ive extraction, such that extraction costs are a function of the in situ stock: 
C=C(X) (e.g. Schulze 1974; Weinstein and Zeckhauser 1975; Levhari and 
Liviatan 1977; Devarajan and Fisher 1981; Sweeney 1993). In theory, Cx 
could have a positive sign (this could happen when resource owners "learn by 
doing", and gradually lower their marginal extraction costs as the stock is 
depleted), but most often it is assumed that Q is negative. Hence, the smaller 
the in situ stock, the higher extraction costs, for example because costs rise 
when the mine gets deeper. 
When a reduction in the stock has the effect of increasing future 
extraction costs, then holding the resource in the ground and not reducing the 
stock provides a dividend in the form of cost savings in the future. 5 This 
dividend equals the discounted sum of these increments to costs in all future 
periods, and is reflected in the necessary conditions for an optimum solution 
as an additional term in (5): X = r\+Cx. Since Cx < 0, the optimum rent 
path is more gently sloped (but see Farzin 1992, 1993). 
A second extension involves market power. For a variety of reasons, 
exploitation of natural resources often occurs under conditions resembling a 
monopoly (or oligopoly). The monopolist faces a downward-sloping demand 
function and will take the depressing effect of additional supply on prices into 
consideration. This implies that marginal revenue (MR) is not equal to price, 
and MR should grow at the rate of interest instead (Fisher 1981; Hartwick and 
Olewiler 1986). Consider a downward-sloping linear demand curve. The 
competitive industry moves up the demand curve and the monopolist moves 
up the MR curve, both satisfying their version of the Hotelling rule. Since the 
marginal revenue curve is steeper than the demand curve, the extraction 
profile of the monopolist should be more gently sloped than the extraction 
profile of a competitive industry. As a consequence, prices will rise more 
5 Hence even if the resource will never be fully depleted, for instance because environmental 
constraints curtail exploitation before exhaustion occurs such that current use does not impede 
future use and the scarcity component of rent is equal to zero, X is still non-zero. 
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slowly in a monopoly than in a competitive industry. However, since the 
monopolist initially extracts less, the monopolistic price path starts at a higher 
level. If cumulative extraction is the same for the monopolist and the competi-
tive industry, the price paths will cross after some time, and from that time 
onward the monopolist extracts more than the competitive industry and 
monopolistic prices will be lower. 
Yet, it is not a general result that monopolistic extraction and resource 
conservation coincide, as proved by Stiglitz (1976), Dasgupta and Heal (1979) 
and Lewis el al. (1979). Since MR(y)=P(y)(l + l/e), where e is the elasticity 
of demand, it is obvious that the answer to the question in what way monop-
olistic exploitation deviates from the social optimum is determined by the 
nature of demand. It depends critically on the development of e over time. 
When demand changes over time, becoming less elastic, the monopolist will 
take advantage of this shift, and will restrict supply in future periods. If 
restricting future supply results in increased supply in early periods (as is 
obviously the case in a two-period model with complete exhaustion, con-
sidered by Stiglitz 1976, but see Tullock 1979), the monopolist will act as an 
anti-conservationist. 6 The monopolist may also accelerate depletion if the 
elasticity of demand e increases with the rate of production, for instance 
because sufficiently low prices attract bulk users at the margin to switch from 
substitutes. Then as y varies over time, e will vary accordingly, even though e 
itself is not a direct function of time. For a constant elasticity of demand 
curve, Stiglitz (1976) demonstrated that extraction for a competitive industry 
and monopoly is identical. 
Third, Hotelling already recognized the importance of exploration, and 
discussed the implications of exploration in the context of uncertainty and 
market failure. 7 Society is not endowed with reserves, but must develop them 
^evarajan and Fisher (1981) remark that the assumption of decreasing elasticity over time 
is unlikely. As time passes, new substitutes are developed and the elasticity of demand will 
probably increase, instead of decrease. 
7 H e concluded that, if whoever finds a deposit can file a claim, which will result in 
excessive levels of exploratory activity. Moreover, he asserted that spillovers of geological 
information (i.e. firms benefit from exploratory activities of their neighbours because it helps 
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through the process of exploration instead. By exploration the reserve base is 
increased, hence in some periods production may gradually increase, rather 
than steadily decrease as in the Hotelling model. 
Consider a simple model where in addition to extraction costs an 
exploration cost function EC(z(t)) is included, where z(t) represents the finds 
in period t. A heroic assumption could be that exploration is a deterministic 
process. Hence, society has two variables to control: y(t) and z(f). In addition 
to decisions about exploitation, it must decide at a target level of new finds 
z(t). With stock effects in extraction costs, C(X) with C x < 0, the new finds 
hold exploitation costs down through their influence on X(t). On the other 
hand, they bear a cost in themselves. Optimally, exploratory activity is chosen 
to build the reserve base up to a level that reduces extraction costs and then is 
adjusted over time so as to trade off cost savings from postponed exploration 
with savings from lower extraction costs and revenue gains from greater total 
production (Pindyck 1978). 8 If production costs were independent of 
reserves, society would postpone much of its exploratory effort (thereby 
discounting its costs) and maintain no reserves. 
Solving a model with exploration costs yields as a result that the rent 
of the resource X is equal to the cost of finding another unit to replace it. This 
implies that the marginal exploration costs may be used as an estimator of the 
rent, which is fortunate since direct data on resource rents are often hard to 
find (Fisher 1981). A nice result of this model is that in theory it can explain 
why prices do not rise exponentially, as in the basic Hotelling model. The 
change in price depends on the changes in extraction cost and rent. When new 
finds exceed extraction in a certain period, the total stock increases, which, 
under the assumption of an aggregate cost function, implies that extraction 
costs may decrease. This effect will mitigate the effect of the rise in rent, and 
them to locate their own deposits) result in excess profits. Peterson (1975) demonstrated that in 
the latter situation sub-optimally low levels of exploration may be conducted because every firms 
hopes to be a free rider. 
^ o me, this is not very satisfying, because it is not clear what the effect is of new 
discoveries in one part of the world on extraction costs in another. After all, the total stock is 
divided over several small resource deposits, and the characteristics of those separate deposits 
determine the extraction cost function. (Also, if a large stock reduces extraction costs for some 
physical reason, it is unclear why it would not have this effect when it is not known.) 
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possibly exceed it, so that price will actually fall. Hence, if the initial reserve 
endowment is small (provoking a lot of exploration), the price profile of the 
resource can be U-shaped, rather than steadily increasing as in the Hotelling 
model. 9 See Slade (1982) for a similar result and empirical results with 
respect to ongoing technological progress. 
Lastly, a lot of effort has been put into incorporate uncertainty into the 
standard model. Uncertainty can relate to, for example, future demand or 
technology (e.g. Weinstein and Zeckhauser 1975; Lewis 1977), property 
rights (e.g. Long 1975), or the size of the stock (e.g. Gilbert 1977; Loury 
1978; Pindyck 1980; and Arrow and Chang 1982). Some sources of uncer-
tainty (for example, with respect to future tenure rights) imply that a rational 
resource owner (risk averse or not) adds a risk premium to the discount rate 
and accelerate depletion. 
However, this is not a general result. Uncertain demand in the form of 
a shifting demand curve may have no impact on risk-neutral resource owners. 
For risk-averse owners, on the other hand, depletion may be accelerated or 
postponed, depending on the characteristics of uncertainty. If uncertainty is 
positively related to the distance in time (such as with prices following a 
random walk), the resource owner is less certain about prices further in the 
future, and will therefore tilt exploitation to the present. If uncertainty is 
related to the amount supplied (revenues are defined as price times quantity, 
so that revenues will be more uncertain when quantities supplied are big), the 
risk-averse owner will typically try to spread his supply more evenly over 
time. Hence, from early periods, when supply is relatively large according to 
Hotelling's model, to future periods where supply and variations in returns 
are relatively small. 
9 Of course the analysis is much more complicated with uncertain exploration (see also 
below). Arrow and Chang (1982) write: "the stock of the resource is very far from known. 
Hence, new discoveries yielding upward revisions of estimated reserves change the basis of 
calculation for the Hotelling rents. The predicted rise at the rate of interest is offset by repeated 
downward revision of the initial price in response to changing supply conditions." New 
discoveries will reduce the future price of already known deposits. This will provoke an increase 
in exploitation, causing a sudden price fall. 
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Pindyck (1980) demonstrated that risk-neutral and risk-averse resource 
owners alike should increase exploitation when exploration is modelled as a 
stochastic process. With (non-linear) stock effects on extraction costs, equally 
big upward and downward deviations from the mean value in a stochastic 
model do not outweigh each other, which is a consequence of Jensen's 
inequality. In Pindyck's model, future marginal extraction costs were higher, 
which resulted in faster depletion than along the certainty equivalent path. 
Efforts to empirically test the theory of efficient natural resource 
exploitation have been few. Researchers have attempted to work with 
prices 1 0 (e.g. Barnett and Morse 1963; Smith 1978; Heal and Barrow 1980; 
Slade 1982), or exploration cost (Fisher 1981; Pesaran 1990) or price minus 
marginal cost, (Stollery 1983; Farrow 1985; Halvorsen and Smith 1991) as an 
indicator of rent. In general, it can be concluded that empirical support is 
inconclusive, with some apparent refutations of the theory (e.g. Farrow 1985; 
and Halvorsen and Smith 1991) and some consistent results (e.g. Stollery 
1983). 
1.3 Sustainability and efficiency 
As mentioned in the previous section, efficient exploitation maximizes 
the present value of welfare for society, but this does not necessarily lead to 
equitable solutions. 1 1 Efficient exploitation may be Pareto efficient (i.e., such 
that it is impossible to improve welfare of one generation without harming 
welfare of other generations), but it is by no means the only Pareto efficient 
allocation (see Page 1977) and it has been criticized by many as ethically 
questionable because of the large weight it attaches to the welfare of current 
generations. Given a positive discount rate, the interests of distant future 
It should be recognized that not all of these studies aimed to test the theory of efficient 
exploitation, as some were investigations of increasing scarcity. 
1 1 As noted in 1.2, in a simple model consumption should fall at a rate equal to the ratio of 
the discount rate and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. 
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generations hardly affect current decision making. An important concept in 
natural resource economics, in addition to efficiency, is sustainability. This 
may be interpreted as an intertemporal equity principle. 1 2 Non-sustainable 
exploitation is often referred to as living off capital rather than income, 
implying that future consumption opportunities are affected. 
The major part of modern mainstream economics in the field of natural 
resources is firmly rooted in the efficiency concept, and so is most of the 
content of this thesis. Unfortunately this implies to a certain extent digression 
from, without in any way mimmizing, the concept of sustainability [although 
it could be argued that preferences with respect to "sustainability" are easily 
incorporated in mainstream economic models, either in the objective function 
or as (an) additional constraint(s)]. In the remainder of this section I will 
provide an introductory review of sustainable resource management, and will 
also discuss the relation between efficiency and sustainability. The extent to 
which these key concepts should be considered complementary or conflicting 
depends primarily on the subjective interpretation of what the concept of 
sustainability actually means. 
There is little certainty about what sustainable solutions to natural 
resource models exactly consist of. Economists, ecologists and philosophers 
have interpreted the concept differently, and even within a certain profession 
opinions may be divided greatly. A well-known definition of sustainable 
development that is applicable to resource modelling is provided by the 
Brundtland report (1987): "Sustainable development is development that meets 
the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs". While it is certainly not the aim of this 
thesis to deal with details and differences with other definitions [see Pezzy 
(1989) for an overview, and also Victor (1991) who attempts to construct 
different "schools of thought"], it is of interest to note that it makes a big 
difference whether "meeting future needs" is in terms of (consumption based) 
utility on the one hand, or in terms of a broader set of environmental func-
tions provided by natural resources (e.g. a variety of regulatory functions and 
1 2 Tumer et al. (1994) mention that some definitions of sustainability imply both intergenera-
tional- and intragenerational equity concerns. 
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existence values) on the other. The first interpretation, combined with the 
perception that the natural environment can be regarded as one of many 
fungible assets, implies that a deteriorated environment and depleted stocks of 
some resources can possibly be compensated for by intergenerational transfers 
of capital and technology. This interpretation of sustainability is often referred 
to as weak sustainability. The latter interpretation, especially combined with 
concern for ecological integrity, will usually lead to the conclusion that use of 
resources must be curtailed and investments in creation of substitutes should 
be enhanced [see Daly (1990) for some operational principles]. The view that 
(some) elements of the natural capital stock can not be substituted for by man-
made capital (implying that these stocks should not be allowed to deteriorate), 
is often called strong sustainability. 
Two central themes, sketched above and intimately linked, in the 
concept of sustainability are the nature of the current generation's responsibil-
ity to future generations and the degree of substitutability between natural 
capital and forms of social capital, such as physical capital and knowledge. 
Both issues have proven to be interesting subjects of debate, of which lucid 
summaries are provided by Toman (1994) and Toman et al. (1995). 
With respect to the first issue, i.e., the nature of the current 
generation's responsibility to future generations, opinions are divided. 
Howarth and Norgaard (1990) have argued that intergenerational equity can 
be achieved when a fair allocation of property rights over current and future 
generations is realized. This would provide an alternative for the efficiency 
criterion that would be very similar to the Rawlsian "maximin" criterion. 1 3 
Modified versions of this criterion that allow for some trade-off between 
equity and welfare maximization have been proposed, but others have been 
quick to point out that assigning rights to potential future individuals leads to 
many difficulties, both in theory and in practice. Some economists would like 
to stray away further from efficiency considerations, and claim that individ-
The maximin approach consists of an objective function plus a rigid side constraint of 
justice. Alternative specifications have attempted to incorporate sustainability concerns into the 
objective function itself, for instance, by adding a positive but finite weight to future, satisfying a 
sustainability condition (Toman et al. 1995). Basically this implies an approach very similar to 
conventional efficiency analysis with extra arguments in the objective function, allowing trade-
offs between intergenerational concerns and other social goods. 
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ualistic preferences need not be the basis for society's decision making with 
respect to natural capital at all. The reason is the existence of overriding 
social values and societal concerns embodied in varying degrees in all 
members of society in their "roles" as citizens, rather than consumers. 
According to this organicist or stewardship perspective, sustainability involves 
an obligation to not just future individuals, but to the species as a whole and 
the ecological systems that surround i t . 1 4 
In addition to considerations concerning the obligation of current 
generations towards future ones, the degree of substitutability between social 
and natural capital determines to what extent current exploitation can be 
justified. Here too, opinions are divided. Under the assumption that natural 
resources are fungible, sustainability in the sense of non-declining consump-
tion is easily satisfied. According to this view, depletion of resources, 
biodiversity loss and climate change may be perfectly compatible with 
sustainable development. Provided that the elasticity of substitution between 
natural and social capital is high enough (or if technical development is 
sufficient to offset the reduction of environmental services), the consumption 
of future generations need not decline when resource stocks run down. Many 
analyses of economic growth in the face of limited resources are based on the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, but unfortunately this does not allow an 
analysis of the limits of substitution among inputs (e.g. labour, capital and 
natural resources) because the elasticity of substitution with this specification 
is by definition equal to 1. For example, Solow (1974), Dasgupta and Heal 
(1974) and Stiglitz (1974) have explored the possibilities of constant or 
growing consumption with depletable resources as a factor of production and 
with technology exhibiting constant elasticity of substitution. 1 5 Daly (1990), 
However, as pointed out by Toman (1994), some of humankind's "most cherished 
economic, political and other social institutions derive fundamentally from giving high respect to 
individual rights". 
1 5 However, the realism of some of the conditions obtained, for example, that the economy 
can run on an extremely small and diminishing quantity of energy, has been questioned in light of 
physical laws. Also, some authors have argued that the potential for capital to substitute for 
resources so that output is maintained indefinitely despite the declining stock of resources is 
undermined because capital is not a gift from nature but rather made from resources (e.g., Victor 
1991). 
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among others, is very sceptical about substitution possibilities between natural 
and man-made capital. He thinks that natural and man-made capital are in the 
first place complements in production, with the latter form of capital as the 
"agent of transformation" and the first as "that being transformed" (Daly 
1990). 
The conventional neo-classical framework also emphasizes the role of 
technological progress. Sometimes a backstop technology (providing unlimited 
services at a constant cost) is simply assumed to be out there (Victor 1991). 
Given sufficient opportunities for technical progress and substitution [in the 
optimistic words of Hartwick (1996): "the bounty of past technological 
progress seems to assure us of future additional large dividends"], Hartwick 
(1977, 1996) demonstrated that sustainable consumption can be achieved when 
resource rents from exhaustible resources are invested elsewhere in the 
economy, such that depleting a stock of natural resources is compensated for 
by accumulation of a stock of physical capital. 1 6 However, for some func-
tions, especially the so-called "life support functions" as maintenance of 
hydrologic and nutrient cycles, it is not clear whether compensatory invest-
ments are feasible or ethically defensible. Then, a so-called "strong 
sustainability" approach may be justified, where net damages to (aspects of) 
the stock of natural capital should be non-positive (Pearce and Atkinson 
1995). 1 7 
It can be concluded that the choice between different interpretations of 
the concept of sustainability is a matter of believing in (i) what kind of world 
we should live in, (ii) technological progress and (iii) possibilities of substitut-
ing man-made capital for natural capital in production. It should be realized 
1 6 For this condition to hold, resource rents should not be measured with their market prices 
(which could be too low with excessive depletion and corresponding low prices) but with shadow 
prices reflecting the sustainability constraint. 
1 7Other reasons provided by Pearce and Atkinson (1995) why the principle of strong 
sustainability may be more appropriate than the weak equivalent (or a combination of the 
principles is required) are (i) that the total value of ecosystems is more than the sum of individual 
functions, (ii) that uncertainty exists about aspects of natural capital, and (iii) "loss aversion" with 
respect to natural capital, so that individuals are interested in maintaining the status quo (it has 
been argued that loss aversion could account for the differences in willingness to pay and 
willingness to accept for similar environmental assets, as measured in various studies). 
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that in reality trade-off decisions with respect to production and conservation 
are taken in the context of uncertainty and irreversibilities, which further 
complicates matters. 
Depending on the interpretation of the concept of sustainability, 
efficient solutions may be considered more or less compatible with sustainable 
development. For example, maximizing profits in a fishery may result in a 
steady-state fish stock and associated harvest level that can be supported 
infinitely. (In theory, infinitely exploiting a stock of fish is possible at all 
stock levels ranging from the minimum viable population to the stock size 
where the carrying capacity of the environment for the stock in question is 
reached.) However, whether all of these stock levels would qualify as 
"sustainable" or not is ambiguous and depends in part on the interpretation of 
the concept as discussed above. When efficiency and sustainability are 
considered incompatible, Randall (1986) and Toman (1994) have suggested to 
introduce a kind of extended safe minimum standard approach to determine 
which concept should prevail: small scale, easily reversible impacts may be 
addressed by conventional efficiency theorems, whereas large scale, irrevers-
ible impacts should be subject to moral imperatives for resource and ecosys-
tem protection. 
1.4 The social discount rate and government intervention 
While interpretation of the concept of "efficiency" is in itself not 
controversial (in contrast to interpretation of the meaning of sustainability, as 
discussed above), there has been a lot of debate in the literature about the 
correct discount rate that should be applied, i.e., the rate at which society 
should be willing to substitute present consumption for future consumption at 
the margin. Broadly speaking, there is a school of thought that advocates use 
of the social opportunity cost (SOC) of capital which is based on the produc-
tivity of capital, 1 8 and a second school advocating the social rate of time 
Due to corporate taxation, the social discount rate according to this school should be 
higher than the market rate of interest. Baumol (1968) is not particularly worried about adverse 
implications for investments in the future: Since per capita income is growing, he regards 
Economics of Renewable Resources 19 
preference (SRTP). The latter discount rate is likely to reflect a measure of 
impatience and a social judgement of the effect that future generations are 
probably richer, such that the marginal benefit of additional revenues is 
lower. 1 9 In a world without taxes, risk or uncertainty and with perfect capital 
markets, the two approaches coincide (Pearce and Turner 1990; Clark 1990). 
When the government is considered a trustee for unborn generations, a 
more or less "ethical approach" with (very) low discount rates could be 
validated. Some authors have argued that impatience should have no implica-
tions for public policies, especially since impatience may be inconsistent with 
lifetime welfare maximization. Others have questioned the argument of 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption by stating that the wealth of 
future generations will (at least in part) depend on the state of the environ-
ment, so that real consumption (and rates of return on investments) may not 
grow or even fall when we degrade the environment. For an overview of 
more criticisms, see Solow (1974), Heijman (1991) and Hanley and Spash 
(1993). These arguments suggest that the social discount rate should be lower 
than the SOC or SRTP, but it is not immediately clear how much lower. 
Pearce and Turner (1990) argue that "adjusting" discount rates to achieve 
intertemporal equity is inefficient and clumsy, for example, because the 
relation between discount rates and resource degradation is complex (see 
section 1.2). Serageldin (1993) adds that it is not clear why society should 
give more priority (by applying separate, lower discount rates) to environ-
mental protection than to health, education or family planning projects. An 
alternative way to circumvent some of the concerns mentioned above is to 
integrate a sustainability requirement into the economic model, more or less 
along the lines discussed in the previous section. Depending on the view of 
the policymaker, the aim could be to avoid depletion of the overall capital 
stock (Hartwick 1996) or that the more narrow subclass of natural capital 
should be maintained intact (Daly 1990). 
redistribution of income from present to future generations a "Robin Hood activity, standing on 
its head". 
1 9 This effect can be incorporated by adding a term where the elasticity of the marginal utility 
of consumption is multiplied by the rate of growth of real consumption per capita. 
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Ultimately, the specification of the social discount rate appears to be a 
political or ethical choice, partly depending on the government's value judge-
ment on the importance of preferences for policy-making. Howe (1979), 
among others, is sceptical about a benevolent role of the government and 
remarks that "it is not clear that the government's effective time horizon is any 
longer or any more responsive to future conditions than that of private 
enterprises, large amounts of rhetoric notwithstanding. (..) The next election 
is always around the corner". 
In reality, actual exploitation of many natural resources is carried out 
through private firms, probably applying discount rates that exceed the desired 
social discount rate (Heijman 1991). This implies that to maximize welfare for 
society, the government should intervene and, most probably, slow down 
exploitation. Government intervention is also appropriate when well-defined 
property rights for resources are lacking, or if exploitation and consumption 
of a certain resource brings about external effects, such as pollution. Inter-
vention can take many forms, for instance (i) taxation, which can shift 
depletion to both the future and the present, depending on the tax base cho-
sen; 2 0 (ii) price regulations which have similar effects (see Kalt and Otten 
1985), and (iii) direct intervention through joint ventures, et cetera. 
Typically, a host of objectives may be served through intervention, of 
which correcting for market failure is only one. Examples include generation 
of local employment, macro-economic issues, distribution of benefits (trans-
fers of rents), and security of supply. An important aspect of government 
intervention is the private firm's subjective assessment of its permanence. 
When intervention is aimed at postponing depletion by implementing high 
severance taxes, firms may decide to temporarily cease exploitation altogether 
to circumvent tax payments, when they believe that stringent regulation will 
be relaxed in the (near) future. Alternatively, subsidy schemes that are 
2 0 F o r instance, severance taxes (a fixed charge per ton of output) will shift depletion to the 
future as discounting will reduce the present value of the fixed nominal charge, whereas property 
taxes (a tax on reserves in situ) will shift extraction to the present for obvious reasons. In theory, 
profit taxes and resource rent tax will not affect depletion patterns, although the latter may affect 
decisions with respect to exploration and development of resource bases. For more information, 
the reader is referred to, for example, Conrad and Hool (1981) and Heaps (1985). 
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considered temporary may provoke enhanced exploitation. These issues have 
been discussed extensively in economic literature. 
1.5 Organization 
In chapter 2, I describe the basics of renewable resource management, 
based on a brief literature review. Key issues are (i) optimum stock size (i.e., 
since harvesting a renewable resource represents disinvesting in the stock and 
refraining from harvesting implies investing, how large should the stock be to 
maximize utility for society?), (ii) approach dynamics (how fast should society 
try to reach the steady state?), (iii) extinction (should society try to sustain a 
positive stock level for the renewable resource in question, or is utility 
maximized when the stock is exhausted?), (iv) property rights (what different 
regimes of property rights exist, and what do they imply for resource manage-
ment?), and (v) tropical deforestation (what are the characteristics of the 
deforestation process? Does it pose a problem? What can be done to combat 
it?). These issues return in more detail in subsequent chapters. Chapters 3 
through 11 are (slightly revised) versions of papers I have co-authored during 
the past 3 years. 
Chapter 3 focuses on tropical deforestation in more detail. As will be 
explained in section 2.6, the distinction between primary, undisturbed forests 
and secondary, or selectively logged, forests is crucial for understanding 
deforestation. The reason is that there are significant differences in accessibil-
ity for shifting cultivators. With a model that explicitly recognizes the 
transformation of primary forests into secondary forests, the validity of two 
widely held presumptions is theoretically examined. First, we examine the 
claim that encroachment is necessarily detrimental for nature conservation. 
Second, we investigate whether high discount rates accelerate deforestation, as 
conventional wisdom implies. Chapter 4 deals with deforestation too. In this 
chapter the usefulness of providing international transfers to developing 
countries to promote conservation of tropical forests is examined. This 
chapter is an extension of a model by Barbier and Rauscher (1994), but 
relaxes the restrictive assumptions of risk neutrality and deterministic prices. 
22 Chapter 1 
In chapter 5 we construct a fairly standard renewable resource model 
to study the impact of the trade ban on ivory on the optimum elephant popula-
tion as perceived by the government of African countries. The trade ban has 
halted the massive slaughter of elephants that occurred during the seventies 
and eighties, so it receives wide support from environmentalists and the 
general public in Western countries alike. However, the rationale of the ban 
has been disputed, especially by government officials in countries with large 
herds of elephants. Since a trade ban implies altering the investment and 
disinvestment considerations made with respect to elephants as an asset, there 
is scope for economic analysis. Questions that are addressed are the follow-
ing: (i) will the optimum elephant population (as for example defined in 
section 2.2) increase or decrease as a result from the trade ban? (ii) under 
what conditions may banning trade be detrimental for nature conservation, and 
(iii) will the apparent success of the trade ban in halting (illegal) killing of 
elephants sustain in the future? 
Chapter 6 follows naturally from the previous chapter, where the 
performance of a trade ban is explored. In chapter 6, the central issue is 
whether, from an economic point of view, trade bans should have been imple-
mented in the first place. The case examined relates to commercial (minke) 
whaling, which has been subject to a commercial moratorium since the mid-
1980s. We analyze whether this moratorium on whaling is economically 
efficient by comparing the intertemporal marginal costs and benefits of strict 
conservation. We also assess whether the current stock of minke whales is too 
small or too great, and compare the outcomes of a dynamic model with the 
findings of a simple static approximation, as recently proposed by some 
authors. 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 are about fisheries policies. Chapter 7 goes back 
to the property rights problems that will be discussed in section 2.4. In the 
mid-1970s, many countries declared sovereign rights within a 200-mile zone. 
This implied that within this exclusive (fishing) zone, a national government 
or supra-national organization as the European Union, was judicially able to 
formulate fisheries policy. Prior to the declaration of sovereign rights, fishing 
occurred under conditions of open access. This implies that every individual 
fisher had an incentive to harvest at full force [or, in the words of Neher 
(1990), every fisher had an incentive "to rape, ruin and run"]. As mentioned 
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before, refraining from harvesting is an act of investment, and under condi-
tions of open access, nobody is willing to undertake this investment because 
surely somebody else will reap the benefits. In chapter 7 we empirically try to 
address the question whether declaration of the exclusive zones and formula-
tion and implementation of subsequent policies has had an impact on resource 
use. 
Chapter 8, on the other hand, is a more formal theoretical model of 
fishing policies. We relax the restrictive and unrealistic assumption that 
governments maximize welfare for society (see Howe's quote in the previous 
section), and explore the consequences of a political preference function 
approach, based on interest group lobbying (think of pressure by fishers, 
consumers and labourers in the sector) for optimum stock size. Hence, it is 
recognized that formal declaration of sovereign rights need not result in 
socially optimum fishing policies because powerful and well-organized groups 
in society may have different interests. Exclusive zones are therefore a 
necessary, though certainly not a sufficient, condition for optimum manage-
ment. 
In chapter 9 we discuss an instrument that could be used to facilitate 
implementation of quota cuts and other management instruments that have the 
potential to meet resistance from the sector. We demonstrate how a futures 
market of fishing rights reduces the risk for fishermen, which increases utility 
of risk-averse fishermen. This implies that there is scope for cutting individual 
quotas, without making the fishermen worse off (that is, compared to their 
initial utility level). 
Chapters 10 and 11 are based on forestry models that incorporate 
uncertainty. In chapter 10 we discuss and apply fuzzy logic to deal with a 
land use problem in British Columbia. Allocation of land to various purposes 
may require processing of data that are far less than perfect. This could relate 
to prices (for instance, there are no clear prices for many environmental func-
tions) or technical information, which is sometimes sparse and unreliable. 
Also, preferences of policymakers may be vague (i.e., "expand wilderness 
protection", "revenues from timber harvesting should be high", or "forest 
employment should preferably be maintained"). We compare fuzzy and 
classical decision models, and evaluate the outcomes in light of the political 
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decision-making process in British Columbia, which relies on consensus 
seeking interest groups. 
Chapter 11 deals with another source of uncertainty, namely stochastic 
prices with a known distribution. With aid of a dynamic programming model 
we determine reservation prices for thinning and harvesting in Dutch forestry. 
We compare profitability and timing of exploitation for the strategic forest 
owner who tries to exploit upswings in prices to increase profitability, and the 
forest owner who focuses on expected values and simply adopts Faustmann's 
criterion with expected prices instead (see section 2.6). Chapter 11 stands out 
from the other chapters because dynamic programming is employed instead of 
optimal control, and because it represents a so-called closed loop problem as 
opposed to an open loop problem. In the latter class of problems a resource 
owner decides on an optimal exploitation scheme once and for all and is 
committed to this scheme in all future periods, whereas in the first class of 
problems (also called feedback problems) the resource owner will continue to 
update expectations and act accordingly. Lastly, in chapter 12 conclusions are 
given. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RENEWABLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present and discuss some of the basic concepts of the 
economics of renewable resource management. Although there are many pa-
rallels with the theory of exhaustible resource exploitation, as discussed 
briefly in the previous chapter, there are some notable distinctions. The 
regenerative capacity of the resource and the associated possibilities of steady-
state harvesting are obviously the most striking differences. The basic theory 
of renewable resources is outlined in sections 2.2 to 2.4. Although the 
specification of growth and production functions may be (quite) different for 
different resources, the general insights spill over to fishery, wildlife manage-
ment and forestry models alike. In section 2.5, the basic theory will be 
applied to typical fisheries issues, and in 2.6 the focus will be on forestry 
problems. 
Fishery economics is different from the economics of forestry, because 
of, for instance, the prominent role of property rights (although this issue may 
also play a role in some deforestation problems in developing countries) and 
search costs: fishermen have to go out and find fish. Since search costs are 
possibly influenced by the size of the wild stock, there may be an incentive to 
maintain fish populations at relatively high levels. Alternatively, typical 
forestry problems are the optimum rotation of a single-aged stand (where it is 
recognized that the Beverton-Holt approach in fisheries management is rather 
similar conceptually) and the difficulties associated with multiple use values 
and multiple products. An additional difference between fisheries problems 
and the classical forestry issue is that fishery models typically attempt to 
determine steady-state stock levels where harvesting equals increment, 
whereas harvesting in traditional forestry models involves both increment and 
the standing stock. 
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Basic understanding of the biology of (single) renewable resource 
stocks is necessary to analyze management of these resources (although it 
could equally validly be argued that the biology of ecosystems and food webs 
needs to be better understood for proper management of natural resources). 
Two simplified models 1 that describe fertility, mortality and growth characte-
ristics of a population are the logistic growth function and the Gompertz 
function. 2 The first, suppressing time notation, is given as: 
G(X) = yX 1 X\ 
'•ccl 
(1) 
and the latter: 
G(X) = Y * h i — ( 2 ) 
where 7 is called the intrinsic growth rate of the resource and Xcc is the 
carrying capacity of the ecosystem for the population in question. The growth 
curve of most growth functions has the shape of a bell or parabola (see Figure 
2.1 for an illustration of a logistic growth curve). When the stock is small, 
growth will also be modest, even under the most favourable conditions. In 
terms of fisheries, the reason is that there are few female fish to produce 
offspring. Growth of the stock will also be small when the population is close 
to its maximum size, i.e., when it has filled its niche in the ecosystem. When 
!With respect to fisheries, these biological models both fit in the so-called Schaefer 
approach. In contrast, the Beverton-Holt approach mentioned above deals with separate cohorts or 
year classes that are followed through time. Harvesting separate cohorts requires a (currently 
almost not available) knife edge selectivity in harvesting techniques. Since modelling the 
economics of multi-cohort fishing becomes complicated (Clark 1990) the Beverton-Holt model 
has not been very successful as a foundation for economic models (Munro and Scott 1985), but 
see Flaaten and Kolsvik (1996) for a nice application. 
2Working with the discrete time analogues of these equations (i.e., working with difference 
equations) may produce chaos, depending on the value of the parameters used. Duarte (1994) 
provides a discussion of the complex interaction in unstable dynamic systems between policy 
measures and harvesting on the one hand and stock behaviour on the other: stationary steady-state 
was only one of many different possible outcomes of bioeconomic equilibrium. 
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the stock has expanded to Xcc it has reached its carrying capacity, and the 
ecosystem is not able to support further growth. Possible reasons are food 
scarcity or spreading of disease because of high densities. 
A more complete illustration of the growth function would include the 
concept of minimum viable population (MVP). This corresponds to the 
population level below which, without intervention, the population would 
decrease and eventually approach zero. The reason may be genetic deteriora-
tion, but also insufficient defense against predators. Minimum viable popula-
tion requirements could be incorporated (but it is not, for consistency with the 
formal analysis presented below) in Figure 2.1 by allowing for a non-concave 
interval with negative values for G(X) at low stock sizes, such that the growth 
function intersects the horizontal axis at XMVP, see Clark 1990). 3 Note that 
Xcc is a stable equilibrium while XMVP, the minimum viable population size, is 
unstable (i.e., when for some reason the actual population deviates from the 
equilibrium population, the equilibrium will not be restored without interventi-
on). 
Besides the growth function, the yield or production function y(r) is 
needed to describe the equation of motion of the optimal control model. A 
common and general production function (especially in fisheries and wildlife 
modelling; incorporation of a biological stock term X in forestry models is 
unusual, but this distinction is harmless for the purposes of this section) is as 
follows: 
y(r) = qE(f)aX(tf <3> 
where q is a (possibly species dependent) catchability constant, and E is 
effort, a measure for the inputs devoted to the yield process. 4 Now, the 
growth function is called purely compensatory if X M V p = 0 and G(X) is strictly 
concave, as in Figure 2 . 1 . It is called depensatory if G(X) is initially convex and later concave 
(note that this does not correspond to the functions described above). Finally, the function is said 
to exhibit critical depensation if X M V P > 0, and G(X) initially convex and later concave (Conrad 
and Clark 1987). 
4 A n alternative specification sometimes applied in fisheries economics is the exponential- or 
Spence production process: y(t) = X(f)(l - e < ' £ W ) (see Amundsen et al. 1995). 
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equation of motion for the renewable resource problem, while suppressing 
time notation, is given as: 
X = G(X) - y. (4) 
Sustained yield or harvesting is defined as harvesting with X, y and E constant 
over time, i.e., y = G(X). In the Schaefer fisheries model (1957), a and 0 of 
the production function (3) are set at one, and the growth of the stock is 
described by the logistic function. Then in equilibrium: 
y = qEX = yX (5) 
solving for X gives: 
'l - si] (6) 
Y 
which implies: 
y = qEX = qEXcc\ 1 - 3& 
Y , 
(7) 
This sustained yield-effort function is parabolic. If qE > y, the resource 
stock is asymptotically depleted and eventually y and X approach 0 (Conrad 
and Clark 1987). 
As is readily observed from Figure 2 .1 , rapid growth of the stock is 
possible with moderate stock sizes. Growth is at its maximum when G'(X) = 
0. The harvest associated with this phenomenon is called maximum sustained 
yield (MSY), and the stock size corresponding to maximum sustained yield is 
depicted in Figure 2.1 as X M S Y . For the logistic growth function, G'(X) = 0 at 
XMSY = Xcc/2, and for the Gompertz function at Z M S Y = rK/4. Harvesting 
G(XMSY) a t s t o c k levels of Z M S Y has been promoted for many years by fishery 
and forestry ecologists alike; it was considered good policy to search for the 
largest harvest that can be sustained forever. However, for a long time 
economists have argued that Z M s y is seriously flawed as a management 
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concept. Neher (1990) puts forward three different arguments tailored to a 
fishery but applicable to forestry as well. First, although perhaps least import-
ant in this respect, the steady-state analysis does not give any insight into the 
dynamics of approaching the optimal stock size. A trade-off arises between 
adjustment costs and bridging time that is overlooked in the ecological model. 
G(x) 
M S Y 
0 ^ M S Y X 
Fig. 2.1: A logistic growth function. 
Second, prices and costs are disregarded in the XMSY concept. As 
mentioned above, harvesting costs are likely to be influenced by stock size 
because it is easier to find fish as there are more of them around (see 2.5.1 
for a more elaborate discussion). Since excessive harvesting costs are a waste 
of productive resources, it may be worthwhile to thicken the stock by accept-
ing smaller harvests, and arrive at a steady-state stock size to the right of 
Straightforward multiplying by the price of fish means that G(X) of Figure 2.1 can be 
transformed to a revenues curve. Next, assume that marginal harvesting costs can be represented 
by a declining function of stock size in the same figure. Then the optimal stock size will be the 
stock size where the slope of the revenue curve is equal to the slope of the cost curve (in that 
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Third, discounting is ignored in the maximum sustained yield concept. 
By the harvesting process, in situ renewable resources can be transformed into 
money in the bank. Since both money in the bank and, for example, fish in 
the sea are productive [the first grows at the interest rate r, the latter produces 
offspring with an average rate of return of G(X)/X and a marginal rate of 
return GI(X)], they can be compared as assets. Disregarding harvesting costs 
for the time being and simply assuming that y is a control variable, the 
problem can be represented in a simple model as follows: 
Max^ fPV)y(t)e-"dt ( 8 ) 
o 
subject to: 
X(t) = G(X(t)) - y(r) ( 9 ) 
With the necessary first order conditions for an optimum solution (while 
suppressing time notation): 
P - X = 0 (10) 
X = (r - G'(X))k 
Combining (10) and (11) yields: 
t + G'(X) = r (12) 
P 
Hence rising prices (P > 0), for instance due to changing preferences, 
encourage conservation as it is a motivation to build up future stocks. The 
intuition is as follows. Along an optimal path, (12) must hold. Given a certain 
(exogenous) value for r, the higher PIP the lower the required value for Gi(X) 
to balance the LHS and RHS of (12). Since G(X) is concave, lower values of 
case, marginal harvesting costs are equal to marginal benefits). This point of tangency is to the 
right of X M s y (see for instance Pearce and Turner 1990; Tietenberg 1994). 
36 Chapter 2 
G'(X) correspond with greater stock sizes. Similarly, higher discount rates (for 
a given value of PIP) imply that G'(X) should increase, which can be achieved 
by reducing X. The relative strength of the countervailing effects of discoun-
ting on the hand and harvesting costs and increasing prices on the other hand, 
determines whether optimal stock size according to economists is bigger or 
smaller than maximum sustained yield levels. 6 
Other reasons why MSY is not to be trusted as a management objec-
tive are that (i) harvesting G(XUSY) will not necessarily be sustainable in the 
long run due to natural fluctuations in the stock (although similar criticism 
applies to other rigid policy prescriptions); (ii) the fact that the relations be-
tween interdependent species are ignored; and finally (iii) that preservation 
values are not included (Conrad and Clark 1987). Especially with respect to 
large marine mammals (see chapter 6), the latter is a serious omission. 
2.2 Optimal population size and dynamics 
As argued above, X M s y is in general not a correct indication of optimal 
stock size if society wants to maximize utility of exploitation and preserving a 
stock (or if firms with well-defined property rights want to maximize profits). 
In this section, optimal stock size is determined by finding a steady-state 
solution to the first order conditions of the optimal control problem for 
society. For the dynamics of the optimal management program it makes a 
difference whether the current value Hamiltonian (or Lagrangian) is linear in 
the control variable y(t) or not (Conrad and Clark 1987; Chiang 1992). Non-
linearity may be caused by a downward-sloping demand curve, or by a certain 
specification of the harvesting costs. We will return to this issue later. 
Currently, the aim of the analysis is to maximize utility for society, and a 
non-linear specification with downward-sloping demand is chosen. 
^ o r the case of the North sea herring fishery, Bjorndal (1988) demonstrated that the 
economically optimum population is smaller than the population that would support harvesting at 
MSY level (the latter is approximately 2 million tons of herring). For various discount rates, 
ranging from 0% to 20%, Bjorndal calculated the optimum economic stock size, which ranged 
from almost 1.6 million tons to 1 million tons respectively. Both the biological and economic 
optimum stocks are greater than 1996 stock levels of about 500 thousand tons. 
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Let the management problem be formulated as follows: 
Max^ [U(y(t),X(t))e-rtdt (13) 
subject to: 
X(f) = G(X(r)) - y(t) (14) 
where U indicates utility derived from either exploiting the stock or preser-
ving it. If society faces a downward-sloping inverse demand function P{t) = 
D(y); utilities of harvesting and conservation [W(X)] are assumed separable; 
and if the resource in question is exploited with a simple multiplicative yield 
function (y = qXE), this management problem (without time notation) can be 
rewritten as: 
MaxE J 
Max, ! 
J D(s)ds + W(X) - CE 
y® 
[ D(s)ds + W(X) 
e~rtdt = 
(15) 
qX 
e"dt 
where C is the per unit cost of effort. The current value Hamiltonian reads as: 
H = [D(s)ds + W(X) - + A(G(X) - y ) ( 1 6 > 
The first order conditions, assuming an interior solution (see e.g. Chiang 
1992; Conrad and Clark 1987; Clark 1990): 
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X = (r - G'(X))X - W, - -Q- (18) 
qX2 
Equation (17) defines the rent of the resource, or the value of an additional 
unit in situ; price minus marginal harvesting costs. Condition (18) indicates 
under what condition society is indifferent to holding the stock in situ, when 
the alternative is to harvest and invest the revenues elsewhere in the economy. 
This condition is a non-arbitrage condition, similar to the Hotelling rule for 
non-renewable resources derived in section 2.2. With fish, trees or wildlife, 
society is compensated for delaying harvest, because the stock is self-reprodu-
cing. The marginal rate of growth must be subtracted from the discount rate 
to yield a "net rate of interest", r - G'(X). The two additional terms on the 
RHS represent benefits for society of holding one extra unit of the stock in 
situ: it is a direct source of utility for conservationists, and with the current 
specification of the harvest function it reduces harvesting costs. 
Differentiating (17) with respect to time gives: 
X = D'(y)y + — X (19) 
qX2 
equating this expression to (18), and solving for y, we find: 
D'(y) 
(r-G'(X))(P(y)--Ç-) - Wx - —G(X) 
& qX2 
(20) 
The optimal stock size is found by setting all time derivatives equal at 
zero. The implication of X = 0 is that harvest should be equal to the regener-
ated fraction of the stock: y = G(X). The optimal size of the stock can be 
derived from (20). Rearranging terms gives: 
Wx + CG(X) n u 
r = G'OO + ? —— ( 21) 
X[qXD(G(X)) - C] 
In equilibrium, the social rate of time preference must be equal to the 
rate of return on holding the marginal unit of stock in situ. The latter can be 
decomposed into two parts: the return from increased stock growth (G'(X)), 
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and a complicated stock term. The numerator of this term reflects the combi-
nation of future marginal cost savings from leaving one unit of the resource in 
situ because less effort will be needed when the stock is thicker, and future 
marginal utility from this thicker stock. These savings and gains are "discoun-
ted" by the current marginal rent due to harvesting (the denominator). Since 
W x and CG(X) are both positive, the stock term is positive. The larger this 
term, the higher the optimal steady-state stock should be: given a certain 
value of r, a higher realization of the stock term corresponds with lower 
required values for GI(X) to balance LHS and RHS of (21). Again, since 
G"(X) < 0 this implies that stock size should increase. 
Hence, current harvesting reduces the stock, and therefore reduces 
future preservation value and increases future harvesting costs in all periods. -
Taking this effect into account implies that current harvesting should be 
reduced at the expense of future exploitation. This is reflected in the more 
gently-sloped rent path [see (18)] and a larger steady-state stock [see (21)]. 
Expression (21) is an implicit solution for the optimal steady state X = X*.7 
Due to the assumption of downward-sloping demand above, the current 
value Hamiltonian is non-linear in the control variable y. Under this conditi-
on, the optimal approach path to the equilibrium solution is found with aid of 
(14) and (20). The differential equations X = y = 0 can be depicted in a 
phase-plane diagram where y is plotted against X. The combination of these 
equations is often called an autonomous system of differential equations, as 
the right-hand sides of these equations are not explicit functions of time t. The 
equilibrium is the intersection of the two isoclines (i.e., the curves along 
which X = y = 0). From (14), we know that the X-isocline is the curve y = 
G(X). To determine the y-isocline from (20), we need to specify the demand 
curve and preservation utility. An example is worked out in chapter 5 for 
African elephant management, and the result is provided in Figure 2.2. Note 
that in the absence of stock-dependent harvest costs and preservation values, 
the y equation would reduce to the vertical line X = X", positioned at the 
stock level that equates G'(Xf) and r. 
7Conrad (1995) calls the summation on the RHS of equation (17) the internal rate of return 
of the resource. The interpretation is that this rate of return equals the rate of return on invest-
ments elsewhere in the economy (the discount rate). 
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The two isoclines divide the graph into four isosectors. Each isosector 
has a directional that indicates the movement of a point (y, X) over time. In 
Figure 2.2 a point would move to the right if X > 0 (and to the left if the 
reverse was true) and upwards if y > 0 (and downwards if the reverse was 
true). The signs of X and y come from the differential equations. 
Fig. 2.2: Steady state dynamics 
In Figure 2.2, from isosectors II and III, a point moves into the 
direction of the equilibrium. However, a point in isosector I and IV would 
move into the opposite direction. The equilibrium (y*, X") would be classified 
as a saddle point. 8 In sectors II and III are trajectories that converge to (y", 
X*). These trajectories are referred to as a séparatrices, or stable branches. 
They define the optimal solution trajectories for the infinite horizon problem. 
Any other trajectory than the separatrix would be unsustainable. Initially, the 
other trajectories approach the saddle point, but later they veer off and 
^ h i s situation is typical of optimal control models with a single state variable. If the model 
has two or more state variables, one must fall back on numerical methods to determine the 
approach dynamics of equilibria (Clark 1990). 
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diverge from it (Clark 1990) so that eventually, either y(r) = 0 or X(t) - 0 as 
t goes to infinity. The séparatrices can be computed by linearizing the 
dynamic system, and finding the eigenvalues and associated eigenvectors. 9 
The eigenvectors determine the directions along which the séparatrices 
approach the equilibrium (for more details, see Conrad and Clark 1987 and 
chapter 6). It is of interest to note that with a feedback control, the séparatri-
ces converge to the steady- state equilibrium (y*, X*), but the velocity of 
points nearer to the equilibrium gets increasingly smaller. The steady state is 
reached at t is infinity, in contrast to MRAP (or bang-bang) models where the 
equilibrium will be reached in finite time. 
MRAP, or most rapid approach paths, are applied when the current 
value Hamiltonian is linear in the control variable y (Kamien and Schwartz 
1994; Chiang 1992; Conrad and Clark 1987). The current value Hamiltonian 
in (16) will be linear in y when, for example, the objective function is 
reduced to: Max y \ [py+W(X)-Cy]e~ndt, where p is a constant price per unit. 
This linearity condition is both necessary and sufficient for the optimality of 
MRAP solutions (Conrad and Clark 1987). Depending on the question 
whether the net revenue per unit of harvest (i.e. P - Q exceeds the shadow 
value of an additional unit of the stock X or not, harvesting is conducted 
either at its maximum feasible level, or not at all. This corresponds with the 
following rule: 
y(r) = 0 , whenever X(t)<X* 
' (22) 
y(f) = y m x , whenever X(t)>X* 
In finite time, the stock will have developed or brought back to its 
optimal size. 1 0 
9 If both eigenvalues are positive, the equilibrium is an unstable node. If both are negative, 
the equilibrium is a stable node. Finally, and relevant for this kind of models with one state 
variable, if one eigenvalue is positive where the other is negative, the equilibrium is a saddle 
point. 
1 0 An exception arises if E^ < E". Then the optimal solution is blocked by the control 
constraint. Under this condition, when building up a stock, it is optimal to resume harvesting 
prior to X(f) = X* (for a discussion, see Clark 1990). 
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The discussions above, for both the non-linear and the linear model, 
are based on the convenient but unrealistic assumption that exploitation costs 
are directly related to harvesting effort. In a paper by Clark et al. (1979) it is 
explicitly recognized that non-malleable capital is pervasive in renewable 
resources. An important conclusion was that relaxing the assumption that 
man-made capital can be regarded as a flow variable has a profound influence 
on (short-run) optimal resource management. More specifically, under the 
assumption that capital investments (K) in vessels, gear and so on are com-
pletely irreversible (i.e., there is no market for excess capacity) but subject to 
depreciation, they found that the X-K phase plane is divided into three 
separate regions where it is optimal to (i) not harvest and not invest, (ii) 
harvest at full force and not invest, and (iii) invest at full force, i.e., increase 
K up to a value determined by a switching curve (see Clark et al. 1979; Clark 
1985). 
Although the optimal policy converges to the same steady-state stock 
as determined by the variable cost model, Clark et al. (1979) have demon-
strated that it may be optimal to have an excessively high capital stock and a 
severely depleted fish stock in transitory phases. Boyce (1995) turned the 
linear model of Clark et al. (1979) into a non-linear model, such that the 
bang-bang solution described above was no longer optimal. However, Boyce 
also found that temporary phases with excess capacity and small stocks may 
be optimal in the short run. This may shed new light on the often heard claim 
that, for example, fish stocks are "over-fished" worldwide: (temporarily) 
reducing (fish) stocks below their optimum stock size may be economically 
efficient when investments are irreversible. On the other hand, with irreversi-
bilities in exploitation, as could occur with harvesting near MVP and with 
tropical deforestation, the finding of rational temporary overharvesting may 
lose its validity. 
2.3 Extinction 
It has been argued that extinction of plant and animal species occurs at 
an increasing rate as a result of expansion of human activities. Extinction as 
an economic problem has received some attention (e.g. Clark 1973; Cropper 
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1988). Extinction can be deliberate in the case of a renewable resource with 
well-defined and enforced property rights, and can occur inadvertently under 
open access management. The latter option will be discussed briefly in section 
2 .4 . " 
In case of a renewable resource with well-defined property rights, 
deliberate extinction may occur if the return yielded by maintaining a resource 
stock is not competitive with investments in other assets (Neher 1990), 1 2 
hence if: 
G'(0) + M < r (23) 
F(0) 
where P(y) represents the inverse demand function for the resource. This 
condition is necessary, but not sufficient for extinction. If the cost of transfor-
ming the resource stock into another asset is prohibitively high [P(0) < 
C(0)], an equilibrium stock will exist. This implies that extinction is less 
likely when harvest costs are stock dependent (such that harvest costs increase 
when the stock is reduced, and C(0) is likely to be high). Depending on the 
size of this equilibrium size relative to MVP requirements, extinction may or 
may not be the result. 
In the absence of price effects, Cropper (1988) proved that extinction 
of a small stock of a renewable resource may be optimal, even if the intrinsic 
growth rate exceeds the discount rate, when the growth function of the 
resource exhibits critical depensation (i.e., when a minimum viable population 
for the species exists). The reason is that the net discounted benefits of 
refraining from harvest for a long time to build up the small stock until 
seizable proportions are smaller than the discounted benefits of a depletion 
strategy. Of course, a necessary condition for this result is that the marginal 
benefits from harvesting are positive at this small stock size. 
1 'We will find that when open access and rent dissipation correspond with a stock size below 
minimum viable population levels, extinction will be the result. Of course, when P(0) > C(0), 
extinction will also occur when the growth function does not exhibit critical depensation. 
1 2 Here it is simply assumed that no social value is put on preservation of a species. 
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In this respect it is also important to recognize two additional issues. 
First, the opportunity costs of harvesting effort play an important role. If 
opportunity costs are low (for example, because alternative employment 
opportunities are scarce), exit from the unprofitable resource depletion sector 
will be slow (as long as revenues pay for the variable costs, harvesting may 
continue), and the probability of extinction is greater. Second, for fisheries, 
the "braking impact" of harvesting costs on effort may be obscured in a multi-
species fishery. One possible reason for near extinction of blue whales (as 
reported by Spence 1973), is that whalers were not very selective in the 
choice of whales harvested (most of the products obtained from blue whales 
can also be obtained from most other whales, be it in smaller quantities). This 
implies that it is the cost of harvesting any type of whales that determines 
whether whaling will continue, not the cost of locating and killing a blue 
whale. See Clark (1990, p.313) for an example concerning blue and fin 
whales. 
Finally, Swanson (1994) has pointed out that Clark's model should be 
adjusted for land-based resources. While marine resources may have low 
opportunity costs (there are few competing uses for the sea), land-based 
resources (such as elephants, see chapter 5) often do compete with alternative 
uses such as agriculture. This implies that policymakers no longer maximize 
the difference between revenues and costs of exploitation, but rather the 
difference between revenues and the sum of harvesting costs and opportunity 
costs. Obviously, this extension to the model increases the probability of non-
sustainable management. In chapter 5 we will demonstrate that the policy 
implications of Swanson's model may run counter to the standard Clark 
model, where low prices and high harvesting costs tend to increase stock size. 
2.4 Property rights 
Property rights can be understood as characteristics that define the 
rights and duties for using a particular asset or resource. According to, for 
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example, Bromley (1992) and Feeney et al. (1996), natural resources can be 
utilized under one of the following property rights regimes: 1 3 
1. Under a state property regime the ownership and utilization of the 
resource is being controlled by the state. Individuals may be allowed to 
use the resource but only according to the rules imposed by the state. 
2. Under a private property regime, the right to utilize the resource, as 
well as buying and selling, is controlled by individuals. 
3 . Common property regime means that a group of owners can control 
the use of the resource and prevent others from using the resource. 
The members of the group have specified rights and duties. 
4 . Under an open or free access regime, each potential user of the 
resource has complete autonomy to utilize the resource since no-one 
has the legal right to keep any potential user out. One cannot speak of 
property since there are no property rights. 
Property rights, or rather the absence of them, have played a central 
role in natural resource economics. Fish populations, for instance, are usually 
very mobile and it has been difficult to assign property rights to individuals or 
even nations. As a consequence, fish stocks have been harvested in many 
places in the world under conditions with strong open access features. It is 
only since the late 1970s that exclusive economic zones have been established, 
within which governments or intergovernmental organizations can implement 
fisheries policies (see chapter 7). This implies that within the exclusive zones, 
open access has been transformed into state property or common property 
such that the problems related to open access management, elaborated upon 
below, are perhaps less pressing than in the past. 1 4 With respect to forestry, 
Where it is understood that in practice resources are often held in overlapping combina-
tions of these regimes (Feeney et al. 1996), and that it is possible to shift from one (dominant) 
regime to another when conditions change. The possible switch from common property regimes 
and state property regimes to open access regimes as population grows has been well documented 
(for example, Murty 1994; Bromley 1992). 
1 4Conrad (1995) writes that in a strict sense, there are few, if any, commercially valuable 
open access fisheries in the world today. But he adds that what might appear to be a managed 
fishery may in practice be one where open access conditions are approximated. De facto open 
access can arise if management regulations are ineffective. 
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lack of well-defined property rights is especially a problem in developing 
countries as tropical deforestation is primarily caused by advancing slash-and-
burn agriculture (see 2.6.2). 
As already mentioned in 1.2, the cost of exploiting a resource consists 
of two distinct components: the private extraction costs and the unobserved 
opportunity cost, or the value of the resource in situ. The intuition behind the 
latter is that harvesting one unit of the resource today implies that this unit 
and possible growth or offspring are not available for future consumption. 
The (future) value of uncaught fish and unharvested trees depends on many 
different factors such as the rate of interest, future markets for the resource, 
technological development, reproductive features and so on. A sole private 
owner who aims to maximize profits will maximize the discounted value of 
this rent, and treat the resource as an asset. Hence, the value of uncaught fish 
prevents a rational fisherman from overfishing his stock as long as he expects 
that he is the one to benefit from his current "investments" in the future. This 
may result in a conservative harvesting policy. Similarly, if sufficient trust 
and social pressure exist, common property regimes may be successful in 
managing resources. Cultural norms, ideology and value systems are impor-
tant determinants of the actual extent of "free riding". See, for example, 
Bromley (1992). 
A certain resource can be regarded as open access property if there is 
no possibility of excluding entrepreneurs attracted by excess profits. If there is 
unrestricted access to the resource system, for example a stock of living fish, 
by all who care to use it, not any fisherman can be sure of who will benefit 
from the value of uncaught fish. Thus, fishermen have no incentive what-
soever to take the price of fish in the sea into account when they make decisi-
ons about their individual harvesting levels. In an open access situation, not 
any individual fisherman has an economic incentive to husband the resource, 
and not any can efficiently conserve the resource by refraining from harves-
ting. Doing so will only enhance the harvesting opportunities for his competi-
tors, which is the tragedy of open access harvesting. One might say that the 
individual cares not at all about escaped fish as someone else is likely to reap 
the benefit from it, and discounts future harvests at an infinite rate (Neher, 
1990). New fishermen will be attracted to the fishery, or existing fishermen 
will expand their efforts as long as fishermen earn more than the opportunity 
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cost of their effort CE. In the so-called bionomic equilibrium, all rent has 
dissipated, and total costs equal total revenues (instead of marginal costs equal 
to marginal benefits). 1 5 The situation where marginal costs exceed marginal 
benefits is usually referred to as economic overfishing}6 
Gordon (1954), who was the first to explain why established fisheries 
were often characterized by a lot of old vessels making few or no profits, 
developed a simple static model of rent dissipation based on zero discounting, 
constant prices and the Schaefer yield-effort function. His model is illustrated 
in Figure 2 .3 . Rent dissipation occurs at an effort level of Then, U(X,E) 
- (pqX - QE = 0, hence X, = C/pq. Clearly, this is excessive when 
compared to two benchmark situations: X M S Y (or EMSY) and efficient harvesting 
where marginal benefits equal marginal costs (£")• Note that the position of E" 
to the left of £ M S Y depends on the implicit assumption of zero discounting. As 
the discount rate increases, E* moves to the right and eventually approaches 
E{ as r goes to infinity. 1 7 As the effort is socially excessive, the stock is 
smaller than socially optimal. Effort levels beyond £ M S Y are usually called 
biological overfishing. 
Depending on the growth function of the stock (i.e., with or without 
critical depensation) and the specification of the production function, the stock 
may be driven to extinction under open access. With critical depensation, 
1 5 Note that fixed costs of fishing are ignored in this line of reasoning. Fixed costs will affect 
both entry in and exit from the fishery. A consequence of considering fixed (sunk) costs is a 
"gap" between entry and exit, as fishermen will only enter when both variable and fixed costs can 
be paid, but will not leave the fishery before revenues fall short to cover just variable costs. 
l 6 In a recent article, Feeney et al. (1996) question the main underlying assumptions of the 
famous "tragedy of the commons" model (assumptions with respect to individual motivations and 
characteristics, the nature of institutional arrangements, interactions among users and their ability 
to create new arrangements, and the behaviour of regulatory authorities), and have found 
sufficient anecdotal evidence to refute theoretical predictions of an "automatically" dissipating 
rent. 
1 7 Note that CE is an expression of the opportunity cost of effort devoted to the fishery. 
Opportunity costs are the incomes that could be earned in another fishery (for instance salmon 
instead of halibut) or in a totally new occupation. As alternative employment opportunities in 
remote coastal areas may be few, these opportunity costs may be low. Clark (1990) reports that 
there is some evidence to support the prediction that especially the fishermen with lowest 
opportunity costs remain active in open access fisheries. 
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extinction may occur for positive stock levels as long as X, < X M V P . In the 
Schaefer model with y = qEX, the catch per unit of effort y/E goes to zero as 
X approaches zero. With constant prices, rent dissipation will therefore occur 
before the stock is totally depleted. 
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Fig. 2.3: Rent dissipation (E,) and optimal effort (E*) in a static model 
With aid of a simple model the dynamics of open access can be 
demonstrated. Under the assumption that new entrants in the fishery are 
attracted with a time lag, and the response of effort leaving the fishery is also 
subject to a lag, a simple entry-exit function (while suppressing time notation) 
can be formulated: 
E = v ( P y - C K - a ) (24) 
E 
where v is an industry response parameter that describes the speed with which 
effort responses to profitability in the fishery, and a is a cut-off rate of return 
for the industry, equal to the opportunity cost of capital multiplied by the 
number of vessels (rE) (Hartwick and Olewiler 1986; Conrad 1995). If the 
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stock has a quadratic growth function with parameters a and b, and we use 
the production function of the Schaefer model, then in the steady state the 
following must hold: 
X = aX - bX2 - qEX = 0 ( 2 5 ) 
which implies that either (i) the stock has been depleted (X = 0), or (ii) no 
harvesting takes place (E = 0 and X = alb), or (iii) an interior solution 
exists: X = (a - qE)lb. Since (23) can be rewritten as: 
E = v(pqX - c - r) ( 2 6 ) 
We know that in equilibrium exit and entry must be in balance, hence E = 0 
so (25) can be solved for X: 
X = (27) 
pq. 
Combining the two isoclines in a phase plane yields the steady-state equilibri-
um. (This steady-state equilibrium for the open access fishery is obviously not 
the same as the steady-state equilibrium for the optimally managed fishery as 
derived in 2.2, but the same technique can be applied to study it). Depending 
on the various parameter values and starting condition [E(0), X(Q)], the 
isoclines may intersect in the interior of the phase plane. Even if an interior 
solution exists, there is the possibility that excessive entry and delayed exit 
will deplete the resource before the equilibrium is reached, as is illustrated 
with path 2 in Figure 2.4. 
The dynamics of open access resources have been analyzed by a 
number of researchers. Especially the situation where different countries are 
exploiting the same stock has received attention. For the case of the North 
Pacific fur seal in the late 1800s, exploited by a number of countries during 
the migratory phase in their reproductive cycle, Wilen (1976) calculated 
values for the parameters. He predicted that a positive steady state would be 
reached, and that stock extinction was unlikely to result. The observations on 
effort and stock levels were consistent with the oscillating path of Figure 2.4. 
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2.4: Open access dynamics 
A similar conclusion has been reached by Amundsen et al. (1995) for the case 
of open access minke whale exploitation in the North Atlantic. In contrast, 
Bjorndal and Conrad (1987) found that North sea herring was probably saved 
from extinction when, after decades of de facto open access management, the 
authorities decided to cease harvesting for a couple of years. Their model 
predicted that, without banning, extinction might have occurred in 1983. 1 8 
Under the moratorium, which lasted in some sectors until 1981 and in others 
until 1984, the stock recovered, setting the stage for new periods of harvest-
ing. 
In order to find a steady-state solution, Bjorndal and Conrad worked with a constant price-
cost ratio to describe effort dynamics. 
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2.5 Fisheries 
The issue of property rights as discussed in the previous section 
implied a move to the field of fisheries economics. In this section, some 
specific fishery problems will be touched upon. People are predators of fish, 
and occupy a top niche of a complicated, and for a great deal unknown, 
marine ecosystem. The literature on economics of fisheries, that arose since 
the mid-1950s, aims to provide insights into the optimal utilization of marine 
resources, and explains why actual exploitation may often deviate from 
socially optimal practice. Usually, analyses are simplified by the single 
species assumption, without further notice of underlying characteristics of the 
ecosystem and predator-prey relationships. One of the interesting areas of 
future research is optimal management of ecosystems instead of single fish 
species biomass (for an application, see, for example, Pearce and Moran 
1996). In this chapter, however, I present a fairly standard description of the 
economics of fisheries. 
2.5.1 Schooling and searching fisheries 
Fisheries are commonly divided into "schooling fisheries" and "search-
ing fisheries", the distinguishing feature being whether the species in question 
has the propensity to school in large numbers or not. Neher (1990) mentions 
as possible reasons for schooling, migration courses and defense against 
predators. Well-known examples of schooling species are salmon, herring, 
anchovies and tuna. It has been found that the size of schools does not 
decrease much if the overall biomass of the stock decreases. Of course, this 
implies that there are fewer schools. 
Since large schools of fish are relatively easy to find, it is expected 
that searching (and catching) costs are not greatly influenced by the size of the 
stock in the sea. This implies that for schooling fisheries there is less reason 
for thickening the stock in order to reduce harvesting costs than for searching 
fisheries. This, in turn, means that their optimal stock size (see 3.3) will 
typically be smaller. Moreover, if property rights are not well established or 
enforced, the risk of extinction is higher, as it pays fishermen to keep fishing 
and reduce the stock, even if the stock is near the X M V P level. 
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The difference between schooling and searching fisheries is formally as 
follows. For searching fisheries, harvesting y(t) is a function of effort devoted 
to the catch (£) and the size of the stock (X), hence y(E,X), with dy/dE > 0 
and dy/dX > 0. For schooling fisheries the latter term is of less importance, 
and therefore often ignored in mathematical analyses: y(E). 
2.5.2 Fisheries regulation 
As described in the previous section, property rights were not well 
defined in marine fisheries for a long time, which resulted in excessive 
harvesting. (For many years, coastal nations only controlled fisheries within a 
small zone ranging from an outer limit of 3 to 12 miles from the shore). 
Widespread depletion of near-shore and pelagic fish stocks resulted in discus-
sions about management policies, and after the extension of territorial waters 
to 200 miles, a provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea signed in 1982, there was a call for the government to step in . 1 9 As 
formulated by Anderson (1977), extended jurisdiction is an important first 
step, but it will be meaningless unless proper management is instituted. 
Otherwise the open access nature of the resource would remain, be it at a 
different level; fishermen of one nation would compete for the resource as 
opposed to the previous situation where there was national and international 
competition among fishers. 
According to Hartwick and Olewiler (1986), economic policies to 
regulate fisheries should (1) find methods of rationing the amount of effort in 
the fishery, (2) find methods of regulating the harvest to maintain efficient 
stocks of fish, and (3) recognize that any policy implemented may affect the 
distribution of income through the reduction of effort and generating rents. 
They add that much existing regulation in fisheries is designed to sustain the 
fishery and increase the incomes of fishermen, not to reach a socially optimal 
1 9Fishing jurisdiction for many valuable stocks was not easily assigned to adjacent coastal 
fishing nations. Retrjg (1995) describes the problems associated with transboundary stocks (stocks 
partly outside the exclusive zone in the open seas; stocks straddling the fishing zones of adjacent 
countries; and highly migratory shared stocks), and the management tools that could be imple-
mented to deal with them. 
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equilibrium. 2 0 Despite this, the literature on fisheries regulation mostly 
focuses on reaching optimal harvest and effort levels, and the optimal steady-
state stock of a particular fishery (but see chapter 8). A number of methods to 
achieve this will be reviewed briefly in this section. Common assumptions are 
that the growth function of the fish stock is known, and that the behaviour of 
fishermen in the sector can be predicted and controlled. Both assumptions are 
often violated in practice. If policies tend to overlook the economic forces 
behind overexploitation, this leads to regulation measures which may tempor-
arily reduce the level of overharvesting but which still include the market 
signals that cause overexploitation. This may result in serious enforcement 
problems and high costs. Enforcement costs are often ignored in economic 
analyses. 2 1 
Most of public regulation alternatives can be classified as follows 
(Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen 1995; Hartwick and Olewiler 1986; Conrad 
1995): 
1. Closed seasons limit harvesting during crucial periods when the fish 
population is reproducing. 
2. Gear restrictions limit the use of 'too effective' catching devices or try 
to preserve the habitat of the harvested population. 
3 . By limited entry the authorities restrict the number of fishing vessels. 
The authorities may first require a vessel to have a license to operate 
and then proceed with limiting the number of licenses. 
4 . Aggregate catch quotas try to shorten the fishing period. The author-
ities may have a monitoring system for ceasing fishing when the 
cumulative harvest level equals the aggregate quota. 
5. Taxes can be imposed on the catch or on some harvesting input. 
6. Individual transferable quotas (ITQ) limit the level of harvest for each 
individual fisherman per fishing period. 
Anderson (1989) argues that for most commercially interesting fisheries in the world, 
economic and biological data that should support optimal harvesting paths are not even available. 
Pearse (1980) writes that perhaps the best that can be achieved by regulation is to allow a safe 
catch to be obtained as efficiently as possible. 
2 I Exceptions are, for instance, Graves et al. (1994); Salvanes and Squires (1995); and 
especially Sutinen and Anderson (1985). 
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7. Establishing ownership by forming cooperatives strengthen social 
pressure, and may rule out "rape, ruin and run" behaviour that way. 
The aim of closed seasons and gear restrictions is to reduce the 
effectiveness of harvesting or increase the real cost of fishing. Conrad and 
Clark (1987) refer to these policies as the economic perversity of purely 
biological conservation. The effects are easily demonstrated with Figure 2 .5 . 
If 73?, indicates the total revenue curve for the fishery, then under conditions 
of open access, the bionomic equilibrium is at Ex. If the regulator wants to 
control effort, and bring it back to, say, the E2 level (which is optimal in the 
context of a static model as it equates current marginal benefits and costs of 
harvesting), then one possible way to do this is to rotate the total cost curve 
TC{ upwards to TC2. Imposing inefficient harvesting techniques 2 2 and closing 
the fishery for long times such that the vessels remain idle will increase the 
costs of fishing. While these policies may meet the goal of stock conservation 
(X = X" in the new equilibrium), they will still cause economic inefficiency 
and wasting of resources, i.e., excessive working hours for fishermen and 
large expenditures on capital and fishing equipment to achieve the desired 
level of harvest. Economic efficiency requires that the level of annual harvest 
reflects the true value of the fish in the sea and that harvest takes place at the 
lowest possible cost. By increasing the cost of harvesting, the regulation 
policy reduces the income level of fishermen as the rent is still zero. 2 3 
Closed seasons may have an additional effect, which is also likely to 
occur when the policy is simply aimed at limiting the number of vessels in a 
particular fishing area: it will easily lead to a phenomenon called 'capital stuf-
fing'. When the ships lie idle in the harbour, the harvesting capacity of 
existing vessels in the longer run is increased by investing in more powerful 
engines, larger nets or by adding more or better electronic devices to find the 
schools of fish more efficiently. This has two effects. First, the danger of 
For instance, until the 1950s the Alaskan government barred certain fishers from using 
engines to propel their boats, such that they had to use sailboats (Tietenberg 1994). 
23 
Conrad (1995) remarks that gear restrictions such as minimum mesh size may also have an 
ecological basis, as it is hoped that young fish will escape the harvest and provide the necessary 
growth and recruitment to the fishery in later periods. 
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overharvesting may still exist as there are no binding constraints on total 
catch. Harvest capacity may increase and more fish are caught in a given 
period. 2 4 This is what Anderson (1995) refers to when he argues that input 
restrictions tend to be "rubber yardsticks". Second, scarce resources are 
wasted as capacity becomes excessive or operational decisions of participants 
in the fishery are distorted. The reason why excessive investments in harves-
ting capacity are likely to be undertaken is that fishermen still have strong 
incentives to start harvesting at full capacity, because being too slow at the 
beginning of the season may imply that their annual share in the total quota 
will be small. 
The fundamental problem of open access fishery is that fishermen have 
no incentive to take into account the value of fish left in the sea or the shadow 
price of the resource. Conrad and Clark (1987) demonstrate that a manage-
ment agency can force fishermen to recognize this cost by imposing the 
shadow price as a tax on harvests. This tax reduces the revenue to the fishery 
for each unit of effort employed. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5 by the new 
revenue parabola TR2 [TR2 = (P - t)y, where t is the per unit tax]. Fishermen 
now set TR2 = TCU yielding the desired amount of effort E". 
While the resulting outcome is theoretically efficient (in the context of 
a static model) and does not involve tedious monitoring of fishing effort, 
some problems are associated with the taxation approach. First and most 
importantly, as made clear by Munro and Scott (1985), this regulation 
measure may politically be unfeasible. The tax transfers all of the economic 
rent from the fishing industry to the government, and fishermen will use all 
their political power to prevent this kind of policy from being implemented. 
Second, the management agency may have great difficulties in computing the 
varying shadow price, which depends on factors as demand for fish and 
biological processes. Also, enforcement of a tax on harvest is hard, and 
collection may be difficult (Hartwick and Olewiler 1986). Rettig (1995) writes 
that taxes are often inflexible, which may be hard to reconcile with fluctuating 
stocks of fish. 
Anderson (1995) describes this as a game between the manager and the fishing industry, 
where the industry always has the last move. 
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Fig. 2.5: Instruments for fishery policies 
An alternative to a tax on harvests would be a tax on effort. Effort is 
often measured as the number of vessel days devoted to fishing during a 
particular year (Conrad and Clark 1987). The effect of such a policy would 
be very similar to the situation of increasing harvesting costs by imposing 
inefficient regulations. The difference is that resources are not wasted in an 
inefficient harvesting process, but collected by the government instead. At 
least two different taxation schemes are possible. First, a head tax can be 
imposed, levied on every fisherman in the sector. An example is a simple 
license f e e / . This shifts the total cost curve up (TC2 = CE + f).15 Second, a 
unit tax on effort t can be imposed: TC2 = (C + t)E, which rotates the total 
cost curve upwards. In principle, both taxes could lead to optimal harvest 
levels. 
Note that, if the tax is not to be paid in every period, it will be a sunk-cost for the fishery, 
which does not influence the marginal amount of fishing effort. 
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Apart from the difficulties associated with taxing described in the 
previous paragraph, in reality it is difficult to define what "effort" is in this 
respect, as fishermen have the incentive to simply substitute types of effort 
that are not taxed for types that are taxed. Empirical studies of substitution 
possibilities between restricted and unrestricted inputs in fisheries, such as 
Squires (1987), Campbell (1991) and Dupont (1991), indicated that fishing 
harvest technology is typically not the fixed-proportions type, as usually 
assumed for convenience in the literature. 2 6 
Another means of regulating a fishery is implementing a quota scheme. 
The authority simply limits the quantity of fish that can be harvested in a 
given period of t ime. 2 7 The moratorium on harvesting herring as mentioned 
in section 2.4 is an extreme example of such a quota. The Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) of the European Union is also based on a quota system. Typi-
cally, first the total allowable catch (TAC) is determined, which is based on 
biological, economic and often political considerations. Next, this TAC is 
distributed over the member states, which use it as a basis for their national 
policies. National quotas may be distributed amongst the fishermen (as in the 
Netherlands), or the fishery can simply be opened up, and be open until the 
national quota is reached. 
While a quota system may result in optimal harvesting levels (provided 
that the authorities have access to all relevant data, and that monitoring and 
enforcement of the policy is not too costly), a quota system will not always 
result in efficient allocation of effort. If the fishery is opened up as long as 
the TACs are not reached, it is possible to end up in a situation where fewer 
fish are caught with more effort, as firms will rush to capture as much as 
possible of the quota before others get the fish first. This may again result in 
the paradoxical 'capital stuffing' situation, where fishermen invest in more 
powerful engines and increase their harvesting capacity, for an ever-shorter 
2 6 N o t e that similarly, when output is taxed, fishermen have the option to substitute taxed 
species for untaxed species in a multi-species fishery. 
2 7 I t is also possible to implement quota on effort. Apart from the question what factor inputs 
need to be restricted, which is very similar to the question of what inputs should be taxed, the 
problems are the same as those to be discussed for harvest quota. 
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fishing season. Next, investments in extra capacity are necessary in processing 
and retailing sectors to handle the large irregular quantities of fish that are 
dumped on the market for an ever shorter time interval. 2 8 Rents are likely to 
dissipate, and the situation is very much like the open access fishery, with the 
main difference that fish stocks are potentially protected from over-exploi-
tation by the quota. 
The open access problems can be overcome if property rights are 
allocated at firm or fisherman level. If fishermen have the rights to harvest a 
certain quantity in a specified time interval, they will decide to use their effort 
such that, for instance, harvesting costs are minimized if discounted prices are 
constant, or that supply is concentrated in periods of high demand and high 
prices. Economic efficiency at the firm level is obtained, but from society's 
point of view it is still possible to improve the allocation of effort as it is not 
clear that the most efficient (low-cost) fishermen are doing the harvesting. It 
is possible to concentrate the quota with low-cost firms by cumbersome 
administrative procedures, by auctioning them off, or by allowing trading of 
the quota. 
As mentioned above, a quota establishes a property right, and as such 
it has a value. The price of the quota is the value of the in situ resource, 
which is simply the market price minus the marginal harvesting cost. 2 9 Firms 
with low costs could bid more for a quota at an auction, and thereby acquire 
them. Likewise, if quotas are tradeable, low-cost firms will buy them from 
high-cost firms, thereby making everybody better off. In equilibrium, the 
price of transferable quotas is equal to the rent of the resource (Clark 1980; 
2 8 Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1995) describe the wasteful harvesting of salmon in Sweden. 
Salmon was abundantly available in a short time for low prices, but at Christmas, when prices are 
high, it had to imported. 
2 9Enforcement of quota rights is a necessary condition for quota prices to reflect scarcity 
rent. For example, ITQs for flatfish species were introduced in the Netherlands in the early 
eighties, and prices of these quotas rose sharply in the later 1980s after the government had made 
it clear that enforcement would be taken more seriously. Without monitoring and enforcement, de 
jure property rights are of little value. 
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Anderson 1995), 3 0 and the impacts of the quota and optimal tax system are 
identical in the sense that socially efficient allocation of effort is the result if 
perfect information about biological and economic conditions is available and 
enforcement causes no problems. 3 1 [For long-run industrial equilibrium in 
such an ITQ fishery, and the effect of changing prices and capital costs on the 
optimal size of the firm, see Hannesson (1996)]. 
However, there is a distributional difference. 3 2 Distribution of quotas 
is in a sense distribution of income, which may result in political complexities 
very similar to the allocation of pollution allowances over and within countries 
in a system with tradeable pollution permits. Both auctioning off the quota 
and the tax approach generate public revenues, and income is transformed 
from the fishery to the government, which may result in considerable resistan-
ce from the sector (Tietenberg 1994). If instead quotas are distributed among 
fishermen on the basis of historical harvesting (a sort of "grandfathering 
approach"), current fishermen receive a kind of gift, at the expense of society 
as a whole. Since the relatively small fishery sector is better organized than 
the amorphous group of tax payers, and has more to lose from an auction 
than any tax payer has to gain, public choices theories predict that the 
interests of the sector prevail. 
If problems with disinvestment exist, for instance because vessels are not easily absorbed 
in (or transferred to) other fisheries, firms compete to gain enough rights to continue operating 
and make at least a contribution toward covering their fixed costs. Hence, fishermen look at their 
average variable cost rather than average total cost, and prices for individual transferable quotas 
will be higher (Anderson 1995). 
3'Enforcement costs depend on social norms (which determine the degree of self-enforce-
ment) and observability of behaviour. Salvanes and Squires (1985) argue that, even for a 
decentralized regulation scheme based on transferable quotas, information on the underlying 
technology of the fishing vessels may be necessary because of interrelated production processes 
(i.e., multiple species harvesting) and to reduce incentives for underreporting of the actual catch 
and discarding of less valuable species. They propose constructing a typical firm for monitoring 
and enforcement. 
32 
Besides the interpretation in the text, there is also considerable attention in the literature on 
the effect of transferability on industry structure. More specifically, the fear has been expressed 
that eventually the rights end up in the hands of a few large firms (OECD 1993). A recent 
analysis of the effect of transferable catch quotas on the structure of the Dutch fleet, however, 
provided not much support for this hypothesis (Davidse 1995). 
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Wilson (1982) is critical about the implications of conventional fishery 
economics for policy makers. He points to the lack of attention for transaction 
and informational costs, and the simplified and unrealistic assumptions with 
respect to fisherman behaviour [an issue elaborated upon by Feeney et al. 
(1995)] and fish biology. Wilson concludes that the social costs of unregulated 
fishing are typically less than might be expected on the basis of accepted 
theory (for example, fishers switch from one species to another when the 
population gets depleted and harvesting costs increase) and that attempts to 
regulate will usually imply higher costs than anticipated. These two effects 
limit the range of economically feasible management options. 
2.5.3 Interaction among species 
Modelling the dynamics of populations with differential equations (see 
previous sections and, for example, chapter 5) or difference equations (see 
chapter 6) implies a neglect or simplification of the ecological interaction 
among species, as mentioned above. While this may not pose serious prob-
lems when only one species is subject to exploitation, Clark (1990) argues 
that with ever increasing demand on renewable resources, such single species 
models become increasingly inadequate. He divides interactions between 
exploited populations in two broad classes: biological and economic interac-
tions. An example of the latter was the case of harvesting cost of blue whales 
in a multi-species fishery, where the stock size of one species affects the 
marginal harvesting cost of another species [see section 2 .3; Anderson (1977) 
refers to this as an example of a technical interdependent] Biological 
dependencies concern the competitive, commensal and predator-prey relations 
that species have with other species. Considering interactions among species 
in economic models implies working with multiple-state variables. Analytical 
results tend to get fewer because of the associated mathematical complexities 
involved, and often we need to rely on numerical solutions for approach 
dynamics. 
Most multi-species models that have been developed in recent years 
are partial models, in the sense that many important relationships and interac-
tions are ignored. This may be due to incomplete knowledge of (marine) 
ecosystems. Clark (1990), for example, writes that no marine ecosystem has 
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probably been studied in sufficient depth to warrant the use of sophisticated 
multi-species models. 
An important feature of (partial) multi-species models is whether 
selective harvesting is possible or not. When multiple species are captured 
with the same gear, differentiation may not be possible. In those cases, 
however, in which ecologically interacting species can be harvested selecti-
vely, the standard theory developed in this chapter seems adequate, although 
it should be slightly modified to allow for these interactions. For example, 
Hartwick and Olewiler (1986) analyze the case of a simple predator-prey 
model with sharks and tuna. Not surprisingly, they conclude that it is socially 
desirable to subsidize shark harvesting such that the steady-state population of 
tuna rises and more tuna is available for human consumption. Similarly, 
Flaaten and Kolsvik (1996) examine a predator-prey relation where both 
predator and prey are commercially interesting species (here the predator is 
cod). In the context of a multiple cohort model with the opportunity cost of 
predation in the objective functional, they conclude that the optimal age of 
starting harvesting is significantly reduced: Harvesting cod yields not only a 
commercially valuable product, it is also a kind of investing in the stock of 
the prey species (in this case: shrimp, herring, capelin and little cod). Unlike 
the conclusion reached by Hartwick and Olewiler, there is no need for subsi-
dies to induce extra cod harvesting. In fact, they conclude that the optimal age 
in the Northeast Arctic is still high compared with the actual age of harvest-
ing. 
More recently, Flaaten and Stollery (1996) have examined the econ-
omic cost of predation of Minke whales on economically valuable species 
such as herring and capelin. Because modelling the interactions among prey 
species (i.e., modelling a more complete multi-species model for the ecologi-
cal system) proved to be very difficult (see Clark's remark above) their model 
neglects these effects. It is shown that the cost of predation depends on the 
management regime that the prey species is subjected to (for example, think 
of constant effort as opposed to constant catch policies), which is to be 
expected. In an empirical section it is shown that the economic cost of whale 
conservation, in terms of fishery benefits foregone, may be considerable. This 
is elaborated upon in chapter 6. 
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The case where selective harvesting is not feasible proves to be more 
difficult. Consider the case of combined harvesting of two ecologically 
independent populations x and z with differential productivity. If E represents 
effort devoted to joint harvesting, then x = rx(l-xlK)-qxEx and t = yz(l-
z/M)-q2Ez, where r and 7 denote intrinsic growth rates and qit / = 1 , 2 , is the 
(possibly) different catchability coefficient for the two species. Clark (1990) 
demonstrates that when such species are harvested jointly, the less productive 
population may be driven to extinction, whereas the other species continues to 
support the fishery. The ratios rlqx and y/q2 are referred to as biotechnical 
productivity. As a general rule, populations with a relatively low biotechnical 
productivity (i.e., species with low growth rates and/or high catchability 
coefficients) are subject to extinction under joint harvesting conditions, 
provided that the cost-price ratio of the other species is sufficiently low to 
ensure sustained profitability of effort devoted to the harvesting process. 
Extinction may occur under conditions of open access, but it may also be 
optimal (even with zero discounting) for a profit maximizing regulatory 
agency. 
Finally, Anderson (1995) mentions another aspect of catching several 
types of fish simultaneously. Under a quota system this may cause problems 
as it may result in discarding fish for which no quota rights are held. Ander-
son describes a number of ways to address this issue, such as retroactive 
trading (i.e., buying and selling quotas after the harvesting has occurred) and 
allowing fishermen to exceed current quotas with any overages today deduced 
from next period's allowable catch. 
2 .5 .4 Uncertainty in fisheries 
In addition to the types of uncertainty addressed in section 1.2, fishe-
ries management involves uncertainty in the reproductivity of the stock. 
Pindyck (1984) argues that the natural rate of growth of the stock is stochastic 
for virtually all resources. In a model with well-defined property rights and 
endogenous prices, he has demonstrated the role of uncertain asset growth. 
The standard equation of motion (equation 4 in section 2 .1) is replaced with: 
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dX = (G(X) - y)dt + a(X)dw (28) 
with a'iX) > 0, a(0) = 0 and rfw = e(f)(d/) a s. Here e(f) is a serially 
uncorrelated and normally distributed with unit variance, implying that w(f) is 
a Wiener process. The current stock X in this model is known, but the instan-
taneous change in the stock is partly random. Pindyck's objective function is 
as follows: 
MAXyf(P - C(X))ye~rtdt <29> 
o 
Straightforward solving of this problem with the deterministic equation of 
motion [equation (4)], gives the following expression for the optimum stock: 
- GXX) - = r (30) 
P - C 
Pindyck solves the model with the partly random equation of motion while 
using stochastic dynamic programming, and obtains the following solution for 
the stochastic model: 
+ G'(X) - = r + a\X)a(X)A(X) (3D 
where A(X) is thought of as an index of absolute risk aversion. The interpreta-
tion of (30) is that the market interest rate is augmented by a risk premium, 
equal to the increase in stock growth variance attributable to the marginal in 
situ unit times the index of risk aversion (Pindyck 1984). Fluctuations reduce 
the value of the stock, and because their variance is an increasing function of 
the stock level, there is an incentive to reduce the stock. From (30) it is 
evident that the expected capital gain required to hold one unit of the resource 
in situ is higher, and ceteris paribus, the rate of extraction is higher and less 
of the stock will be held in situ. 
Pindyck has demonstrated that rent and extraction rate are affected by 
random growth in two other ways as well. First, since G(X) is concave, 
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stochastic fluctuations in the stock level reduce the expected rate of growth, 
which is an implication of Jensen's inequality. This results in increased scarc-
ity, and reduced extraction. Second, since the cost function C(X) is typically 
convex, fluctuations in the stock level increase expected extraction cost over 
time, again an implication of Jensen's inequality. 3 3 This effect reduces rent 
and increases the rate of extraction. Pindyck then concludes that, given a 
particular current stock level X, the net effect of uncertainty on the current 
rate of extraction is ambiguous. 
More ambiguity arises if, in addition to stochastic growth of the 
resource, a stochastic stock of pollutants is modelled. Olsen and Shortle 
(1996) have elaborated upon the Pindyck paper by introducing a stochastic 
equation of motion for a stock of pollutants (s) adversely affecting growth and 
(perceived) quality of fish: 3 4 
ds = (z - bs)dt + ox(s)dw (32) 
dx = (G(x,s) - y)dt + a2(x,s)dw2 (33) 
where z(?) is the emissions rate of the pollutant, 6 is the expected rate of 
decay, and a^dw describes random disturbances in the level of the pollutant. 
It is assumed that the variability of the disturbance increases or is independent 
of the stock of pollutants. It is also assumed that the variability of the growth 
rate increases with the stock of pollutants. Olsen and Shortle find that the new 
source of uncertainty adds a term to the RHS of the equation for the optimal 
stock of fish, analogous to Pindyck's risk premium. Unlike Pindyck's "risk 
premium", however, the sign of this extra term is ambiguous. It depends on 
the correlation coefficient between both stochastic processes and the change in 
the value of the fishery due to a change in s. This implies that the required 
rate of return of the resource in situ is increased or decreased, hence that 
Note the similarity between these arguments and Pindyck's (1980) stochastic exploration 
model, discussed in chapter 1. 
^Their model is partly based on a deterministic model by Tahvonen (1991). 
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optimum population size can go up or down. Due to Jensen's inequality there 
are two more effects of a randomly fluctuating stock of pollutants. First, since 
the growth function of the fish stock is assumed concave in x and s, the 
expected growth rate is reduced. This implies that optimal harvesting is 
reduced. Second, with consumption benefits concave in the pollution level, the 
expected benefits of future consumption are reduced, which tends to enhance 
current harvesting. As in Pindyck's case, the net effect is ambiguous. 3 5 
2.6 Forestry issues 
Traditionally, an important issue in the economics of forestry is 
calculation of the optimum rotation of a stand of single-aged trees. Since this 
topic is not easily discussed within the context of the preceding sections, I 
will review briefly some major insights that have developed in this field of 
research in this section. Tropical deforestation is dealt with in a subsection. 
2.6.1 Optimum rotations 
For the sake of simplicity it is often assumed that growth of individual 
trees and forest stands can be accurately described by a logistic growth 
function. The development of volume and wood quality over time is much 
more subject to management (silviculture) than fisheries. Define V(T) as the 
function that describes volume over time. For a long time, maximizing 
sustained yield (or mean annual increment, MAI) was the focus of foresters. 
This amounts to simply maximizing V(T)/T with respect to T, which readily 
solves for V = V(T)/T. This solution disregards prices, costs and discounting, 
and is therefore generally rejected by economists. For economists, the 
traditional forestry problem ("when to cut a tree?") is formally specified as 
follows: 3 6 
For information on the optima) emissions rate under uncertainty, the reader is referred to 
Olsen and Shortle (1996). 
3 6 Note that l/(l-e" r T) is a convenient way to write l+e" r T +(e"' T ) 2 +. . . 
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PV(T)e~' 
1 - e 
~rT - c MaXj. (34) 
where P is the (fixed) stumpage price per unit of wood, C are (fixed) regener-
ation costs and T is the optimum rotation cycle that is to be found. Hence, we 
begin with bare land and try to find the rotation length that maximizes the 
present value of revenues from current and future harvesting cycles (it is 
implicitly assumed that forestry is the optimal land use, but the model can 
easily be extended to allow for exogenous land rents or incorporation of 
alternative forms of land use). With P, 7(7), C and r constant, it is easy to 
see that T is the same for all future harvest cycles. 3 7 The first order condi-
tion for this problem is: 
The interpretation of this condition (the so-called Faustmann solution) is 
straightforward. The optimum harvest cycle is characterized by the require-
ment that marginal benefits of postponing harvesting one more period (more 
wood to sell at price P) are equal to the marginal cost of delaying the harvest. 
The opportunity cost involves two components: first, delaying current harves-
ting implies that potential interest income is foregone, and second, there are 
costs of delaying harvesting of all future rotations (delaying harvesting 
necessarily implies that re-planting starts later too). The term rW(where Wis 
the maximum present value of the stand when the land is to stay in forestry in 
perpetuity) is also called the implicit rental cost of the land. When land is in 
unlimited supply (Hartwick and Olewiler 1986), or if C is high relative to P 
(Bowes and Krutilla 1985), the land rent approaches zero. However, in 
general solving for a single rotation without consideration of the opportunity 
cost of land results in incorrect solutions (see Samuelson 1996 for a lucid 
discussion). 
McConnell et al. (1983) have expanded the Faustmann model by allowing for non-constant 
prices and costs, such that site rent changes over time. They find that with constant discounted 
price and increasing (decreasing) discounted costs over time, the rotation length increases 
(decreases). 
PV(T) = rPV(T) + rW (35) 
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Bowes and Krutilla (1985) demonstrate comparative statics of the 
Faustmann solution by rewriting (34) as PV(T)/(PV(T)-Q = r/(l-e" r 7), where 
the LHS is interpreted as the relative growth rate in net harvest revenues. The 
LHS and RHS of this expression can be plotted in a graph as in Figure 2.6. 
RHS 
LHS 
1 
"~~ l - e r T 
— P V 
PV-C 
0 T 
Fig. 2.6: The Faustmann age graphically derived 
Obviously, the Faustmann age occurs at the intersection of the two curves. 
Now, (i) a higher price shifts the LHS-curve downward such that the intersec-
tion occurs at a younger age, (ii) a higher cost shifts the same curve upward, 
such that rotation age is increased, and (iii) a higher r shifts the RHS curve 
results in an upward change of the RHS curve, such that optimum rotation 
length is reduced. The intuition behind these results can easily be understood 
with equation (34). Although the process of discounting usually implies that 
economic rotations are shorter than the rotation length that maximizes sustai-
ned yield, Binkley (1987) has demonstrated that this is not a general result. 
As argued above, high clearing or regeneration costs tend to postpone harvest-
ing, so that they are incurred at a later date, not only for the current rotation, 
but for all rotations that follow. Specifically, Binkley (1987) has shown that 
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the economic rotation is greater than the MSY rotation when the discount rate 
is less than the inverse of the MSY rotation. 
The Faustmann solution does not take non-market benefits into 
account. This implies that the optimum rotation age as prescribed by the 
model may be sub-optimal for management of, for example, public-owned 
forests. Hartman (1976) has generalized the Faustmann model by adding a 
flow of non-timber benefits, related to the age of the standing stock. These 
benefits could include recreation benefits or nature conservation. If these 
benefits at age n are called B(n), then 0 f TB(n)e~rndn represents the present 
value of these flow benefits for a rotation length T. The problem reduces to: 
T 
PV(T)e-rT + [B(n)e-rndn - C ( 3 g ) 
MAXT 5 
T 1 - e'rT 
The first order condition of this problem is called the Hartman rotation age: 
PV(T) + B(X) = rPV(T) + rW ( 3 7 ) 
The optimum rotation is where marginal benefits of delaying harvesting 
[which now include B(T), the flow of amenity benefits during delay] are equal 
to the marginal costs of delay. The land rent reflects the value of land for 
timber production and flow services. 
Note that the effect of non-market benefits on rotation length is 
ambiguous. At one extreme, with B(ri) very large and increasing with stand 
age, it may be optimal to never harvest the stand. In general, with B(ri) 
increasing in stand age, the Hartman rotation is longer than the Faustmann 
rotation. However, with B(ri) declining in stand age, the Hartman rotation is 
shorter than the Faustmann age [Bowes and Krutilla (1985) mention forage 
production as a possible flow benefit which may decline as the stand matu-
res]. Not surprisingly, flow benefits do not affect optimum rotation length 
when B(ri) is independent of stand age. With B(ri) = B, harvesting and 
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subsequent planting do not affect the flow of services, hence the Faustmann 
and Hartman rotation coincide. 3 8 
Economic literature provides more extensions of the Faustmann model. 
Van Kooten et al. (1995) have done so by incorporating the forest's ability to 
"store" carbon dioxide, and as such mitigate the greenhouse effect. They 
assume that carbon uptake is proportional to the growth of a forest, which 
implies that growth of the forest is valued, i.e., changes in the stock, instead 
of the stock itself. They conclude that incorporation of this externality in 
general results in slightly longer rotations. Reed (1984) modified the 
Faustmann model by including an age independent probability of forest fires 
that would destroy the stand. Consistent with intuition, such a risk would add 
a risk premium to the discount rate, which reduces the length of the optimum 
rotation. 
As mentioned above, McConnell et al. (1983) have relaxed the 
restrictive assumption of constant prices in Faustmann models. They argued 
that historic prices are subject to a rising trend, which is likely to continue in 
the future. Apart from the question whether prices follow a (long-run) trend, 
there is abundant evidence that short-run stumpage prices follow a stochastic 
process, be it "efficient" (i.e., Washburn and Binkley 1990) or not 
(Hultkrantz 1995). Assuming the latter, Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988) 
demonstrate that the present value of expected returns are increased signifi-
cantly when, instead of working with expected prices according to the 
Faustmann tradition, the landowner applies the so-called reservation price 
approach based on asset sale models or search models. This implies solving a 
dynamic programming problem for (age-dependent) reservation prices. 
Reservation prices are based on the expected return that can be earned by 
delaying harvesting. This approach is applied in chapter 11 of this thesis. 
An interesting feature of the model with flow-benefits is that the age of the stand matters 
when we do not start out with bare land. In the Faustmann model, immediate harvesting is 
prescribed when the current stand age is older than the Faustmann age. However, in the Hartman 
model it may be optimal to delay harvest further or never harvest at all (Bowes and Krutilla 
1985). The intuition is similar to the one provided by Cropper (1988) with respect to optimal 
extinction and inherited stock size (see 2.6): When the inherited stand is young, discounting may 
prevent us from waiting for high amenity values from old growth forests. However, when by 
chance an old-growth stand is inherited, the current high benefits of the amenity flow may justify 
further conservation. 
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2.6.2 Tropical deforestation 3 9 
Tropical deforestation is a subject that has received ample scientific 
and popular attention in recent years. 4 0 Tropical forests serve a variety of 
functions, among which conservation of biodiversity, local and global regula-
tory functions and provision of useful forest products. Many of these benefits 
accrue to people in other countries. This gives rise to the usual problems of 
taxing and subsidizing externalities. Theoretically, three different levels of 
efficient harvesting of tropical forests can be distinguished, with decreasing 
exploitation intensity: (i) efficient harvesting at private (logging) firm level, 
where discounted (expected) profits are maximized, (ii) efficient harvesting at 
national level, where regional and national externalities as watershed protec-
tion and protection against soil erosion and nutrient loss are incorporated into 
decision making, and finally (iii) global efficient harvesting where global 
externalities such as biodiversity protection and global regulatory functions 
(for example, the forest as store of carbon dioxide) enter the analysis. The 
Western world should aim to persuade developing countries to adopt the latter 
option, but some evidence exists that current deforestation proceeds at a pace 
faster than the private optimum (Barbier et al. 1994). 4 1 An often-mentioned 
reason may be perverse government policies (e.g., distortive taxation, 
uncertain tenure rights, short concession contracts, industry protection but 
This section is based on: Bulte E.H. en D.P van Soest (1996), "Ontbossing en de Handel 
in Tropisch Hardhout", Economisch Statistische Berichten 80, nr. 4034, p. 1044-1047. 
^ o r a critical review of some empirical studies in this field, see Kummer and Sham (1995). 
A major concern is that in many cross-sectional studies (percentage) forest cover serves as a 
proxy for deforestation, because time-series data on specific countries are often lacking. If 
anything, forest cover represents cumulative deforestation, rather than recent or current deforest-
ation. This implies that conclusions about deforestation may be invalid when either the initial 
forest stock or the period during which past deforestation has occurred differs between different 
countries in the sample. 
4 I I t should be recognized that few studies have been directed at establishing socially 
optimum deforestation rates and steady states of forest cover, which basically implies that the 
benchmark against which current deforestation has to be measured is often lacking. A notable 
exception is a study by Ehui and Hertel (1989) for Ivory Coast. 
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also pricing and exchange rate policies). For an overview, see Repetto and 
Gillis (1988). 4 2 
According to the FAO (1993), tropical deforestation advanced during 
the 1980s at a pace of 15 million hectares annually. This would imply that 
each year approximately 1.5% of the total stock of tropical forest was remo-
ved. For many, this is a cause of great concern. Conventional wisdom is that 
there is a strong relation between tropical deforestation and the trade in 
timber. Closer examination of the data, however, suggests that this relation is 
in fact weak and mostly indirect. Empirical research into the timber trade and 
deforestation (for instance, reported in Barbier et al. 1994) does not provide a 
strong or even significant connection. The reason is that commercial logging 
is not the primary cause of deforestation, as often suggested. According to 
Amelung and Diehl (1992) at least 85% of deforestation is due to advancing 
agricultural conversion, and at most 10% due to logging. Logging may 
(severely) damage forest areas, but mostly the forest is able to regenerate 
itself such that at least a tree cover is maintained. 
About 80% of the logged wood is for domestic consumption in the 
form of fuelwood. Barbier et al. (1994) estimate that 17% of the volume of 
wood is for industrial purposes. Only a third of this industrial wood is export-
ed. Hence, less than 6% of the wood produced is traded internationally and 
less than 1% of tropical deforestation can be directly linked to the timber 
trade (0.1 * 0.17 * 0.3 = ± 0.005). This suggests that trade restrictions may 
not be effective instruments to combat deforestation, in spite of recent interna-
tional agreements (see e.g. ITTO 1992). Instead, many researchers (e.g. 
Jepma 1995; Myers 1994) have indicated that tropical forest conservation can 
only be achieved by reducing population growth (but see Kummer and Sham 
1994) and illiteracy, investments in productivity growth of agriculture, labour-
Deacon (1994) empirically analyzed the relationships between deforestation and population 
pressure, income growth and insecure tenure rights, with special attention to the latter possible 
explanation. He has found some support for the hypothesis that (lagged) population growth 
contributes to deforestation and (very) little evidence for the hypothesized role of tenure security. 
Since there exists a strong theoretical support for the claim that tenure insecurity should imply a 
(higher) risk premium which tends to accelerate harvesting, this is an interesting field of future 
research (see also Dasgupta and Heal 1974; and Long 1975). For an overview of empirical work 
in this field, see Brown and Pearce 1994). 
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intensive industrialization, land reform and establishing or enforcing secure 
tenure rights. In the words of Myers (1994): "The source problem is an 
amalgam of non-forestry problems, ... hence the overall problem [of deforest-
ation] must be tackled largely through non-forestry measures". 
Even though the direct link between deforestation and commercial 
logging is weak, there are clear indications that a more indirect relation 
exists. To transport the logged wood from isolated forest areas to ports or 
markets, commercial foresters have to construct a road network. It has been 
observed that this road network facilitates advancement of slash-and-burn 
farmers. Hence, agricultural conversion proceeds more rapid in secondary, or 
over-logged forests, as compared to pristine, undisturbed primary forests (see 
chapter 3). This suggests that commercial logging acts as a catalyst or pace-
maker for the deforestation process by providing the necessary infrastruc-
ture . 4 3 In chapter 3, I will explore this typical aspect of deforestation (pri-
mary forests are turned into secondary forests by logging and are next subject 
to encroachment) in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TROPICAL DEFORESTATION, HIGH DISCOUNT RATES AND 
SLASH-AND-BURN AGRICULTURE1 
Abstract 
In this chapter the validity of two widely held presumptions is examined using 
a two-state variable model, that distinguishes between primary and secondary 
forests. First, the supposedly adverse impact of shifting cultivation for 
conservation of tropical forests is addressed. With a two state variable model, 
we demonstrate that (the threat of) encroachment acts as a "natural brake" on 
the pace at which concessionaires open up primary forest areas. Hence, while 
encroachment may inflict severe ecological damage on secondary forest areas, 
it may also promote conservation of virgin forests. Second, conventional 
wisdom implies that high discount rates accelerate depletion of tropical 
forests. We show that this result does not necessarily hold in a two state 
variable model. 
3.1 Introduction 
The rate of deforestation and forest degradation in tropical countries 
caused by human interference has been high and increasing over the past two 
decades. According to FAO (cited in Amelung and Diehl, 1992), deforesta-
tion, defined as the total removal of tree cover, has increased from 0.6% per 
year in the second half of the 1970s to 0.8% in the 1980s. This would 
indicate an increase in the deforestation rate of 30% in a decade. Myers 
(1994) states that the deforestation rate reached 1.8% in 1991, and he also 
'This chapter is based on two published articles: (i) Bulte E. and D. van Soest (1996), 
Tropical Deforestation, Timber Concessions and Slash-and-Burn Agriculture-Why Encroachment 
May Promote Conservation of Primary Forests, Journal of Forest Economics 2 , pp. 55-66, and 
(ii) Bulte E. and D . van Soest (1996), A Note on High Discount Rates and Depletion of Primary 
Forests, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 21 , pp. 341-350. 
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asserts that the deforestation rate in 1994 must be even higher. In economic 
literature, encroachment by shifting cultivators and high discount rates applied 
by commercial logging firms are often noted as important causes of excessive 
deforestation. In this chapter, the validity of these claims is investigated. 
Several types of economic activities are important causes of the 
depletion of forest resources: agriculture (shifting cultivation, permanent 
agriculture, cattle ranching), logging, mining and generation of hydropower. 
Of these causes, the agricultural sector is generally believed to be the single 
most important contributor to tropical deforestation: shifting cultivation alone 
is probably responsible for about 40 to 60% of total deforestation (Lanly 
1982; Briinig 1989). Myers (1994) claims that shifting cultivators were 
responsible for 6 1 % of total deforestation in 1989 and that this share appears 
to be rising over time. The timber industry is responsible for about 10% of 
total deforestation (Lanly 1982; Briinig 1989). As one course of action, many 
authors have concluded that encroachment must be stopped if efforts to 
combat deforestation are to be successful. Myers (1994) elegantly summari-
zes: 
"A broad based approach is needed to overcome the economic, social, 
political and institutional marginalization of the shifted cultivator which would 
involve the redistribution of existing farmlands, reform of land tenure systems, 
build up of agricultural extension services, improvement of credit facilities and 
provision of agrotechnologies. ... The source problem is an amalgam of 
non-forestry problems, ... hence the overall problem [of deforestation] must be 
tackled largely through non-forestry measures" (Myers 1994, p . 40). 
In this chapter we examine the validity of two pieces of conventional 
wisdom with respect to conservation of tropical forests. Using a two state 
variable model, we analyze whether (i) shifting cultivation implies nothing but 
bad news for nature conservationists, and (ii) whether high discount rates are 
necessarily detrimental for nature conservation. Although the models we 
develop below are still far from perfect (and difficult to solve analytically), it 
is our opinion that they provide a more realistic starting point for analysis 
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than single state models that do not distinguish between primary forest areas 
and secondary forests. 
As mentioned in section 2.6.2, and more elaborately discussed below, 
the differences between primary and secondary forests, and especially the 
difference in accessibility fox shifting cultivators, is of crucial importance in 
the deforestation process. Primary forests are untouched forests, where trees 
have matured fully and the timber extracted from these forests can be sold at 
high prices in international markets. Primary forests have no net growth: they 
are in ecological equilibrium where growth equals decay. By definition, 
primary forests are turned into secondary forests if they are selectively logged 
(see for example, Kummar and Sham 1995). In contrast to primary forests, 
secondary forests display net growth because half-grown trees are exposed to 
more sunlight and face less competition for other scarce resources. 
It is widely acknowledged that the issues of encroachment and com-
mercial, selective logging are not independent. Logging, for instance, increa-
ses the attractiveness of agricultural activity in the tropical forest area by 
providing access to previously inaccessible areas. The existence of a road 
network facilitates travelling into the forest and increases potential agricultural 
rents because of the increased possibilities to transport agricultural surpluses 
to local and regional markets (Grut 1990; Grut et al. 1991; Horta 1991; 
Jepma 1993; Southgate et al. 1991). Furthermore, land clearing costs are 
lower on logged-over forest lands, because loggers have already removed 
some of the larger trees (Panayotou and Sungsuwan 1994). For these reasons, 
some authors argue that logging encourages forest destruction through 
encroachment. In the words of Amelung and Diehl (1992): 
"The opening up by the forestry sector can only be regarded as the main 
source of forest disturbance, if it was clear that otherwise potential users face 
prohibitive costs of entering virgin forests. ... In countries, in which the 
share of shifting cultivators in deforestation is high, logging can be considered 
as a necessary first step of destruction by opening up forest areas" (Amelung 
and Diehl 1992, p . 120). 
There is empirical evidence supporting the claim that shifting cultiva-
tors use the logging sector to gain access to primary forest areas. Although 
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the rate of deforestation caused directly by the logging sector is generally 
believed to be small (as indicated above), logging is the primary cause of 
forest modification. 2 More than 70% of the primary forest areas brought 
under exploitation are first degraded by the commercial logging sector 
(Amelung and Diehl 1992). Furthermore, according to the FAO (cited in Sun 
1995), deforestation rates due to agricultural conversion are eight times 
greater in logged-over forests than in undisturbed forests. Barbier (1994) 
reports that in many African countries around half of the area that is initially 
logged is subsequently deforested, while there is little, if any, deforestation of 
previously untagged forest land. 
In the first part of this chapter (section 3.2) we analyze the differences 
between conservation of secondary and conservation of primary forests. More 
specifically, we demonstrate that a trade-off may exist between the two issues, 
when encroachment is included in the analysis. Obviously, the only sensible 
way to model shifting cultivation is with aid of a model that distinguishes 
between primary and secondary forests. 
In the second part of this chapter, using a slightly different model, we 
focus on the supposedly adverse effects of high discount rates for nature 
conservation. For this model, apart from the difference in accessibility for 
shifting cultivators, we focus on another difference between primary and 
secondary forests: the latter category displays net growth whereas the first 
category does not. Conventional wisdom implies that high discount rates 
discourage sustainable forestry. High discount rates typically accelerate 
harvesting, depress investments in sustainable resource management, and 
reduce the weight attached to the needs and desires of distant future generati-
ons. In the economic literature, the process of discounting has been labelled 
ethically indefensible (Ramsey 1928), a polite expression for rapacity (Harrod 
1948) and is believed by some to advance doomsday (Koopmans 1974). At 
first sight, the higher the discount rate, the more pronounced the negative 
impact on intergenerational equity and sustainability. Since it has been argued 
2Forest modification is defined as the conversion of virgin forests into productive closed 
forests or other forms of land use (Amelung and Diehl 1992). Forest modification may be due to 
selective logging. 
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by many that current deforestation is excessive and socially wasteful (e.g., 
Barbier et al. 1994; Brown and Pearce 1994), 3 and since intertemporal 
harvesting paths are for an important part driven by discount rates (Hotelling 
1931; Dasgupta and Heal 1979), a logical conclusion would be that the timber 
industry applies a discount rate that is too high. 
However, the observation that high discount rates have adverse effects 
for intergenerational equity and sustainability is not generally valid in resource 
economics. Farzin (1984) demonstrated that if the backstop price of a resour-
ce is a function of the interest rate or if production is capital intensive, the 
depletion period of a mine may increase or decrease as the interest rate shifts. 
With respect to forestry, Price (1991) argued that if discount rates are 
lowered, the opportunity costs of investment funds are also reduced, thereby 
making forest exploitation more profitable. Hence lower discount rates may 
enhance the case for short-term exploitation of forests. 
In section 3.3, we obtain similar results for tropical forestry without 
making any assumptions about the capital requirements of substitutes and 
without exploring the consequences of changes in the discount rate on the 
opportunity costs of investment funds. Instead, we analyze the influence of the 
discount rate on the way in which primary forests are converted into seconda-
ry forests. It is explicitly recognized that primary forests are converted into 
secondary forests by the timber industry and we model the interlinkages in a 
simple two-state variable model. 
An important assumption in the first model is that the commercial 
logger has imperfect control over the behaviour of shifting cultivators. The 
second model is driven by the assumption that the government (as the owner 
of the forest) has imperfect control over the harvesting decisions of the 
logging firm that is granted a concession for harvesting, such that the firm has 
a certain freedom to allocate its intertemporal supply. An important assumpti-
on that relates to both models is that logging firms maximize their profits in a 
competitive industry. We assume that all firms are equal, so we model the 
logging sector as a representative firm. 
3 To evaluate whether harvesting is "excessive" or not, one needs to relate it to a benchmark. 
It is often unclear what this may be; invariably, subjective opinions will play a role. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. We develop a simple two state 
variable model of encroachment in section 3.2, providing a numerical solution 
to illustrate the relation between the harvesting of primary forests and encro-
achment. In section 3.3 we construct another two state variable model, but 
here we will disregard the complexities introduced by shifting cultivators (the 
second model is easily extended to incorporate the key features of the first 
model). The conclusions follow in section 3.4. 
3.2 A Two State Variable Model 
Tropical commercial logging typically involves a contract between the 
government, as the owner of the resource, and a private firm. The firm is 
granted the right to harvest and manage a certain parcel of forest for a 
specific period of time, a "concession". In principle, the concessionaire has 
the sole right to use the resource. In practice, however, control and monito-
ring costs to safeguard the area from encroachment (i.e., small scale agricul-
tural conversion) are high. This implies that, once shifting cultivators have 
gained access to the forest, they will share its use. The effect of encroachment 
on logged-over forest areas is that under-aged trees or tree species that are 
currently not commercially interesting but potentially valuable, are removed. 
This implies that the forestry sector is confronted with a much younger, less 
valuable collection of trees for succeeding rounds of logging. For the conces-
sionaire, this can be considered as a cost of opening up an area. Recognition 
of this will influence decision making. This effect will be illustrated more 
formally in this section using a simple model. 
In order to highlight the effect of encroachment on degradation of 
secondary and primary forests, we make several assumptions. First, we 
assume that the impact of encroachment on the logger's decision can be 
adequately analyzed by evaluating the optimal depletion time of the primary 
forest (7j) and the secondary forest ( J 2 ) , respectively. The interpretation is 
that postponing depletion is beneficial for nature conservationists because 
society can enjoy the stock and flow services provided by the forest for a 
longer time. Likewise, reducing the optimal depletion period corresponds with 
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a less desirable situation. Obviously Tx must be smaller than r2.The specifica-
tion of the objective function of the logger is as follows: 
Maxy f [P^y^t) + P2(t)y2(t)] e' rtdt <*> 
o 
where P„ i = 1,2 indicates the price of wood from primary and secondary fo-
rests respectively, and y{ represents the quantity harvested in forest type i. In 
the model, harvesting of primary forests is expressed in hectares whereas 
harvesting of secondary forest is expressed in biomass units. Our focus is on 
the size of area of primary forests, whereas incorporating the growth potential 
of secondary forests makes representing this stock in terms of biomass more 
logical. Apart from the fact that P, is a price per hectare and P 2 is a price per 
biomass units, prices for wood from primary and secondary forests may also 
differ due to, for instance, different species composition (Grainger 1993) or 
differences in average stem size. The discount rate r is assumed constant. 
The equations of motion of the model will be explained next. With 
respect to harvesting primary forest, for which net growth is negligible, the 
model is an extension of the standard mining model (Hotelling 1931, Dasgup-
ta and Heal 1979). It is assumed that all harvesting takes the form of selective 
logging, 4 and that encroachment is induced by commercial logging. No 
encroachment is possible unless the forest is first subjected to selective 
harvesting so there is no encroachment on primary forests, which is consistent 
with some of the empirical evidence summarized in section 3 . 1 . 5 Thus, the 
equation of motion of the stock of primary forest is simply: 
4 A s mentioned above, the share of the logging sector in deforestation is relatively small. 
Since the forestry sector is by far the most important source of forest modification, the explanati-
on must be that after the first round of logging there is still some sort of tree cover present. Grut 
(1990) even asserts that selective logging is "a regime not much more interventionist than the 
regime of nature itself". 
5 This assumption is perhaps somewhat heroic, but it facilitates the formal analysis. The 
results will not be affected qualitatively if we would mitigate this assumption and assume instead 
that there is a difference in the speed at which slash-and-burn cultivators encroach upon primary 
and secondary concession lands. 
Economics of Renewable Resources 87 
*,(0 = -y,0) (2) 
where xff) is the stock of primary forest, measured in hectares, and y,(r) is 
the area of primary forest selectively logged, also measured in hectares. The 
dot over a variable indicates a change in time, hence x represents a change in 
the size of the stock. 
Now turning to the specification of the second equation of motion, we 
need to make the translation from the area of primary forests to quantity of 
biomass in secondary forests. For this purpose we multiply the area harvested 
in primary forests by a constant conversion factor 7 . This constant is derived 
as follows. Assume that the timber volume per hectare of undisturbed forests 
equals 1//, units of trees, and that it is optimal for the firm to restrict har-
vesting to \j/2 trees. Now, 7 is given by ( i / / ]-^). If the different age classes of 
trees are homogenously distributed over the total area (or if firms are restric-
ted by laws or custom to harvest a certain fraction of the stand), ^, and 7 will 
be constant. 
To incorporate encroachment in the model we arbitrarily assume that 
encroachment can be represented as a destructive process beyond the control 
of the forestry sector that devastates j8% of the stock of secondary forest in 
every period. This is an uncommon assumption, for which no empirical 
support exists. However, since encroachment is restricted to secondary forest 
area (x2), damage due to agricultural conversion (S) is likely to be linked to 
the size of the forest that has been opened up for access. For any other model 
specification with dS/djc2 > 0 similar results can be obtained. The current 
specification is chosen for mathematical convenience. The second equation of 
motion of this two state variable model is: 
where x^t) is the stock of secondary forest measured in biomass units. 
Depleting the stock of primary forest implies accumulating a stock of secon-
dary forest as is evident from the first term on the right hand side of (3). 
Next, y2(f) is the quantity of biomass harvested in the secondary forest and p 
is the (constant) growth rate of secondary forests. The assumption of a 
x2(t) = yyx(f) - y2(r) + ( P - p)x2(t) (3) 
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constant growth rate is for mathematical convenience and does not affect the 
qualitative results 
Invoking the maximum principle and assurning an interior solution 
gives the following necessary conditions for an optimum solution: 
Pl(0 + 7M(0 = Mt) (4) 
P2(t) = (S) 
M = r <6> 
\{t) 
k®.=r-P+{i. (7) 
In these equations, \(t) and fi(f) are the costate variables, akin to Lagrange 
multipliers, that measure the shadow price of the associated state variable, and 
A and ji represent the derivatives of these shadow prices with respect to time. 
The interpretation of (4) is that the marginal benefits of harvesting a unit of 
primary forest, measured as the sum of direct revenues and future harvests as 
a secondary forest, are equal to the foregone future timber benefits from 
leaving it as primary forest. Equation (5) states that marginal timber benefits 
from secondary forest should equal marginal cost of foregone future timber 
benefits. Equations (6) and (7) are non-arbitrage conditions: (6) is simply the 
Hotelling rule and (7) is an extended version of this rule that accommodates 
the growth of the resource (p) and encroachment damage (|3). When we 
assume that the inverse demand functions are linear, i.e. Pj(f)=Prayer), then 
substituting (6) and (7) in (4) and (5) and solving the differential equations, 
we get: 
P,(i) - (P, - ^p^'-'+W-TjyU-T,) + ypi{t) = 0 (8) 
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p2(t) - py-ow-v = o (9) 
where P b i = 1,2, is the backstop price for wood extracted from forest type 
i, which will be reached at / = T-, because by definition at time T-, forest type 
Xj must be depleted and subsequently ^,(7^) equals zero. This also means that 
by integrating (2) and (3) and evaluating them at J , and T2 respectively, we 
find: 
T, 
*,(0) = f y,{t)dt (10) 
Note that by definition x2(0) equals zero. Substituting the linear inverse 
demand function in (8) and (9) and solving for y-,(t), the optimal depletion 
periods can be derived (see appendix 1). 
The model is complicated and analytically solving it in order to 
illustrate the relation between T{ and 8 proves to be extremely cumbersome. 
Therefore, we resort to a numerical solution. Representative results are 
presented in Figure 3 .1 . The optimal time of depletion is on the vertical axis 
and 8 is on the horizontal axis. 
The following observations apply. First, in this model high discount 
rates (r) correspond with enhanced depletion of both primary and secondary 
forests. As is evident from Figure 1, optimal depletion periods for a high 
discount rate are always lower than for a lower discount rate (i.e., the T, 
curve for r = 12.5% is located below the T, curve for r = 10%). More 
importantly, however, is the trade-off between conservation of primary and 
secondary forests as encroachment increases: the higher j8, the higher 7*, and 
the lower T2. The Tx path is an upward sloping function of B whereas the T2 
path is downward sloping. 
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Figure 3.1: Optimal depletion as a function of encroachment (r= 10% 
andr=12.5%, x,(0)=400, P1=40, y=2, P2=20, a, = 0 . 5 , a2=0.15.). 
The interpretation is that concessionaires want to avoid losing part of 
their stock to shifting cultivators. Encroachment thus can be considered as a 
sort of property tax on "owning" logged-over forest areas. Cutting back on 
encroachment losses can be achieved in two ways. First, by reducing the 
"supply" of secondary forest by harvesting less primary forest. Encroachment 
acts as a "natural brake" on the rate of harvesting in primary forests: supply 
is postponed such that encroachment damage is discounted (hence, dTfdB > 
0). Second, by intensified harvesting of secondary forest areas in order to 
outrace the shifting cultivators. 
The effects are twofold. First, during the depletion period of the 
primary forest the area of this type of forest will be greater if the threat of 
encroachment exists. Hence during this period amenity values will be higher, 
and biodiversity is greater when compared to logging not constrained by 
encroachment. The second effect is that the quality and quantity of secondary 
forest areas will deteriorate if more shifting cultivators move to the area. The 
shifting cultivators themselves will cause more direct damage and in addition 
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the forestry sector will respond by increased harvesting. This may cause a 
change in species composition and will reduce biomass per hectare. A trade-
off exists between conservation of primary forest and conservation of the 
quantity and quality of secondary forest. Depending on the preferences of the 
international community with respect to nature conservation, different weights 
are given to these effects. This implies that, on balance, the destructive 
process of slash-and-burn agriculture can be considered either beneficial or 
detrimental. 
2.4 A slightly different two-state variable model 
Many governments in developing countries consider their forest base 
to be suboptimally large (Myers 1994) and develop forest zonage plans in 
which part of the forest area is designated as conversion forests. Conversion 
forests are destined to be cleared for alternative uses, such as agricultural 
cultivation (see, for example, the case of Cameroon, as described in Côté 
1993). Land can be cleared from its forest cover by clearcutting the entire 
area as quickly as possible, or it can be transformed gradually such that the 
net present value of land use is maximized. Of course there are situations in 
which instantaneous clearcutting maximizes net present value of land, but this 
is certainly not generally true. This implies that during a gradual conversion 
phase two types of forests can be discerned; primary and secondary forests. 
Suppose that the government owns an area of primary forest Xi(0). If 
the benefits accruing to society from sustainable forestry are less than the 
benefits associated with alternative land use (for instance, agriculture), then 
eventually the forest cover will be cleared. The government will solve the 
following problem: 
subject to appropriate state equations, nonnegativity constraints, and the 
constraint that cumulative extraction from 0 to T equals the total forest stock 
at ? = 0. In (1), B(t) are (social) benefits derived from timber exploitation and 
T 
max (12) 
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A(t) are (social) benefits from the alternative land use option. 6 Finally, 5 is 
the (constant) opportunity cost of capital, used by the government as discount 
rate. Solving the government's problem yields (a) an optimal intertemporal 
extraction path for the forest stock and (b) the optimal period T in which all 
forest cover is cleared. 7 
We assume that the government aims to achieve optimal deforestation 
as determined by the optimality conditions that follow from the government's 
problem by setting the terms of a concession contract with a logging firm. 
However, limited ability of governments in tropical countries to enforce con-
cession contracts is well documented (for example, Grut, Gray and Egli 
1991). An alternative interpretation is that the transaction or enforcement 
costs associated with enforcing full compliance exceed the benefits of compli-
ance. For that reason we assume that the government is able to set the optimal 
"depletion time" of the forest stock r,8 but due to limited capability of the 
government to monitor the firm's logging activities or output, the harvesting 
decisions of the firm cannot be fully controlled. The consequence is that the 
firm has a certain freedom to allocate intertemporal supply, which will result 
in an intertemporal harvesting path that is optimal for the firm (conditional on 
the pre-determined depletion time T) but not necessarily for the government. 
Discrepancies arise if, for instance, harvesting involves external effects or if 
the firm applies a different discount rate than the government. In the remain-
ing part of this chapter we focus exclusively on the latter. 
^ e can assume that the government solves for a harvest plan that is socially optimal. 
Alternatively, and without loss, we can assume that the government maximizes, for example, a 
political preference function (e.g. Becker 1974). 
7 User cost and its development over time is an important determinant of the optimal timing 
of switching to alternative land use. We refer to McConnell, Daberkow and Hardie for a model 
that determines (approximately) optimal harvesting when timber production eventually ends. Since 
we are interested in optimal management of the firm (which faces a given T) rather than the 
government, we do not deal explicitly with the complexities of solving the government's problem. 
^Hence the timber industry is not allowed to harvest after T, and is not allowed to stop 
harvesting before T. A reason for the latter may be that the government wants to get a steady 
stream of revenues from forest exploitation. Because of imperfect monitoring, the government can 
only enforce that in each period a positive harvest takes place. 
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In a simple model, the discount rate of a private firm may be based on 
the opportunity cost of capital (<5) and a possible risk premium (a). In the case 
of the timber industry in tropical countries, the latter may be a function of the 
security of its tenure rights (Deacon 1994, Mendelsohn 1991). We assume 
that the timber industry perceives a constant probability K of losing its tenure 
rights due to hostile government policy. When a = -ln(l-/c), then e01 is the 
probability of having control over the stock at time t. We define a + 8 = r. 
Due to this risk premium the government and firm will prefer different 
extraction paths, even if they have the same opportunity cost of capital. 
Now the firm's optimization problem can be sketched. For convenien-
ce, we do not include encroachment on secondary forests in this model, but 
extension in this direction is straightforward. The firm has agreed to deforest 
an area of mature, non-growing primary forest (x,(0)) in T years. Suppose 
that it is optimal for the firm to log the primary forest selectively such that 
trees with small diameters are allowed to grow and reach commercially 
(more) profitable stem sizes. Selective logging turns the primary forest into a 
forest with net growth. The firm's problem consists of two linked subpro-
blems: (a) with respect to the primary stock, an optimal extraction path and 
depletion time (denoted by Tx) must be solved for; and (b) with respect to the 
stock of secondary forest, an optimal extraction path and starting time 
(denoted by T2) must be solved for. Obviously these problems must be solved 
simultaneously. Note the difference with the previous model, where T2 
referred to the depletion time of the stock of secondary forest. Due to the set-
up of the model, and more specifically the transversality condition that every 
hectare must be cleared from its (secondary) forest cover at T, the firm's 
subproblem is concerned with finding the starting time that maximizes net 
present value of exploitation, rather than the optimal depletion time. Of 
course it is possible to harvest primary forest and secondary forest at the same 
time (though not on the same hectare, obviously), as T{ can be arbitrarily near 
T and T2 can be arbitrarily near zero. 
Formally, the objective function of the firm is specified as follows: 
r 
max,^ n = [ [^(Oy.CO + P2(t)y2(t)] <r 8 ' e"'dt, <13> 
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where II indicates the present value of the profit stream, T is the concession 
period as determined by the government, y{f), i = 1,2 indicates harvesting in 
primary and secondary forest in period t respectively, and P{(f) represents the 
(net) price of wood from forest type i in period t. Again, harvesting in 
primary forests is measured in hectares logged whereas harvesting of the 
growing secondary forest is expressed in cubic meters of wood. 
Prices are assumed to be net of extraction costs, and revenues are net 
revenues. If marginal extraction costs are constant, this assumption is harm-
less, but even with marginal extraction costs that are not constant the qualitat-
ive results are generally not affected. However, there is one aspect of ignor-
ing extraction costs that is potentially restrictive in this model: if there are 
significant economies of scale in harvesting, it may be more attractive for 
firms to clearcut the entire tree cover and save on exploitation costs, than to 
harvest selectively and benefit from forest growth for future harvesting. In the 
remainder of this article we assume that possible economies of scale in 
exploitation are outweighed by the benefits from harvesting additional forest 
growth after selective logging, such that selective logging is optimal for the 
firm. If scale economies dominate growth benefits and we maintain the 
condition that output should be strictly positive from 0 to T, interior solutions 
for the firm's problem may be infeasible. 9 
In order to make this an interesting problem, we assume that the firm 
faces a downward sloping, inverse demand function for wood: dP, I dy, < 0. 
More specifically, in the numerical solution we will assume that the inverse 
demand function is linear: P-tf) = Pt - a{ y,(t). In the absence of extraction 
costs and with constant prices, the representative logger's optimal decision 
when to remove all commercially interesting trees would simply be to deplete 
'Suppose that the terminal point of the optimal extraction path (y,(T)) and the starting time (t 
- 0) are specified. Then, at most 1 extraction path will satisfy the conditions that (a) (1 J ry,(t)dt 
= X,(0), (b) y(t) > 0, V t e [0, TJ, and (c) the necessary non-arbitrage condition that describes 
the development of the co-state variable over time [see equation 7 ] . This path may be optimal, 
depending on the discount rate applied by the firm, but most probably it won't be. Changing the 
firm's discount rate and evaluating the effect on deforestation makes no sense in this context. 
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the mature stock in the first period and benefit from the growth potential of 
secondary forests in all periods that follow. 1 0 
The equation of motion for the stock of primary forest is equal to the 
one of the first model [see (2)]. The equation of motion for the stock of 
secondary forests differs slightly from the previous one [see (3)], because 
encroachment is not considered here: 
x2(t) = yyfi) - y 2 ( 0 + g(x2(t)). (14) 
In this equation x^f) is the stock of timber in cubic meters available in 
secondary forest, y2(f) is the number of cubic meters of timber harvested and 
gCXj) describes secondary forest growth. Invoking the maximum principle and 
assuming an interior solution gives (4), (5), (6) and the expression below as 
necessary conditions for an optimal solution: 
ACQ = . _ - / (15) 
MO ' 
The interpretation of these necessary conditions is similar as before [see 
section 3.2], and (15) is again an extended version of the Hotelling rule that 
accommodates growth of the resource. After substituting the solutions of (6) 
and (15) into (4) and (5), we find 
P,(0 - (P, + yP2eir'8'nTl'T))erU'T') + yP2(t) = 0 , and (16) 
P 2(f) - p 2 e " - « ' H ' - R > = 0 , ( 1 ? ) 
where Pj, i = 1,2 is the backstop price for wood extracted from forest type i, 
which will be reached at ; = T, for primary forest and t = T for secondary 
forest because, by definition, at Tx and T respectively primary and secondary 
1 0 Note that, without loss, a so-called bang-bang solution can also be avoided when we model 
harvesting costs explicitly and assume 3Q / Sy, > 0. 
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forest stocks must be depleted. Harvesting the stock of secondary forest starts 
at time T2. By integrating (3) and (14) we find 
Solving this model we obtain the optimal depletion time of the primary 
forest T, and the starting period of secondary forest extraction T2 [see appen-
dix 2; we have chosen a linear growth function (gfe) = px2) because it 
facilitates the mathematics considerably without affecting the qualitative 
results]. 1 1 Next, the optimal depletion paths for primary and secondary 
forests can be derived. The response of Tx to changes in r is the subject of 
analysis in this section. The discount rate r can change, for instance, because 
the firm perceives its tenure security differently as time passes. There are 
numerous reasons why (the perception of) tenure security may change over 
time. For example, the firm may fear that the present political elite loses its 
dominant position, through elections or a coup d'etat, and that the new 
government will renege on the contract (for a discussion and empirical study 
of tenure security, see Deacon 1994). Alternatively, political preferences of 
the government may be subject to change over time. This latter will especially 
be important if government decision making is in accordance with public 
choice theories (e.g., Mueller 1989) and not so much aimed at achieving a 
socially optimal solution. 
u W i t h this specification, even though g(x) is a function of 7, it is easily verified that g'(x) 
and 7 are independent terms. This is clearly a violation of standard biological relationships central 
to selective tree harvesting. However, since the focus is on the transformation of non-growing 
primary forest into growing secondary forest, this simplification is harmless. It is recognised that 
the present model specification is not suitable to analyze, for instance, optimal thinning in the 
secondary forest. 
(18) 
T 
e (19) 
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If the government does not want to renegotiate the concession contract 
because the opportunity cost of capital has not changed (hence, T is constant), 
the firm will alter the intertemporal allocation of supply and redefine its 
optimal Tx using the procedure outlined above. 1 2 
Given the mathematical results as presented in appendix 2, the effects 
of an increase in the rate of discount r on the optimal depletion time of 
primary forests Tx and on the optimal time at which the firm starts logging 
secondary forests T2 can be derived. The model is complicated and analyti-
cally solving it in order to illustrate the relation between T, and r again proves 
to be difficult. Therefore, we resort to a numerical solution. We have 
arbitrarily selected values for the parameters of the inverse demand functions 
and for x,(0) and T, as reported in figure 3.2. Representative results are 
presented in figure 3.2. 
As is clear from this figure, the higher the rate of discount, the more 
logging in secondary forests is postponed while the effect on the depletion 
period of primary forests is less clearcut; the results are presented for two 
different values of y but are robust for other parameter values (as long as the 
nonnegativity constraints are not violated). The fact that a higher y leads to 
lower optimal values of T, and T2 can easily be explained by analyzing 
equation (14). Ceteris paribus, an increase in 7 (which may correspond with a 
high initial stocking density) will raise the marginal benefits of primary forest 
exploitation because the investment aspect of harvesting, hence the role of 
converted primary forest as an input in the secondary forest production 
process, gains weight. In order to benefit more from the stock of secondary 
forest the concessionaire wants to accelerate access to this stock. Hence, the 
higher the conversion factor 7 the shorter the optimal rotation of the primary 
forest, and logging in secondary forests can start at an earlier date. 
Second, and more important, the curve that relates optimal depletion to 
the discount rate is not monotonically declining but has an inverted U-shape. 
This implies that there exists a range of r-values for which raising the dis-
count rate actually postpones depletion of the primary forest. The reason is 
In fact, the model we use does not investigate the impact of a change in r after a couple of 
years of harvesting but, instead, determines optimal exploitation paths from period 0 onwards. 
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that a high discount rate "tilts" the price paths and optimal exploitation paths 
of both the primary and the secondary forest stock. With respect to the 
primary forest, on the one hand, this results is an incentive to harvest more in 
early periods, which is the standard Hotelling result. On the other hand, the 
shift in the price path of the stock of secondary wood has a countervailing 
effect on optimal exploitation of the virgin stock. The reason is as follows. 
Raising r while keeping T and P2 fixed implies that the new price path for 
secondary wood (P2(f)) W M D e steeper and necessarily located entirely below 
the original price path. If the growth rate of P2(t) increases and the terminal 
point is identical, then automatically the starting point of the price path must 
be lower. Hence, 
A'(0 > A(0 A n'(f) < n(t) , V? G [0,21. ( 2 0 ) 
Figure 3.2: Optimal depletion times for y=1.75 and y=2 (p=0.05, 
x,(0)=550, T=50, P,=30, P2=15, a ,=0 .5 , a2=0.15) 
The implications are as follows. From (4) it is clear that the low level 
of n(t) reduces the marginal benefits of converting primary forest into a 
productive asset. This slows down the optimal extraction rate of the stock of 
virgin forest, which explains the inverted U-shaped Tx path as shown in figure 
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1. Perhaps this explains why empirical support for the hypothesis that high 
risk premiums should accelerate deforestation, provided by Deacon (1994, 
table 4 and 5, p.424), is weak. 
From the inverse demand function we know that low realizations of 
n(f) ( = P2{t)) correspond with a relatively large supply of secondary wood. 
To satisfy condition (19), this means that T2 must be shifted to the future, as 
the increase in supply per period must necessarily be compensated for by a 
reduction in the number of periods in which timber is actually supplied. Thus 
supply is increased and prices are depressed, but harvesting the secondary 
stock starts later. 
3.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have demonstrated that well established theoretical 
results, obtained with single state forest models, may lose their validity in the 
context of a more realistic model with primary and secondary forests and 
imperfect control. 
First, encroachment by shifting cultivators on tropical forest concessi-
ons is generally considered a primary cause of deforestation. Drastic measures 
have been proposed in the literature to reduce the number of people who 
appear to depend on forest resources. Here we demonstrate that destructive 
conversion of forest areas for agricultural purposes is only part of the story. 
Under the assumption that encroachment is confined to accessible logged-over 
forest areas, encroachment has similar effects as a property tax on owning 
secondary forests. If the damage due to encroachment is positively related to 
the size of the secondary forest area, hence agricultural conversion increases 
as the area of accessible forest increases, then concessionaires will respond by 
reducing the rate at which they harvest primary forests. This implies that the 
net effect of encroachment is theoretically ambiguous and needs to be empiri-
cally determined. Whether the moderating effect of encroachment on harves-
ting of primary forests described in this paper will be significant in practice 
remains an open question. The braking power of squatters is probably small 
relative to the overall desire of logging firms to enter new areas. Also, if 
loggers do not consider successive rounds of logging, for instance because 
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concession rights are defined for a short period or because primary forests are 
more profitable to exploit and abundantly available, the "natural brake effect" 
will be negligible. 
Second, it is well documented that high discount rates are detrimental 
for natural resource conservation. If supply is restricted, for instance because 
of a tropical timber concession contract, this general conclusion no longer 
holds. If the concession period is exogenously determined and fixed and we 
recognize that depleting a stock of primary forest implies building a stock of 
secondary forest, then the effect of high discount rates on the stock of 
primary forest is ambiguous. There is a range of r-values over which an 
increase in the discount rate actually postpones depletion. The reason is that 
the marginal benefits of converting primary forests into secondary forests (a 
growing asset) are reduced. This result follows directly from the revised non-
arbitrage conditions for the firm. In addition, the effect of higher discount 
rates on the stock of secondary forest is that the first period of exploitation is 
shifted to the future for all r. Whether this phenomenon is likely to occur in 
reality depends on the strength of the government to enforce concession 
contracts. 
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From the first order conditions, the optimal extraction paths y,(t) and 
y2(t) can be determined: 
yx{t) = Ifp", - [P , + y P ^ - ^ ^ W ^ + yP^^M 
a , 1 ' 
y2(0 = 1 [ P 2 - P 2 e ( r - p . 0 ) < f - r 2 ) 
The two equations which simultaneously determine T, and T2 are derived by 
solving equations (10) and (11), using the optimal extraction paths derived 
above. Solving (10) yields: 
- I[P, + y P ^ ^ - ^ j l - e - ^ 
yP2e-'r-^)T>< 
Furthermore, solving (11) yields: 
eir-"*B)T>-l\ 
« 1 ^ 2 
«27 
1 
p-0 
( l - e - ( p ' •f»T2\ 
r-2p+2B 
P , . ( l - tf-c-«r.) + 7 ^ e 
P-J9 
2 " J e(r-2p.2g)2-, _ 
r-2p+2B 
By solving these two equations simultaneously in GAMS, the optimal depleti-
on times of primary and secondary forests are determined. 
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Appendix 2: 
In order to determine Tx and T2, equations (11) and (12) must be 
solved. First, we have to determine the optimal paths of harvesting in 
primary and secondary forest areas. These paths can be derived by inserting 
the inverse demand functions into equations (9) and (10), and then solving 
them for yx(f) and y2(t): 
Now the integrals (11) and (12) can be derived using the optimal depletion 
paths derived above. The result for equation (11) is 
y , (0 = _L[p, - [P, + yP2e 
a. 
> 2 e ( ' - ' ) ( r . - r ) ] e ' ( ' - r ' ) + yP2 (r-p)U-T) » 
and 
y 2(r) = 1 [P 2 - P2e<'-'>«-"]. 
yP2e -(r-p)T 
( r - p ) 
The result for equation (12) is: 
T, and T2 are determined simultaneously by these two equations. 
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INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS AND TROPICAL DEFORESTATION1 
Abstract 
International transfers to developing countries are sometimes advocated on the 
ground that they contribute to tropical forest conservation. Here we demon-
strate that the effectiveness (and attractiveness) of this instrument is reduced if 
the restrictive assumption of deterministic prices is relaxed. With stochastic 
prices, the steady state forest stock in the absence of transfers is greater, 
implying that the marginal benefit of additional hectares conserved is less. In 
addition, the 'wealth effect' of transfers counteracts the so called 'freeing up 
effect', which implies that per unit of subsidy less hectares of tropical forest 
is protected. Both effects reduce the attractiveness of transfers as a policy 
instrument for Western governments to combat tropical deforestation. 
4.1 Introduction 
International concern about tropical deforestation has resulted in an 
increased focus on timber trade interventions and other policies aimed at the 
conservation of forest stocks. In a recent paper, Barbier and Rauscher (1994) 
argue that, to conserve tropical forests, international (lump sum) capital 
transfers are to be favoured over trade interventions. More specifically, they 
assert that "a direct international transfer will increase the long run equilib-
rium forest stock unambiguously". This result is obtained by balancing 
marginal benefits of exploitation (and subsequent consumption) and conserva-
tion. 
The driving mechanism in their model is that imports must be paid for 
with foreign exchange, earned by selling tropical timber. Foreign aid eases 
'This chapter is published as: Bulte E.H. and D.P. van Soest (1996), International Trans-
fers, Price Uncertainty and Tropical deforestation, Environment and Development Economics 1, 
pp. 281-287. 
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the stringency of the foreign exchange constraint. This means that more 
imports can be bought, which lowers the marginal utility from imported 
goods. In equilibrium, the marginal utility of forest conservation must also 
fall. This corresponds with a larger steady state forest cover. Capital transfers 
may also contribute to forest conservation because they may alleviate poverty. 
The effect of poverty on environmental degradation is described by, for 
instance, Jepma (1995) and Pearce and Warford (1993). A justification for 
providing international transfers are the global externalities associated with 
tropical forest conservation, such as storage of carbon dioxide and preserva-
tion of biodiversity. 
The fact that transfers increase the size of the steady state of tropical 
forest does not justify the actual donation of funds - it is also a matter of 
marginal benefits and costs for the donor country. This paper aims to extend 
the model of Barbier and Rauscher (1994) by allowing for uncertainty with 
respect to future timber prices and risk averse policy makers. Wood prices 
have fluctuated widely in the past (World Bank 1991) and risk aversion is the 
rule rather than the exception, implying that this extension is relevant. We 
find that the marginal benefits of providing transfers are typically lower (and 
may approach zero) under these conditions, hence the likelihood that it is 
optimal to actually provide transfers to tropical countries is reduced. 
4.2 The model 
We assume that there are substantial unpredictable short-run fluctua-
tions in timber demand that result in varying short run prices. Future prices 
are assumed to be drawn randomly from a stationary distribution. For 
mathematical convenience we assume that the price distribution is adequately 
represented by a uniformly distributed density function, defined as: 
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/OP) 
for P, < P < P.. 
Pu-P, ' (1) 
0 otherwise, 
where P, and P u are respectively the lowest and the highest wood price 
feasible. Suppose the government of a tropical country aims to maximize its 
expected utility derived from consumption of imported goods (c) and the size 
of its forest area (N). Imports must be paid for with foreign exchange, earned 
from sales of timber products (q is the quantity of wood sold in international 
markets at the prevailing price P), or with international capital transfers (s). 
The constrained dynamic optimization problem is: 
oo 
MAXq E [ U(c(t),N(t))e-" dt <2> 
subject to: 
P{t)q{t) + s(t) = c(t), 
N(t) = g(N(t)) - q{t). 
(3) 
In the equation of motion, g(N) represents growth of the forest stock. If the 
government is risk averse, the utility function must be concave, hence > 
0, J7„ < 0, for i = c, N. A specification that satisfies these requirements is 2 
2Because we require explicit solutions of the model, our model differs from the Barbier and 
Rauscher model in two respects. In the first place, for mathematical simplicity, we ignore 
domestic use of timber. In the second place, we have specified a utility function explicitly. It 
could be argued that the current choice of the utility function is restrictive because the govern-
ment's relative preferences for forest conservation and consumption are assumed constant, while 
it is possible that relative preferences for nature change as the level of wealth changes. The 
qualitative conclusions are not affected by this assumption. Also, for the main qualitative results it 
does not matter whether the utility function is separable or not. 
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U(c,N) = CN*. (4) 
It is assumed that a and 8 are positive, and smaller than 1. An important 
feature of the current specification is that -U"(c)/Ul(c) = -(a-l)/c, which 
implies that the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is declining in 
the arguments of the utility function (see for example Varian 1992). 
Applying the maximum principle and assuming an interior solution 
gives the following necessary first order conditions (suppressing time sub-
scripts): 
where X(t) is the shadow price of the state variable, or co-state variable. 
Condition (5) states that the expected marginal utility derived from selling one 
unit of timber today should equal future timber revenues foregone. Condition 
(6) is an extended version of Hotelling's rule, stating that the rate of change 
in the shadow price is equal to the difference between opportunity costs of 
holding on to a unit (r - g'(N))\, plus expected marginal social value of that 
unit as standing stock dll/dN. 
Substituting (3) into (4) gives an expression for the expected marginal 
utility of harvesting a unit of timber: 
(5) 
X = (r-g'(N))\ E dU 
dN 
E du] 
dq 
= ' f(P) ?E dP = {aP{c{P)"-l)NB) dP. (7) 
Furthermore, expected marginal utility of the forest stock is given by: 
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dU 
dN f f(P) — 
dP {BciPyN"-1) dP. (g) 
Solving (7) and upon substitution into (5) gives: 
N8 X = P»C" - ^ - - **) (9) 
Obviously, c u and c, correspond with Pu<? + s and Pxq + s, respectively. 
Substituting (9) and (8) into (6), and setting all time derivatives equal to zero, 
we obtain an implicit expression for the equilibrium stock size: 
(r-G'(N;))N;(p.cr -p^r) = 
8 (r-g'(Ns'))N; 
a + 1 q" (« +1) 
(10) 
Note that N*, q* and c" denote the equilibrium values of the forest stock, rate 
of harvesting and consumption with stochastic prices. 
The effect of an increase in the amount of the international transfers 
on the equilibrium size of the forest area can be found by comparative static 
analysis (see appendix 1): 
<JN; = -(r-g /(jv;))«jv/[p. c; ( t t-1 ) - p ^ - ' - " ] + 
ds D 
0 + 
(r-g'(Ns'))N; 
(11) 
D 
in which D is the determinant of the system. When we compare this result to 
the one obtained by Barbier and Rauscher (1994) in the context of determi-
nistic prices, it is clear that the solution becomes much more complex if 
prices are stochastic. 
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4.3 A comparison 
Comparing the effect of international transfers under conditions of 
stochastic and deterministic prices requires that a similar procedure is fol-
lowed for deterministic prices: P(t) = P, t e [0, o o ] . For the equation that is 
used to derive the steady state forest stock it is easily verified that: 
= JL (12) 
N; 
Similarly, the result from the comparative statics procedure is simply: 
d N ; = 0 (13) 
ds aP[r~g'(N;)~N;G"(N;)-[ - BPg'(ND") 
Analytically comparing these expressions with the solutions for 
stochastic prices proves to be cumbersome. For that reason we have resorted 
to a numerical comparison. 3 Representative solutions are provided in Tables 
4.1 and 4.2 . In these tables Pu = yPu with 7 > 1. 
Table 4.1: Steady state forest stocks for deterministic and stochastic scenario. 
Parameter values: Pl=2, a=0.25, 8=0.75, r=10%, p=0.05, K=10,000. 
iV* 7 = 2 . 5 7 = 5 7 = 7 . 5 7 = 1 0 
Stoch. 268.1 213.6 184.8 165.9 
Det. 261.9 200.0 168.0 147.7 
From Table 4.1 it is clear that the steady state forest stock under 
uncertainty always exceeds the steady state forest stock with deterministic 
prices. The reason is simply that uncertain prices (i.e. uncertain consumption) 
will reduce marginal utility of consumption for any risk averse policy maker. 
In order to be able to derive numerical solutions we assumed a logistic growth function, 
commonly specified as g(N)=pN(.l-(NlK)). The deterministic and stochastic price models were 
programmed in GAMS. The model is available from the authors upon request. 
(r - g'(Nd')) 
PqJ + s 
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In equilibrium, marginal utility of conservation must also fall, which corre-
sponds with a larger forest stock. This is just an extension of the argument 
applied by Barbier and Rauscher (1994). Also, from Table 4.1 we learn that 
increasing 7 reduces the steady state stocks for both the deterministic and the 
stochastic variant. The reason is that increasing 7 while keeping P, fixed 
increases the expected price, which tends to enhance deforestation. 
Table 4.2: Changes in steady state forest stocks resulting from international 
transfers for deterministic and stochastic scenario. Parameter values: P, = 2, 
7 = 10, a = 0.1, 8 = 0.9, r = 10%, p = 0.05, K = 10,000. 
dN"/ds s = 2 0 s = 3 5 s = 5 0 s = 6 5 
Stoch. 6.8 6.4 6.1 5.8 
Det. 6.9 6.6 6.3 6.1 
From Table 4.2 it is clear that, given a steady state A7* in the absence 
of transfers, the marginal gains from providing international transfers in terms 
of additional hectares protected are smaller with stochastic prices. As 7 
increases and/or a decreases, the difference between the stochastic and deter-
ministic model becomes greater, and eventually, the marginal gain in steady 
state forest stock approaches zero. This implies that, give any positive 
marginal cost of providing transfers, the probability that it is optimal to 
provide transfers approaches zero. The interpretation is as follows. It is well 
documented that with stochastic prices, risk averse governments should 
harvest less than under conditions of deterministic prices (in a different 
context, this has been discussed by, for instance, Lewis 1977; Leland 1972; 
Sandmo 1971; Robison and Barry 1987). The reason is that (expected) 
marginal utility of exploitation is reduced when prices fluctuate. This 'brake' 
on the harvesting process is partly offset by international transfers. This is the 
'wealth effect' or 'income effect' of international transfers; because a govern-
ment has more wealth, it is willing to gamble a little more on timber revenues 
by increasing exploitation. Or, in the words of Robison and Barry (1987, 
p.76): "the total purchases of the risky asset increase ( .. ) with increases in 
initial wealth as there is decreasing ( .. ) risk aversion". The reason is that an 
increase in risk free wealth shifts up the EV set in a parallel fashion which 
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decreases the equilibrium slope with the iso-expected utility curve. 4 This 
effect will be more pronounced for (i) low values of a, (ii) large values of s, 
and (iii) a large (mean preserving) spread Pa - P,. 5 
This counteracting effect only arises with a declining absolute risk 
aversion (DARA) specification of risk aversion. If risk aversion is of the 
CARA type (i.e., constant absolute risk aversion), the degree of risk aversion 
is not affected by transfers, and transfers unambiguously increase the optimal 
stock size, as indicated by Barbier and Rauscher (1994). With LARA (increas-
ing absolute risk aversion), the 'wealth effect' even re-enforces the 'freeing 
up effect', and increased transfers increase the stock size even more than 
predicted by Barbier and Rauscher (1994). However, arguing that increased 
wealth makes governments more risk averse is a bit odd, and not nearly as 
likely as the DARA case (for a discussion, see Robison and Barry 1987; and 
Blanchard and Fischer 1993). 
4.4 Conclusions 
If resource prices fluctuate and resource owners are risk averse of the 
DARA type, which are both quite reasonable assumptions, international 
capital transfers to developing countries to reduce tropical deforestation are a 
less effective instrument to combat deforestation than previously thought, or 
even not an effective instrument at all. The reason is that, because of 
increased wealth, governments become less prudent in their harvesting 
decisions. This effect weakens the 'freeing up ' effect that predicts that, to 
restore equilibrium, harvesting of tropical forests will decline since transfers 
reduce the marginal benefits of consumption. In addition, under conditions of 
stochastic prices, the steady state of the forest stock is greater than the steady 
state stock with deterministic prices. This implies that the marginal utility of 
4 The EV set describes efficient trade-offs between expected value and variance (see Robison 
and Barry, chapter 4 and 6). 
5 This also implies that the counteracting wealth effect is reduced as wood prices are 
stabilized, for instance as a result of establishing buffer stocks for tropical timber. 
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additional conservation is less with stochastic prices. Combining these effects 
leads us to the conclusion that the attractiveness of international transfers as 
an instrument to combat deforestation with stochastic prices is reduced. 
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Appendix 1 
The comparative static solution can be represented by: 
Us] 
A -B dqs c 
.-1 S'_ dN S 0 
where: 
A - (r~g<)Ns«\p2»cr - phr] - ^ ^[cr 1 - cr] 
(r-g')Ns 
Is 
B = (r-g'-Nsg") 
C = -{r-g')N,*\Pucrl - Ptcr'\ + 
ß + 
(r-g')N, 
Is 
Cu Ci 
Note that in this appendix the asterix denoting equilibrium values have been 
suppressed. Solution can be derived through the application of Cramer's rule: 
dNJds = C/D, where D is the determinant of the Hessian matrix: 
D = g'A - B (A2) 
The sign of this expression is positive. A necessary condition for an unique 
solution in the (q,N) space is that the curve dqldt = 0 is positively sloped and 
cuts the curve dNIdt = 0 from below (see Barbier and Rauscher): 
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dq 
~dW. > dN 
Hence, I B I > I g'A I. This means that the sign of the determinant D is 
the same as the sign of the term - 5 . The sign of determinant D is the same 
as the sign of the term -B. By rewriting B as: 
Sign(D) = Sign(-B) = Sign p.c; - ptcr -
<7> + l) 
Sign (PU1S + *y qfoL + 1) - (Pfl,
 + s)a 
aP,q: Iis 
qAa + 1) 
it can be found that the sign of the determinant is strictly positive using the 
extra information derived from applying the second order condition (that is, 
the second derivative of the hamiltonian with respect to q must be negative). 
CHAPTER 5 
IVORY TRADE AND ELEPHANT CONSERVATION1 
Abstract 
To protect the elephant, trade in ivory has been banned since 1990. In this 
paper, we demonstrate that the effect of this ban on elephant populations is 
ambiguous. Depending on the discount rate, among other things, the trade ban 
can either increase or decrease optimal population size. If the decision 
maker 's discount rate exceeds a certain threshold, the optimum stock of 
elephants is greater with a trade ban. Since the threshold is in the range of 
possible social discount rates, the success of the trade ban in promoting 
elephant conservation will vary spatially and temporally, depending on the 
characteristics and level of development of countries with significant elephant 
populations. 
5.1 Introduction 
During the 1970s and 1980s, elephant stocks were severely depleted. 
According to Chadwick (1992), "statistics showed a species on a toboggan 
ride towards absolute zero." African elephant populations are estimated to 
have declined from some 1.2-1.3 million animals in the mid 1970s to less 
than 800,000 by 1988 (Lindsay 1986; Harland 1988). Besides the large 
decline in elephant populations, scarce resources also appear to have been 
wasted as illustrated by the movement of ivory prices: in contrast to 
Hotelling-style models of efficient exploitation, real ivory prices have 
followed no trend, rising at an unprecedented rate in the 1970s and remaining 
high but variable thereafter (Milner-Gulland 1993). 
'This chapter published as: Bülte E.H. and G.C. van Kooten, A Note on Ivory Trade and 
Elephant Conservation, Environment and Development Economics, In Press 
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To halt the process of excessive depletion, the official status of the 
elephant as determined by the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (CITES) changed in 1989 from Appendix 2 (monitored trade) to 
Appendix 1 (trade only in special circumstances). This implied a world-wide 
ban on trade in ivory, thereby halting the (legal) killing of elephants for this 
purpose. Previous attempts in the framework of CITES to reduce ivory trade 
were less effective, as major loopholes in its application existed (Barbier et al. 
1990, Milner-Gulland 1993). 
Countries with relatively large elephant stocks, such as Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, South-Africa and Namibia, opposed this measure and have since 
lobbied to down-list the species, re-opening limited trade in ivory and other 
elephant products. Their main argument against the endangered species listing 
is that, in a number of areas, there are too many elephants and not too few, 
and that numbers need to be controlled to keep elephants from damaging 
agricultural lands and wildlife habitat. The ivory revenues can then be used 
for wildlife management and protection. 2 Barbier and Swanson (1990) have 
provided an economic argument for removing the trade ban, but it is based on 
a static model and intuition. 
In this chapter, the impact of the trade ban on elephant products is 
evaluated using a dynamic optimization model that determines optimum 
elephant populations. We disregard potential effects on other species and 
poaching. These are important omissions because conservation policies for 
elephant and rhino tend to be inter-linked and because elephant poaching has 
proved to be important in the past. 3 Yet the model developed in this chapter 
2Zirababwe, for example, spends US$12 million annually to counter illegal poaching of 
elephants, rhinoceroses and other animals (Chadwick 1992). Ivory trade generated US$10 million 
and, according to the Southern African countries, paid for most of the protection for all species. 
However, the link between wildlife management and protection is, in reality, no more than an 
assumption, although the link could be made real by designing appropriate institutions. 
3Poaching is not modelled here because it is not clear how the trade ban affects consumer 
preferences for ivory—one cannot infer that banning legal sales promotes illegal activities. 
Poaching may decline as it becomes more difficult to market poached ivory, while, on the other 
hand, government incentives to combat poaching (provide funds for monitoring and enforcement) 
are smaller, which enhances poaching. Reports indicate that ivory prices were as low as $ l l / k g 
in March 1993 (Sack 1996; but see Bakker-Cole 1995), indicating that demand had shifted 
inward. Without adequate enforcement, harvesting elephants will take place under conditions 
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allows distillation of some recommendations for policy. The concept of an 
optimum population size (as perceived by the government) will, to a certain 
extent, determine the development of actual stocks over time. For example, 
when governments believe that the actual stock exceeds the optimal stock, it 
could decide to cut back on its enforcement efforts, as poaching of elephants 
appears to be strongly related to law enforcement (Anonymous 1994, Bakker-
Cole 1995). Alternatively, excessively low stock levels (as measured against 
the optimum population) may induce governments to spend more resources on 
enforcement activities. In other words, preferences of host countries matter. 
Implementation of a trade ban affects both costs and benefits of "owning 
elephants". Implementation of a trade ban requires governments to re-assess 
their optimal stock size. In this chapter we show that for some countries, 
more specifically those with relatively high interest rates y efficient manage-
ment could prescribe an increase in population size under a trade ban. 
Moreover, we find that the "critical discount rate"—where the elephant 
population with and without the trade ban is the same size—is reasonably 
close to the social discount rate for many countries. Since discount rates used 
by different African countries are likely to differ (and change over time), the 
effects of the trade ban on African countries may be diverse. 
5.2 The model 
Suppose a government wants to maximize revenues from elephant 
management. Elephants impose a financial cost because they damage agricul-
tural crops (Pearce and Warford 1993) and possibly wildlife habitat 
(Chadwick 1992). Yet, they are a source of ivory benefits and revenues from 
eco-tourism. According to Pearce and Warford (1993), elephants play a 
flagship role in attracting tourists. The objective function for the government 
can therefore be written as follows (suppressing the time variable): 
resembling open access. The result will be rent dissipation and severe stock depletion (Barbier et 
al. 1990). For theoretical work on poaching and elephant conservation, see Khanna and Harford 
(1996) and Bulte and van Kooten (1997). 
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Max., {H(y)+R(x)-D(x))e~r'dt, (D 
where x(t) is the stock of elephants at time t, y(t) is the number of elephants 
harvested at t, H(y) are net revenues from harvesting elephants (i.e. selling 
ivory), R(x) are net benefits from tourism, and D(x) is damage inflicted on 
agricultural lands and other wildlife habitat. Obviously, R'(x), D'(x) > 0. The 
dynamics describing the stock of elephants can be represented as: 
x = G(x) - y, ( 2 ) 
where G(x) is the growth function for elephant herds; for bioeconomic models 
of elephant management, see also Swanson (1994) and Barbier et al. (1990). 
From the maximum principle and assuming an interior solution, 
first-order conditions are: 
H'(y) = X, (3) 
X = [r - G'(x))x - R'(x) + D'{x). ( 4 ) 
From (3) and (4): 
A = r - G'(x) + D'M - R'M (5) 
X ff'(y) 
Equation (3) states that the marginal revenue generated by harvesting another 
elephant now and selling its ivory is equal to the shadow value of retaining 
the elephant and perhaps harvesting it at a later date. Equation (4) is a 
generalized version of Hotelling's rale (Hotelling 1931), which, rewritten as 
in (5), states that the elephant population should be maintained at the level 
where the growth rate of the shadow value of an elephant (or, it's ivory) 
equals the dynamic opportunity cost of culling elephants (i.e., reducing the 
stock). The latter equals the discount rate minus the growth rate of the stock, 
plus a term that measures the change in future agricultural damages avoided 
plus lost future tourism benefits from culling another animal today. 
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Differentiating (3) and equating it to (4) gives: 
_ (r - G'(x))H'(y) - R'Qc) + D'{x) (6) 
H" (y) 
Once the optimum equilibrium stock x", or steady state, is reached, harvest 
levels will be constant; hence y=0. The implicit optimal stock size is then 
determined by solving 
r = G'(r) +
 R'V> ~ D'M (7) 
H'(y) 
If the discount rate equals the growth rate plus a nonmarket value term, the 
optimal stock size has been reached. Then, from (2), harvest (y*) should equal 
the regenerated fraction of the stock [G(x")]. 
The effect of a trade ban can be determined by removing the term 
H(y) from (1) and solving the dynamic optimization problem anew. In that 
case, enforcement of the trade ban reduces expression (7) to 
R'(x) = D'(x). ( 8 ) 
The optimal population level now occurs where marginal benefits generated 
from tourism equal marginal agricultural damage. 
Is the level of the elephant stock determined from (8) larger or smaller 
than that determined from (7)? Alternatively, does the trade ban increase or 
decrease optimal population size? An answer can only be found by specifying 
the underlying functions. With respect to D(x), it seems reasonable to assume 
that agricultural damage and damage inflicted on nature reserves are directly 
proportional to the size of the stock. 4 Hence, assume D(x) = ax, where a > 0 
is a parameter (see below). On the other hand, the marginal utility of watch-
ing elephants is a positive but diminishing function of stock size, as anyone 
•^ This is a simplification since the presence of small groups of elephants may even have 
beneficial effects, since their feeding habits result in more sunlight on the ground, which favours 
growth of grasses, the preferred food of grazers. Thus, over some range, a convex curve would 
describe D(x), while D{x) might be concave over some other range (Western 1989). The current 
specification is chosen for expositional convenience, and it does not affect the qualitative nature 
of the results. 
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who ever spent a week in a Zimbabwean game park would agree. For 
simplicity, assume that the convex relation between R(x) and stock size is 
adequately represented by R(x) = |81n(je), with B > 0. Also assume that the 
growth of an elephant population can be described by a logistic growth 
function, G(x) = gx(l-x/K) where g is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the 
region's carrying capacity (for a more complex, and probably more appropri-
ate functional form, see Basson et al. 1992). 
5.3 Estimates of Optimal Elephant Stocks: Kenya 
We consider two cases—an individual country that is a price taker 
(Kenya) and the African continent as a whole. For Kenya, the demand for 
elephants is given by H'(y) = P, where P is the (fixed) price of an elephant 
derived from the price of ivory. Using the functional forms described above 
and solving equation (7) for the steady state optimal stock of elephants with 
trade in ivory gives: 
. _ (g-r)KP - aK + JtpgKP + [aK-(g-r)KPf (9) 
AT — • 
4gP 
Equation (9) is solved for two recent prices and different values of the 
discount rate, with the results provided in Figure 5 .1 . The parameter values 
behind Figure 5.1 are given in the Appendix. Under the trade ban, the 
optimum population is simply B/a, or 15,700 elephants (with associated 
annual cull of 880 animals) irrespective of the discount rate. 5 
5 The actual stock of Kenyan elephants was approximately 16,000 elephants in 1989 (Pearce 
and Warford 1993). 
122 Chapter 5 
23000 
5000 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
O i - c \ i e o g i o œ r » . c o g ) T - i - c \ i 
O O O O O O O O O Q T - T -o o o o o o ' o o c i d o 
Discount Rate 
Figure 5.1: Estimated Optimal Elephant Stocks for Kenya for Given Prices 
and Discount Rates 
From Figure 5 .1 , it is clear that, for both prices and when the discount 
rate is more than about 3 .5%, the optimal stock of elephants under a trade 
ban exceeds that with trade; at lower discount rates optimal elephant stocks 
are greatest when trade in ivory is permitted. 6 A real discount rate of 3.5% 
^ n the absence of recreation benefits, damage and stock size dependent harvesting costs, the 
optimum stock size approaches Q.5K (=30 ,000 animals, see Appendix) as r approaches zero. In 
our model, at the optimum stock size, marginal agricultural damage exceeds marginal recreation 
benefits, which explains why for both prices x* is (far) below 30,000 animals. Relatively high 
prices for ivory induce the government to "tolerate" more damage, so we obtain the unusual 
result that the curves cross at a positive rate of discount. 
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might be a good approximation of the social discount rate for developed 
countries. For developing countries, however, r probably exceeds 3.5% by a 
substantial amount. This would imply that elephant populations should have 
increased after implementation of the trade ban. This is consistent with actual 
observations in recent years (Chadwick 1992). If the discount rate applied by 
the Kenyan government equals 10% and P is US$ 3,060 per elephant (or 
$300 per kilogram of raw ivory), 7 the optimum population size should almost 
double after implementation of the trade ban. However, if a social discount 
rate of 2% would be a more accurate description of the rate of time prefer-
ence of the Kenyan government, the optimum population size under the trade 
ban is almost 3,000 elephants smaller than the equilibrium stock with trade. 
The effect of the trade ban, or its removal, on population size is sensitive to 
the discount rate. 
Ivory prices also play a role. When ivory prices are $300/kg (as in 
1989), optimal elephant stocks are higher for low discount rates but lower for 
higher discount rates compared to an ivory price of $100/kg (as in 1985-86) 
(see Harland 1988; Barbier and Swanson 1990). Increasing a reduces optimal 
stock levels, while increasing 8 enhances them. The results of a sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the recreation and damage parameters are provided in 
Table 5 . 1 . 8 The negative values for the critical discount rate in Table 5.1 
indicate that, at low values of a and high values of 8, there is a chance that 
the trade ban is always optimal. On the other hand, high values of a (accom-
panied by low values of 8) lead to critical discount rates that are higher than 
5 % , meaning that a government with a lower rate of time preference than this 
critical value will favour elephant conservation to a greater extent when trade 
is permitted. The analysis illustrates the importance to the international 
community of obtaining good estimates of a and 8 before making decisions 
about the benefits of a trade ban in ivory products. 
7 The conversion from raw ivory prices to elephant prices is based on average tusk weights 
(see Appendix). For an empirical analysis of ivory prices, see Milner-Gulland (1993). 
Substituting appropriate functional forms in (7) gives: r = g(l-2x"/X) + IIP (filx'-a). 
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Table 5.1: Critical Switching Points of the Discount Rate for Various Values 
of a and 8. 
\!2a a 2a 
1/28 3.3 5.2 6.1 
negative 3.3 5.2 
28 negative negative 3.3 
5.4 Estimates of Optimal Elephant Stocks: The African Continent 
Next, consider the case of the African continent as a whole. Assume 
that the inverse demand function for ivory is linear and downward sloping, 
i.e., Ifty^-yy. In this case, equation (9) cannot be solved in straightfor-
ward manner because it is necessary to solve for the optimal harvest level y* 
and optimal stock x* simultaneously. The approach in the case of ivory trade 
is to find the steady state solution by setting x and y in equations (2) and (6) 
to zero and solving both for y: 
y = - -
7 
ax - 8 
gx I _ 2x 
(10) 
rxy 
It is also not straightforward to solve (10) and (11) for y* and x* so this must 
be done graphically and numerically. The graphical results are presented in 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3, with the parameter values discussed in appendix 1. 
Again, the optimal stock under a trade ban is given by 81a, although the 
values of these parameters are different in the case of Africa than Kenya 
alone (see appendix 1). In the case of Africa, the optimal stock of elephants 
under a trade ban is 411,200 compared to a stock of approximately 600,000 at 
the time the ban was implemented (Pearce and Warford 1993). 
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The y=0 locus is sensitive to the discount rate, intersecting the growth 
function ( i = 0 ) from above when discount rates are 5% or less and from 
below when discount rates are greater than 5%; there is only one intersection 
point in all of the cases examined here. In Figure 5.2, the y = 0 locus for a 
discount rate of 4% is illustrated. As indicated in the figure, a stable, steady 
state solution to the problem exists, albeit a saddle point solution. Upon 
comparing Figures 5.1 and 5.3, one finds that the critical discount rate in the 
small country case is about 3.5% compared to about 5% when harvest of 
ivory affects price. The critical discount rate for the large country case is 
higher because the large country has the ability to set prices and realise a 
higher rate of return. 9 The conclusion is that a trade ban may lead to greater 
elephant conservation in the small-country case of Kenya (where the critical 
discount rate is low) than in the large-country case with a higher critical 
discount rate. 
It is important to note, however, the potentially restrictive assumption 
in the "large-country" model that the relation between (potential) recreation 
benefits and elephant population size in Africa is proportional to that for 
Kenya—recreation benefits for Africa equal benefits for Kenya multiplied by 
the ratio of the total African elephant stock to the number of elephants in 
Kenya (see Appendix). This gave a value of recreation benefits for all of 
Africa equal to about $900 million. Clearly, benefits from elephant watching 
are lower in many African countries where potential for this activity is less 
well developed (viz., the disturbing influences of wars and the lack of a 
well-maintained physical infrastructure in some countries). For that reason, 
the estimate of $900 million (and the value of 8 derived from it) serves as an 
upper bound for our calculations. A sensitivity analysis over benefit values 
can be used to discover critical discount rates. First, solving equations (10) 
and (11) simultaneously for r gives: 
9 For example, the price of ivory for the large country case amounts to US$ 533 per kg, with 
an associated harvest of approximately 22,000 elephants. 
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Figure 5.2: Stock and Harvest Dynamics for African Elephants (r=4%) 
For different recreational values, it is possible to derive 8 from the relation 
R(x) = Bln(x), where x=600,000 and the remaining parameters are provided 
in appendix 1. Critical r ranges from 5 .1% for $900 million in assumed 
recreational benefits, to 5.9% for $500 million in assumed benefits, and to 
6.8% for $100 million in assumed benefits. The result is rather stable with 
respect to parameter values and the earlier conclusion does not change. 
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of Optimal Stock Levels for all Africa, With and 
Without the Trade Ban 
5.5 Discussion 
A natural next step in the analysis would be to test whether our 
prediction—countries with high discount rates have increased their stock, 
while countries with low discount rates have reduced their elephant popula-
tions in response to the 1990 trade ban—can actually be observed. 1 0 Empiri-
cal testing of this hypothesis is difficult because the social discount rate, or 
the rate of interest as applied by the government in inter-temporal 
cost-benefit analyses, is not revealed on markets. Even market-determined 
real rates of interest are difficult to determine for many African countries due 
to poorly functioning financial markets. Governments of many developing 
For a discussion of social and private rates of discount, see, e.g.. Barbier et al. (1990). In 
this model, the correct discount rate is the social discount rate. 
128 Chapter 5 
countries have typically tried to "fix" nominal interest rates in the past, 
mainly for political purposes. Real interest rates (nominal rates minus infla-
tion) have been negative in the seventies and eighties for many countries 
(International Monetary Fund 1995). These artificial interest rates provide 
insufficient information about the rate of time preference of governments, so 
applying such a rate in an empirical analysis would serve little purpose. A 
more fruitful approach might be to work with indicators of the rate of time 
preference. For example, a common assumption is that the rate of time 
preference is related to (material) wealth and uncertainty of the future 
(Barbier et al. 1990), but this is left to future research. 
One interesting observation, however, is that the rate of time prefer-
ence of African governments will not be constant, but will change (more 
specifically, decline) as the economy and per capita income grows. This in 
turn implies that, to conserve elephants, it is necessary to frequently re-assess 
instruments implemented in the past. The same instrument (e.g., a trade ban) 
that worked well yesterday could be detrimental to elephant conservation at a 
future date. Whether a trade ban is effective in achieving its goal of species 
preservation or enhancement depends crucially on the discount rate, which is 
an object of a country's macro-economic policies, as much as it is on 
intervention by the international community to protect wildlife species. 
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Appendix 
Here the parameters used in the model are described. For both the 
small-country case and all of Africa, a is determined as the value of lost 
forage, and not the damage that might be caused by elephants trampling 
crops, since such damages can be avoided by appropriate management 
practices. As herbivores daily consume about 2.5% of their body weight in 
forage, one elephant annually consumes as much forage as required to bring 
4.7 cows to full maturity (about 36,500 kg of dry matter). Using data for 
Kenya (see van Kooten, Bulte and Kinyua 1996) and current exchange rates, 
each cow has a net value of US$35. Hence, the forage displaced is valued at 
$164.50, which is taken as the value of parameter a. 
The intrinsic growth rate of elephants is estimated to be 7%, or 
g = 0 . 0 7 , although that is an optimistic estimate that can only be obtained with 
appropriate management (Lindsay 1986; Forse 1987). We take the carrying 
capacity of Africa to be approximately double the highest population estimate 
of recent times (i.e., K = 3 million). Kenya currently has some 16,000 
elephants, which is about one-half of the numbers of several decades earlier. 
We assume double the latter amount as an approximation of carrying capacity 
for Kenya (K=60,000). 
In the small-country case of Kenya, which is a price taker in the ivory 
trade (prices given in the text), 8 is derived as follows. Brown and Henry 
(1989) estimate that the annual value from viewing elephants in Kenya is $20-
25 million. Given that there are an estimated 16,000 elephants in Kenya, then 
8 = $25 million/log(16,000) = 2,582,553 (where log refers to the natural 
logarithm). For all of Africa, there are approximately 600,000 elephants, but 
there is no information about their tourism or recreational value. Taking the 
average estimate of Brown and Henry (1989) and assuming it applies to all of 
Africa (an unrealistic assumption) gives an upper estimate of view-
ing/recreational value of some $900 million. Then 8=67.6 million. 
Unlike for a small-country, a decision maker who might wish to 
determine the optimal stock of elephants for the entire African continent 
would need to take into account the effect of harvest on price. A linear 
demand function can be constructed from the fact that, in 1986, some 118,600 
elephants were harvested and the price of ivory was about $100/kg, while, in 
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1989, 75,000 animals were harvested and ivory price was $300/kg (it should 
be recognized that the price data for 1986 and 1989 may be affected by 
political events). Average tusk sizes were reported to be 5.6 kg in 1986 and 
5.1 kg in 1989. Using these values, raw ivory prices are converted into 
elephant values of $1120 and $3060 for ivory prices of $100/kg and $300/kg, 
respectively; then, the parameter values can be calculated as i/<=6397.16 and 
7 = 0 . 0 4 4 . 
CHAPTER 6 
DYNAMIC AND STATIC APPROACHES TO MIXED GOOD MAN-
AGEMENT: THE CASE OF MTNKE WHALES TN THE NORTHEAST 
ATLANTIC1 
Abstract 
Whales have private and public good characteristics. In this chapter a dynamic 
model is developed that captures the complexities of managing such a resour-
ce. Estimates of the optimal steady state with this model suggest that the 
current stock of minke whales in the Northeast Atlantic is below the optimum 
steady state stock. The optimum approach dynamics to the steady state are 
consistent with drastic measures as the current moratorium on commercial 
whaling. These findings are not consistent with previous research in this field. 
The discrepancies should be attributed to the inclusion of non-use values in 
the present chapter. Finally, we compare the outcomes of the dynamic model 
with the results of a simple static model. We find that the latter consistently 
errs on the side of excessive exploitation because of its failure to account for 
the impact of current harvesting on future benefits and costs. 
6.1 Introduction and brief historical overview of whaling 
Commercial whaling has taken a severe toll on whale populations, 
especially in the period when whaling took place under conditions of open 
access. During the period 1920-1970, for instance, the population of blue 
whales in the southern ocean was reduced to 5 % of its initial size, humpbacks 
to 3 % , fin whales to 2 1 % and Sei whales to 54% (World Resources, 1990-
91). To regulate harvesting the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was 
'This chapter is based on: Bulte E.H., H. Folmer and W.J.M. Heijman (1996), Dynamic 
and static approaches to mixed good management: The case of minke whales in the Northeast 
Atlantic, Department of Development Economics, Wageningen Agricultural University, 
Discussion paper. 
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established in 1946. It introduced catch quotum systems in the seventies. Such 
a system was introduced for the North Atlantic in 1976. 
At the 34th annual meeting of the IWC in 1982, it was decided to 
impose a moratorium on the commercial harvest of all whale species. This 
meant a total ban on harvesting any whale species under IWC purview for 
commercial purposes, starting from the 1986 coastal whaling season and the 
1985-1986 pelagic whaling season. This ban was intended to continue until the 
end of the 1990 whaling season. The IWC decided in 1991 and 1992 to 
extend the moratorium, even for (the few) species that were considered to be 
able to sustain some commercial whaling. As expected, these decisions were 
not taken unanimously. The countries involved in commercial whaling used 
their right to object and voted against the proposals (with Spain as the only 
exception). Imposition and extension of the moratorium did not imply that 
whale harvesting ceased completely. Small numbers of minke whales were 
caught for ostensibly scientific purposes. 
Due to the voluntarily basis of complying with the IWC, its stability 
was fragile. In 1992 Norway decided to "break" the moratorium and restarted 
commercial whaling on a modest scale the following year. Norwegian whalers 
harvested 301 minkes in the northern hemisphere in the following season. The 
1995 quotum set by the Norwegians amounted to 232 minke whales (Anony-
mous, 1995). It should be observed that, since Norway filed formal objections 
to the moratorium, it was not bound to it. The Norwegians were thus in their 
right to continue whaling. 
Minke whales can be found in all oceans, but their recurrence is 
seasonal as they undertake extensive migration between the tropics and polar 
seas. The large-scale commercial whaling industry was not very interested in 
the minke whale until the 1970's low stock sizes and quotas reduced catches 
of larger species. Minke whales are small baleen whales, growing to a size as 
large as approximately 10 meters. They compare poorly with many other 
whale species. For instance, approximately 32 minke whales are needed to 
yield as many barrels of oil as one blue whale. Moreover, they are fast, and 
once shot, they sink. Minkes are harvested for meat and fat. Estimations of 
the global stock size range from 500,000 to (way over) 1,000,000. They are 
especially 'abundant' in Antarctic waters. According to the whaling industry 
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and IWC, minke whale populations are able to sustain some regulated com-
mercial harvesting. This claim has aroused protest and debate. 
The animosity can partially be explained by the "mixed good property" 
of whales: they involve elements of both private and public goods (Kuronuma 
and Tisdell, 1993). In the opinion of the whaling industry, the resource should 
be looked upon as a private good, i.e., harvested and marketed under conditi-
ons of exclusion and competition. 2 On the other hand, society is increasingly 
regarding whale resources as a public good, and has especially related 
existence values to the stock. A good that possesses this combination of 
private use values and public non-use values is defined a mixed good. Because 
of their public good characteristics, harvesting mixed goods like whales in 
accordance with conventional fishery models will result in market failure 
(though conventional models can be easily extended to include non-use values, 
as will be demonstrated below). 
One of the objectives of this chapter is to test whether the moratorium 
on commercial harvesting of minkes is economically justified. Recent analyses 
of the moratorium exclusively focused on (private) use values, probably 
because of data availability. Conrad and Bjorndal (1993) use a delayed 
recruitment model to examine the efficiency of the moratorium for part of the 
North Atlantic stock of minke whales, and find that the moratorium is 
inefficient in most circumstances. Amundsen et al. (1995) show that this stock 
was in no danger of extinction, even under conditions of open access. 
However, if maximizing utility for society as a whole is the purpose of whale 
management, these findings are not sufficient to abolish the ban on harvesting, 
as non-use values are disregarded. 
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. The first objective is to 
develop a dynamic framework to analyze management decisions of a natural 
2 For a long time property rights of marine mammals were not defined. Therefore the private 
good aspects of whale management gave rise to open access problems. It is recognised that this 
issue has been partially solved by the United Nations 1977 Informal Composite Negotiating Text 
and the United Nations 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. In 1977 many nations (including 
Norway) declared souvereign rights within a 200 mile zone. From then onwards, in principle, a 
national authority was able to manage the fish and whale stocks that inhabit the souvereign area. 
It thus can be argued that an open access regime has been replaced by a common property regime 
(see, e.g. Feeney et al. 1996). Since, however, whales tend to migrate and don't respect 
territorial borders, an international governing body like the IWC has an important role to play. 
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resource when the resource is a mixed good. The results of this model allow a 
comparison of the current stock and the economically optimal stock. The 
second objective of the chapter is to evaluate the economic rationale for the 
moratorium on the harvesting of minke whales by analyzing the approach 
paths towards this optimum. Because the unilateral "breaking" of the morato-
rium by Norwegian whalers has triggered off some tension (the U.S.A. 
threatened to ban Norwegian fish exports and Greenpeace called on tourists to 
boycott Norway), the issue is certainly not only of academic interest. 
A by-product of the chapter is an illustration of the importance of 
employing an intertemporal rather than a static model. The latter was propo-
sed by Tisdell (1991) and Kuronuma and Tisdell (1993). With respect to the 
problem of evaluating the moratorium, the simplified static approach boils 
down to balancing marginal preservation and consumption benefits. We 
demonstrate that, for this specific case, the static simplification will result in 
incorrect policy recommendations. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In section 6.2, an 
optimal control model is developed that captures the mixed good effect. 
Solving the dynamic model suggests that the current population of minke 
whales in the Northeast Atlantic is below the social optimum (though some 
ambiguity remains because of uncertainty with respect to marginal non-use 
values). However, this result does not necessarily imply that a moratorium is 
optimal. To examine the validity of the moratorium, the optimal approach 
paths are numerically solved in section 6.3. In section 6.4 we apply the static 
model proposed by Kuronuma and Tisdell (1993) to the minke whale case and 
compare the results with the findings of the dynamic model. Conclusions and 
policy recommendations follow in section 6.5. 
6.2 The mixed good model 
An optimal control model is developed that includes both the public-
and the private good features of whale stocks. In this context, it will be 
assumed that the IWC has the authority to set and monitor the quotas. The 
objective will be to maximize social value. Under the assumption that the 
private and public good benefits are separable, and that the cost of harvesting 
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whales C is a function of the number of whales caught (y), 3 the objective 
function is as follows (suppressing time notation): 
+ 0 0 
MAXy w = Yl FiH<y)+ u&> -  cw - p w i ( 1 ) 
(»0 
where H(y) is the benefit from consuming y whales [i.e., the area under the 
demand curve for whales, so that H(y) - C(y) is the sum of producers and 
consumers surplus], U(x) is the benefit from conserving x whales as an 
amenity resource, and B is the social discount factor (equal to ( 1 + r ) 1 , where 
r is the social discount rate). The usual assumptions prevail: H'iy) > 0, H"(y) 
< 0, lf(x) > 0, C'(y) > 0, C"(y) > 0. The term P(x) relates to the econ-
omic cost of biological predation by minke whales. Flaaten (1988) claims that 
reduced harvesting of sea mammals such as minke whales increases predation 
by these mammals, which increases the cost of harvesting their prey species 
(capelin, herring and cod). In a recent article, Flaaten and Stollery (1996) 
estimated that the annual "predation cost" per minke whale amounts to 
approximately US$ 2,000 (the cost depends, among other things, on the 
management regime applied to exploit the prey species). 4 The equation of 
motion of the state variable and the non-negativity constraints are as follows: 
In the Cobb-Douglas production function for whaling, as estimated by Amundsen et al. 
(1995), the stock output elasticity was not significantly different from zero. Possibly, this is 
explained by the biology of the resource (see Horwood 1990): minkes school in small numbers 
and therefore have characteristics of a "schooling species" (see Neher 1990). However, in the 
Spence production function (which was eventually preferred in the Amundsen et al. article 
because the predictions were more in line with actual observations), the stock output elasticity is 
by definition equal to one. This implies that it may be more appropriate to add the stock of 
whales x as an argument in the cost function: C(y,x). For computational convenience we have 
omitted this variable, but we will discuss its potential implications in section 6.5. 
''The predation cost of US$ 2,000 is only relevant given the current stock of the prey 
fisheries and the current management regime applied in these fisheries. A more correct approxi-
mation of this damage function would be to model it as the negative of the present value of 
economic benefits to the prey fisheries foregone. Hence, for a correct measure we should also 
maximize the benefits of the prey fisheries. This is beyond the purpose of this paper. However, 
the current specification implicitly assumes that management of the prey fishery is aimed at 
keeping the stock of prey species constant at the current stock size. 
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= (l-m)(xt - y) + G{xt_) 
(2) 
y > 0 , x > 0 
where m is the natural mortality rate; xt - yt is escapement, or the stock of 
whales left after harvesting; G(xx_r) is the recruitment function; and r is the 
delay in recruitment, reflecting that minke whales do not become sexually 
mature immediately after birth. Conrad and Bjorndal (1993) and Amundsen et 
al. (1995) specify a generalized logistic function to characterize recruitment: 
where y is the intrinsic growth rate; L is the environmental carrying capacity; 
and a > 1 is a parameter that skews the logistic function to the right. The 
current value Lagrangian is given by: 
Lc=£ ß'[H(y) + U(x) - C(y)-P(x)] +\M / T 1 [(1 ~m){xt -y) + G{xt_) -xM ] 
The necessary first-order conditions for an optimum solution are as follows: 
G{xt_T) =yxt_\l-(xJL)«] (3) 
(4) 
= ß'[H'(y) - C'(y)) - X ! + 1 / 3 t + I ( l - m ) = 0 (5) 
(6) 
_i =ß'[U!(x)-Pf(x)) *\tlßTl(l ~m) +\t^ß>^lG> 
and the equation of motion (dLc/dX = 0). Equation (5) can be rewritten as: 
X M j8(l - m ) = H'(y) - C'(y) (7) 
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implying that the present value of next period's shadow price of the escaped 
fraction of the resource should equal price minus marginal harvesting cost in 
the current period. Equation (6) can be rewritten as: 
X,+1 - X, = P>(x) - V(x) + XI+1 ^ - X,+r+1 1 G'(x) (8) 
which is an extended version of the standard non-arbitrage condition for 
renewable resources. The optimal rent path over time depends on (1) the rate 
of discount; (2) recruitment and mortality of the resource; and (3) the stock-
effect on conservation utility and economic prédation cost. Harvesting whales 
reduces the stock and thereby reduces (total) preservation values and prédation 
costs, both now and in the future. A rational decision maker should include 
these effects when he decides about current harvesting. If the preservation 
values outweigh prédation costs, the efficient rent path is more gently-sloped. 
This indicates that some of the harvesting should be postponed along an 
optimal path. 
It is possible to use the first order conditions to solve for the optimal 
steady-state stock of whales that the IWC should try to support if it seeks to 
maximize social economic value. If the current stock of whales exceeds this 
optimal stock (x"), it should be depleted in accordance with the efficiency 
conditions (7) - (8). We find the optimal equilibrium solution by substituting 
(7) into (8), and setting the RHS of equation (8) and (2) equal to zero [hence, 
(GOO-rocXl-m*)1 = y*]: 
r + m= 8*G'(x ') + (1 -m) U ' ( x ' ) ~ W 
D(y') - C'(y') 
We have thus obtained a single implicit equation for the optimal steady state x, 
= x".s Equation (9) is a modified golden rule, where the second term on the 
RHS is the marginal rate of substitution between leaving the (surviving 
fraction of the) stock in situ and harvesting it today. Two observations that 
5Equation (9) can be rewritten as Z(y,x) = 0, which is an implicit function in (y,x) space. 
By the implicit function rule (dy/dx = - Z„/Zy) it is readily demonstrated that this function is 
upwards sloping for lf(x) > P(x). 
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are in line with intuition apply: first, the higher the marginal benefits of 
conservation [£/(.*)] or marginal harvesting costs [Ciy)], ceteris paribus, the 
higher the optimal equilibrium stock. Second, the higher the marginal benefits 
of consuming whales [D(y)] or the marginal economic cost of biological 
predation [P'ix)], ceteris paribus, the lower the optimal stock. This is true 
because G"(x) < 0. 
Equation (9) can be solved for the optimum population of minke 
whales in the Northeast Atlantic x" if G(x), U(x), P(x), H(y) and C(y) are 
known. It is possible to find approximations of C(y), G(x), and P(x) in the 
literature, and to estimate the inverse demand function D(y). Conrad and 
Bjorndal (1993) and Amundsen et al. (1995) model growth of minke whale 
populations with delayed recruitment models in the tradition of Clark (1976). 
In this paper we apply their specification of recruitment, implying that m = 
0 .1 ; a = 2.39; r = 7; y = 0.15; and L = 130,000. 6 For convenience, we 
initially assume that marginal harvest cost are constant and equal to Norwegi-
an Kroner (NOK) 1,000 [for cost data, see Amundsen et al., (1995)]. We also 
assume that the marginal economic predation costs P'ix) are constant (i.e., 
every whale eats the same quantity of commercially valuable fish species) and 
equal, as mentioned above, US$ 2,000, or approximately NOK 14,000 
(Flaaten and Stollery, 1996). 
Next, we turn to the inverse demand function D(y). First the variables 
included in the function will be described briefly. The income variable 
included in the equation to be estimated is real income per capita (/). Prices 
and numbers of whales harvested (from 1950 until 1987) are provided by 
Amundsen et al. (1995). In addition to quantity and income, prices of 
substitutes should be included in the inverse demand equation. For this 
analysis beef is used as a substitute. Since Norway is a net importer of beef, 
the average yearly import price of beef (B) was used. Inspection of the data 
indicates a non-linear inverse demand function. This was confirmed by the 
Box-Cox test. We therefore resort to a Box-Cox transformation: 
^ i s implies that the pristine, or natural population (where natural mortality is exactly offset 
by recruitment) equals approximately 82,000 whales (see Amundsen et al. 1995). 
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f - 1 , for 7T 5 * 0 
7T (10) 
= log(z) , for IT = 0 
The Box-Cox model is general, and can take the form of a log-linear 
and linear specification as special cases. The transformation can be applied to 
just the LHS of the model (model 1), or the RHS of the model (model 2), or 
both sides of the model (model 3). Lx)g-Likelihood estimates indicated that 
model 1 is preferred. According to this specific Box-Cox model, the parame-
ter 7r is estimated to be 0.60. 7 
Having obtained an estimation of TT, we transform the LHS-data by 
means of equation (10), and estimate a conventional linear model. Estimates 
of the full model showed that the coefficient of the variable beef was highly 
insignificant. The estimated model, with the variable beef deleted and with 
prices expressed in 1994 NOK per whale, reads as (t-values in parentheses): 
where Y indicates the number of whales supplied per period, and z(0.6) = 
(p06 - l ) /0 .6 . The Durbin Watson statistic indicates no autocorrelation. 
Given the inverse demand function, it is possible to solve equation (9) 
for x , provided we have an estimate of Ifix) and the social discount rate r. It 
is obvious that information with respect to lf{x) is not readily available. The 
marginal utility of conservation could be derived from e.g. a CVM study by 
means of questions like: "Given that there are currently so and so many 
whales, what is the maximum you would be willing to pay to enlarge the 
population of minke whales by 1,000 whales?". Such data, however, are to 
7 W e will use the Box-Cox model only to estimate % because except for -TT, the other parame-
ters are generally not invariant to the "scale" of the analysis (i.e. whether quantities of meat 
supplied are expressed in kilograms or tons). This means that one should not rely on t-statistics of 
the variables besides ir in the context of Box-Cox models (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). 
z(0.6) = 1020 + 0.0037/ - 0.3 F 
(3.6) (2.2) (-7.3) (11) 
DW = 1.7 , R2 = 0.9 , F = 37.8 
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our knowledge not available. Because of this limitation, we will focus on the 
willingness to pay for stock conservation, and assume that marginal utility of 
preservation is constant. Admittedly, this assumption is quite strong [see e.g. 
Loomis et al. (1993), Loomis and Larson (1994) and Loomis and White 
(1996)], and will probably lead to an overestimation of the optimum populati-
on. Values for stock conservation will be derived from the literature on 
willingness to pay for strict conservation of related species, such as blue and 
gray whales. The WTP for stock conservation are per adult or per household. 
Assuming the latter, (/(x) is found by multiplying the number of households 
in the analysis by the total willingness to pay per household, and next divide 
this product by the (maximum) number of whales, x. In Table 6.1 we vary 
the total willingness to pay per European household 8 for preservation of 
minkes in the Northeast Atlantic from NOK 0 to NOK 30 (or, approximately, 
from US$ 0 to US$ 4, relatively low numbers when compared to estimates 
found in the literature, as will be discussed below). Equation (9) is numerical-
ly solved for various combinations of r and I/(x), and the results are pres-
ented in Table 6 .1 . 
^ h e reason for restricting the analysis to European households (approximately 90 million 
households) requires some explanation. One could argue that whale stocks constitute a global 
public good, hence that the relevant human population is the world population and not just that of 
Europe. However, the whale population under consideration is primarily found near the European 
coast whereas other parts of the world like eastern North America have access to whale 
populations in their own region. More important, however, is the following reason. Enlarging the 
spatial scope of the relevant human population would also require enlarging the total stock of 
whales: If all the households in the world care for all the whales in the world, the analysis should 
focus on the global whale population instead of dealing with minke whales in the Northeast 
Atlantic. 
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Table 6.1: Optimum minke population (in thousands of whales) in the North-
east Atlantic according to the dynamic model. WTP expresses annual willing-
ness to pay for stock conservation in Norwegian Kroners (NOK) per house-
hold. 
* 
X W T P = 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
r = 0 . 0 0 0 0 6.6 70.0 81.4 82.0 82.0 
0.02 0 0 0 66.1 79.8 82.0 82.0 
0.04 0 0 0 61.5 78.7 82.0 82.0 
0.06 0 0 0 57.2 76.2 82.0 82.0 
0.08 0 0 0 52.8 74.3 82.0 82.0 
0.10 0 0 0 44.5 73.3 80.5 82.0 
As mentioned above, for the current specification of the delayed recruitment 
function, the natural population is 82,000 whales. From Table 6.1 it can be 
deduced that the equilibrium population is equal to this natural population for 
discount rates lower than 8% when the average WTP per household for 
conservation of the stock of minkes in the Northeast Atlantic is greater than 
or equal to NOK 25. Note that the optimum stock is very sensitive to relative-
ly low non-use values. Without willingness to pay for preservation, the whale 
stock should be depleted if maximizing the present value of welfare is the 
objective of the policy maker, even for low discount rates. This result is due 
to the significant predation costs imposed by whales. 9 
The literature provides two estimates for the actual stock in this area. 
First, according to Amundsen et al. (1995) this stock consists of approximate-
9There appears to be a general societal consensus on the notion that exploitation of 
renewable resources should be on a sustainable basis. This implies that extinction should be 
avoided, and that at least a viable population of minke whales should be supported for an infinite 
period of time. More accurately formulated: the risk of extinction of the species within several 
centuries should be acceptably low. The model can be elaborated by a condition that relates the 
current stock xt to the concept of the minimum viable population (MVP). This would imply 
incorporating the feature of critical depensation in the recruitment function, such that net growth 
becomes negative for population levels below MVP. We refer to Soule (1987) for more 
information with respect to MVP and (marine) mammals and to Clark (1990) for more informati-
on on (critical) depensation in recruitment. 
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ly 57,000 whales, which would imply that the current stock is sub-optimally 
low for many (realistic) combinations of preservation values and discount 
rates as reported in Table 6 .1 . Second, according to the IWC (1992) [cited in 
Flaaten and Stollery (1996)] the actual population amounts to 86,000 
whales. 1 0 In other words, the actual population would exceed the natural 
population of our model, which is clearly not consistent. In other words, this 
population estimate should not be compared to the population estimates as 
presented in the table. Instead, it suggests that the delayed recruitment 
function applied in this chapter and elsewhere in the literature is not correct, 
and should be modified to allow for a higher natural population. One crude 
way to achieve this is to increase the environmental carrying capacity L. 
When we repeat the analysis with such a higher value (for example L = 
160,000, such that the natural population is approximately 100,000), then the 
optimal steady state x* would be equal to this new natural population for WTP 
> NOK 35 and r < 10%. This implies that, again, the optimal stock equals 
the natural stock for many different combinations of preservation values and 
discount rates (indicating that whenever the current stock is lower than the 
natural stock, it is sub-optimally low), although this finding is less clearcut 
then when the lower population estimate is more apt. 
We would like to note that the preservation values for which the 
optimum steady state exceeds the current stock need not be high. For exam-
ple, taking the average of the population estimates mentioned above (or 
72,500 whales), then for a social discount rate of 10%, the annual willingness 
to pay for whale conservation per household should be about NOK 20, or less 
than US$ 3. Of course, it is an open question whether the average European 
household is actually willing to pay such amounts, but the literature available 
suggests that this may well be the case. Pearce and Warford (1990), for 
example, present results of research indicating that the existence value of blue 
whales equals about US$ 8 per adult, (which would be US$ 16, or about 
An anonymous reviewer has pointed out to us that recent (1996) IWC estimates of the 
minke stock are significantly higher than the ones reported above. 
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NOK 100, in our analysis because we focus on households). 1 1 Loomis and 
Larson (1994) have estimated WTP to increase populations of gray whales, 
and present numbers that are even higher; according to their work, the WTP 
for households to increase the current population by 50% and 100% amounts 
to approximately $ 17 and $ 19, respectively. This indicates that actual WTP-
values may well be in the vicinity of NOK 100, which would be consistent 
with the conclusion that the current stock of whales is sub-optimally small, 
even for high discount rates. This result is robust with respect to the magni-
tude of P(x) and C'(y). For example, for P(x) equal to NOK 28,000 and 
NOK 7,000 (hence doubling and halving the original value) and r < 10%, 
the optimum population is equal to the natural population when WTP > NOK 
40 and NOK 25, respectively. 
In order to evaluate the rationale of the moratorium, however, the 
observation that the current stock may be sub-optimally low is not enough; we 
also need to consider the optimal approach path to the steady state. We turn to 
this topic in the next section. 
6.3 Approach paths to the steady state population 
The optimum approach paths to the optimum population are obtained 
by solving the trajectories that converge to (x~, y"). The model described in 
the previous section would in general not prescribe a moratorium or Most 
Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) because the Hamiltonian is not linear in its 
control variable y, (this is the case because we have a downward sloping 
demand curve for whales). However, it is possible that the optimum approach 
path in the x-y phase plane is steep and prescribes zero harvesting even for 
stock sizes just below the optimum steady state. 
It is straightforward to evaluate the rationale of the moratorium for the 
remaining steady states by analyzing whether the optimal approach path (i.e., 
"The existence values for other natural assets according to Clark (1980) and Herrera (1985), 
cited in Pearce and Warford (1993), range from about US$ 7 per adult (for dolphins, seals and 
oners) to US$ 15 (for the Grizzly bear), corresponding with almost NOK 100 and more than 
NOK 200 per household, respectively. 
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the stable arm) to the equilibria is consistent with periods of extreme low or 
zero harvesting. For example, let us assume that the low population estimate 
of 57,000 whales is correct and analyze the case of the following steady state: 
(x = 78,700 , y = 420), corresponding with WTP = NOK 20 and r = 4% 
(if the high population estimate of 86,000 whales is more apt, obviously the 
model prescribes positive harvesting because then the current stock would 
exceed the optimal stock). Since the selected steady state is an equilibrium, 
we can approximate the dynamical system for the state variable [equation (2)] 
and control variable [implicit in equation (8)] using Taylors expansion: 
F(x",y") = Fx(x',y')(x-x") + Fy(x " ,y * ) (y -y ') + h.o.t., (12) 
where F(x,y) is the RHS of (2) and (8), and where h.o.t. is short for higher 
order terms. After the appropriate derivations and substitutions [78,700 for x" 
and 420 for (G{x")-mx")(\-m)A = / ] , we obtain the linearized system: 
x,.rx, = -o- ix - 0 . 9 * 
= -0.012x + 0 . 4 * 
where x = x - x* and * = y - y*. The eigenvalues of this linear system are 
i?, = 0.42 and R2 = -0.12. Since one eigenvalue is negative and the other is 
positive, the steady state is a saddle point equilibrium for the system. The 
corresponding eigenvector of the eigenvalue with negative value is just V = 
(1 , 0.022). 1 2 
Next, a point on the linearized separatrix near the steady state equili-
brium is chosen, and the Runge-Kutta algorithm is employed to approximate 
the actual, non-linear séparatrices (see Press et al., 1986 or Conrad and Clark 
1987). While the time lag between birth and sexual maturity does not have an 
1 2 The general solution to the general system also includes the positive eigenvalue R, and 
associated eigenvector W 
= a We" bVe 
However, the only trajectories that converge to the equilibrium are those for which a = 0 
(Conrad and Clark 1987). 
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impact on the steady state (where, by definition, xUT = x t) it does have an 
impact on the approach dynamics. Allowing for this, the thus obtained 
separatrix is steeply upward sloping, and crosses the horizontal axis of the x-
y-phase plane at a stock size near 74,000. This implies that a (temporary) 
moratorium is optimal until the population has grown to 74,000 whales. 
Beyond that point harvesting should start, and annual harvesting should 
rapidly increase from 0 to 420 whales as the population grows to the steady 
state stock of 78,700 whales. The phase plane with stable arm for the case 
just analyzed is depicted in Figure 6 .1 . 
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Fig,6.1: The steady state stock and harvest and approach dynamics (S.A. is 
the stable arm) for the case r = 4% and WTP = NOK 20. 
We obtained similar results for other steady states reported in Table 
6 .1 . This finding is consistent with a casual remark by Clark: "It can be 
shown that the optimal approach to equilibrium is not the bang-bang appro-
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ach, but in most cases the bang-bang approach is nearly optimal" (Clark 
1990, p.239). 
An assumption that underlies the optimality of this solution is reversi-
bility in capital investments. Amundsen et al. (1996) write that "in addition to 
whaling, the boats also participate in other fisheries. About 24-45% of total 
fishing time was devoted to whaling". This suggests that capital in the whaling 
sector is, at least to a certain extent, malleable. For models with irreversible 
capital investments, we refer to Clark et al. (1979) and Boyce (1995). 
6.4 A static simplification 
The numerical solution by means of the Runge-Kutta algorithm has the 
advantage that it is convenient and rather accurate. It has the disadvantage that 
there is not much intuition to the solution it provides. This is especially 
unfortunate in this particular field, because whale management is a politically 
sensitive issue, where politicians have to account for their decisions to critical 
and perhaps powerful interest groups. Under these circumstances, decision 
makers may be tempted to resort to models that are easily explained and 
readily understood by the public. 
In this section we will demonstrate what would happen if we had 
approximated the dynamic model by an annual series of static models, as 
advocated by Tisdell (1991) and Kuronuma and Tisdell (1993). In the static 
model, the marginal benefits of (current) preservation and consumption are 
balanced (see also Longva, 1990). Disregarding harvesting costs and predation 
costs for the time being for expositional clarity, judging the rationale of the 
moratorium in the static framework boils down to comparing the marginal 
benefits of whale conservation (i.e., the marginal benefit to conservationists of 
preventing whaling harvest) and whale consumption (Kuronuma and Tisdell, 
1993). In this chapter we do not assign property rights to the resource to a 
particular group. Rather, we assume that there is a benevolent planner that 
allocates the resource to the group where marginal utility of the unit is 
greatest. In Figure 6.2, the annual catch of minke whales is indicated on the 
horizontal axis, ranging from zero to x (the entire stock). 
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H'(y) 
B Annual Catch x 
Fig. 6.2: Marginal utility of conservation (curve CD) and marginal utility of 
exploitation (curve AB). According to the static model, a moratorium is 
justified because the first exceeds the latter for all harvest levels. 
In Figure 6.2, the marginal benefit to conservationists of avoiding 
whale harvesting (curve CD) exceeds the (current) marginal value of whaling 
(curve AB) for all levels of whale harvesting, hence a moratorium is justified. 
Kuronuma and Tisdell (1993) demonstrate two more cases, that will not be 
depicted here. First, it is possible that the marginal benefit curves intersect. 
Then, a quotum would be optimal, as the socially optimal harvest level (i.e., 
the harvest level at which the curves intersect) is smaller than the harvest 
level collectively desired by the whaling industry for well behaved marginal 
benefit curves. Note that the optimal harvest level in the context of a static 
model for the whaling industry coincides with the intersection of horizontal 
axis and the curve displaying marginal benefit to whalers, or B in Figure 6.2. 
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Second, it may be the case that the curves do not cross, but rather both 
intersect the horizontal axis with a "gap" in between (or, along the horizontal 
axis: OC > OB). Under this condition harvesting of a species as a pure 
private good is optimal (Kuronuma and Tisdell 1993). 
As described above, the economic criterion of strict conservation in a 
static context is that the marginal utility of harvesting the first whale is less 
than the net marginal utility of conserving that whale. With marginal utility of 
conservation constant, we can calculate the WTP that locates the net marginal 
value of preservation curve (a horizontal line) just above the demand curve 
for whales. This implies that the minimally required WTP for the moratorium 
per household is obtained by multiplying the sum of the value of this first 
whale harvested and the marginal predation cost [P'(x)+D(l)] by the total 
number of whales (xt), and next dividing this total by the number of (Euro-
pean) households: WTP = x[P'(x)+D(l)]/9n01. 
If the required WTP thus found exceeds the WTP estimates found in 
the literature for minke whales or comparable assets, the moratorium is not 
justified (see section 6.2). The average economic value of the first whale for 
the whaling industry is estimated by substituting 1 for Y and the 1994 per 
capita income in equation (11). The price of the first whale harvested thus 
obtained amounts to approximately NOK 106,429. It should be observed that 
this price is not exceptionally high when compared to prices paid in the 
1980s. For example, the price per whale in 1987 (expressed in 1994 NOK) 
was about NOK 76,000, corresponding with a harvest of 279 whales. 
In order to determine whether the moratorium is efficient, the "reverse 
analysis approach" is applied. This comes down to evaluating whether the 
WTP to avoid whaling is such that the benefits of conservation exceed the 
benefits of exploitation. The minimum necessary WTP to conserve the 
complete stock per European household, calculated as described above, is 
approximately US$ 16.5 . 1 3 When the lower estimate of population size, 
For a correct measure of the minimally required WTP per household we should correct for 
the marginal harvesting costs. Deducting the average harvesting cost in the 1980s from the 
consumption value of the first whale and calculating the minimally required WTP for strict 
conservation amounts to a trivial correction: about US$ 15 instead of US$ 16.5 for the high 
population estimate (cost data taken from Bjorndal and Conrad 1993). Also, it is important to 
note that the number of whales caught per vessel was low in the mid 1980's: in 1986 and 1987 
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reported by Amundsen et al. (1995) is correct, the necessary WTP reduces to 
almost US$ 11. Comparing this to the estimates of WTP for conservation of 
minke whales as discussed in section 6.2, we conclude that the static model is 
not necessarily consistent with a moratorium: when the higher population 
estimates are more apt, the moratorium may be not efficient and hence should 
be replaced by a harvest quotum. For low population estimates a temporary 
moratorium may be optimal, but with growth of the resource stock the 
required WTP to support a moratorium will increase, and after a period of 
zero harvesting the static model prescribes a switch to a quotum system. 
Obviously, such a switch is advocated too soon (i.e., at too low stock levels) 
when compared to the results of the dynamic model. This further illustrates 
the importance of applying the correct (i.e. dynamic) model for policy 
recommendations. 
6.5 Conclusions and discussion 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze efficient management of 
mixed goods. Static and dynamic aspects were considered. A conclusion is 
that the effect of existence values (or amenity values) on depletion is in 
accordance with intuition: efficient depletion is characterized by a more 
gently-sloped rent path, and some of the initial harvesting is postponed. In 
addition, the equilibrium stock of mixed goods will be larger than the equili-
brium stock of a pure private good. In this chapter we have used various 
values of (constant) marginal preservation utility, and concluded that the 
current stock may is probably sub-optimally low, depending on the social 
discount rate and magnitude of the non-use values. This is especially true 
when the (lower) estimates of current stock size as reported by Amundsen et 
al. (1995) are correct [as opposed to the higher estimates presented by Flaaten 
and Stollery (1996)]. 
for example, the average annual number of whales harvested per vessel was about 7. This 
suggests that the bias due to the existence of fixed costs that arises, because we determine the 
average cost of harvesting just one whale, will be relatively small. 
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The dynamic model in section 6.2 can be expanded upon by allowing 
for stock dependent harvest costs [C(y,x), with dC/dx < 0] . This would result 
in optimal population estimates that are even higher than the ones presented in 
Table 6 .1 , such that the gap between the current and optimal stock size is 
underestimated. An interesting topic for future research would be to estimate 
declining marginal non-use values of whales, along the lines set out by 
Loomis and Larson (1994) for gray whales, such that the optimum whale 
population and approach dynamics of the dynamic model as provided in 
section 6.2 can be solved using more realistic function specifications. For 
some of the dramatic implications of allowing for declining marginal utility on 
optimum stock size of minke whales in the Northeast Atlantic, see Bulte and 
van Kooten (1997). 
A second objective of this chapter was to investigate whether mainte-
nance of the moratorium as installed by the IWC is efficient. For this purpose 
we compute the stable arm of the dynamic model. The numerical simulation 
indicates that the moratorium is an optimal management strategy whenever the 
current population is smaller than the optimum population. Again, the result is 
obtained under the assumption that the marginal utility of conservation of 
whales is constant. Consequently, the case for a moratorium may be over-
estimated. 
The (prudent) conclusion that the moratorium on harvesting whales is 
economically efficient is not consistent with results of Conrad and Bjorndal 
(1993), who argue that a quota system may be more appropriate than a 
moratorium. However, their analyses focus exclusively on the consumption 
side of whales. 1 4 Our result is consistent with a recent paper by Horan 
(1996), in which he analyses whether the moratorium is justified when ethical 
1 4 The following remark with respect to this finding is relevant. Allowing whalers to harvest 
the relatively abundant minke will increase the risk of harvesting rare and vulnerable species. 
Although the various species are not hard to distinguish, and accidental killings of rare species 
will therefore be few, whalers will be tempted to shoot at any whale that comes by, regardless of 
the species. Once processed it is hard to tell the various species apart. Extinction of more rare 
whale species may be the result. Clearly, control and enforcement of the rule will therefore be 
important. In addition, enforcement and control will be needed to guarantee that the whaling 
industry does not over-harvest its minke quota. The extra costs associated with enforcement (that 
is, the costs over and above the costs of assuring the moratorium) should not exceed any social 
benefits of switching to the quotum system. 
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values are included. He assumes that people receive disutility from the actual 
harvesting of whales, irrespective of the stock size in situ. With this specifica-
tion, Horan also concludes that a moratorium may be optimal. 
Our static approximation of the dynamic model, as proposed by some 
authors, yields results that are misleading. Because the effect of current 
harvesting on future harvesting possibilities and preservation utility (and 
conversely, on future predation costs, but this effect is dominated by the first 
two effects) is overlooked, the static model incorrectly suggests that the 
current moratorium should be abolished. This illustrates that there is a danger 
in "simplifying" dynamic models: the resulting policy recommendations of the 
simple static model could well be badly wrong. 
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CHAPTER 7 
OPEN ACCESS, COMMON PROPERTY AND SCARCITY RENT TN 
FISHERIES1 
Abstract 
For a long time, property rights for marine resources were lacking. Many fish 
stocks were characterized as open access resources, and not managed effi-
ciently. This resulted in falling stock levels and a declining income for fisher-
men. In the late 1970's, the policy response to this problem in fisheries was 
the implementation of 200-mile fishing zones, which enabled the European 
Union to formulate and implement the Common Fisheries Policy, aimed at 
(among other things) conservation and distribution of available stocks. For the 
case of Germany, empirically examined in this chapter, this shift from an 
open access regime towards a common property regime had favourable 
outcomes. The trend of falling prices was reversed. The conclusion was that 
intertemporal efficiency had increased as a result of (inter)governmental 
policy. Apparently, a wedge was formed between price and marginal harves-
ting costs, which we have interpreted as a return of scarcity rent as a compo-
nent of prices. 
7.1 Introduction 
For a long time, marine fisheries in Europe and elsewhere in the 
world were managed as open access 2 resources. The outcome of open access 
A different version of this chapter is previously published as: Bülte E.H., H. Folmer and 
W.J.M. Heijman, Environmental and Resource Economics, 6(1995):309-20. The main results are 
summarized in Bülte E.H., H. Folmer and W.J.M. Heijman, Economisch Statistische Berichten, 
p.330-333. 
2 In an open access regime each potential user has complete autonomy in utilizing the 
resource. Under a so-called common property regime a group of owners can control the 
resource and exclude others from using it (see section 2 .4 ) . 
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management, however, was far from sustainable and efficient. Although 
global fish catch in tonnes did not decline until 1990, the composition of 
species changed substantially. Valuable species, such as herring and flounder, 
were replaced by less valuable ones such as skates and dogfish. In addition, 
the catch declined in several major fishing areas and fishermen's incomes 
were depressed. 
Economic theory predicts that under conditions of open access, a 
natural resource will be exploited at such a pace that the scarcity rent dissipa-
tes completely and that, eventually, total costs equal total revenues (Gordon 
1954, Schaefer 1957, Bjorndal and Conrad 1987). Open access implies that, 
as long as there is an excess profit, new entrants are attracted, thereby 
reducing overall profits. The rationale for rent dissipation is that no fisherman 
is willing to "invest" in stock maintenance since the expected benefits are 
likely to be reaped by others, which implies that the future is discounted at an 
infinite rate. Also, other drawbacks of open access resource management have 
been documented. First, the fish stock is often severely depleted, and extincti-
on may be the result. For instance, Spence (1973) found that the stock of blue 
whales was reduced to undesirable levels because of the open access character 
of the species. 3 Second, in addition to lost profit and possible stock extincti-
on, open access fisheries usually result in an inefficient structure of the 
fishing industry, as is argued by for instance McKelvey (1983) and Lipton and 
Strand (1989). 
It is now widely recognized that open access results in biologically and 
economically suboptimal outcomes. That is why nowadays fisheries are 
regulated. Iceland and Norway were the first European countries to declare a 
substantial exclusive fishing zone. In 1977 the European Union followed this 
initiative and declared sovereign rights within a 200-mile zone, thereby 
3 Likewise , Bjorndal and Conrad (1987) argue that North Sea herring was saved 
from possible extinction by the closure of the fishery at the end of the 1977 season. 
Wilen (1976) , however, studied the dynamics of open access fur seal hunting and found 
that rent dissipation may well be compatible with stock survival. 
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anticipating the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 4 By establishing exclusive 
zones, it was expected that the open access characteristics of marine resources 
would be reduced. In fact, the open access regime was replaced by a common 
property regime, under which a group of owners was expected to regulate 
exploitation. This exclusive zone has been very important to the European 
fishery. The nine Atlantic E.U. member states produce more than 5 million 
tonnes of fish every year, over 80% of which are harvested in the exclusive 
zone (Salz, 1991). 
To be effective, a conservation policy must be pursued for the entire 
area inhabited by the fish stocks concerned. Since 1977 such an area has 
existed for the European Union (for some stocks, cooperation with third 
nations, as Norway, is required for effective policy formulation). It was, 
however, not until 1983 that the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which 
aimed at both the distribution of fish stocks among member states and the 
maintenance of the stocks, was implemented. 5 Total Allowable Catches 
(TACs) were determined, based on mostly biological and political considerati-
ons (see chapter 8), and then divided among member states. These states in 
turn allocate the national quota to their fishermen. There are differences, 
however, in how individual countries do this. In some countries, fishermen 
are allowed to harvest until the national quota is reached, while in other 
countries fishermen are allotted individual quotas, possibly transferable. 
Initially the TACs were fixed at levels which corresponded with existing 
catches. The levels of the catches have been reduced in a stepwise manner. 
Likewise, there has been a shift in the structural policy from stimulating 
Already at the third United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea in 1977 a 
document called the Informal Composite Negotiating Text was produced with the 
recommendation that coastal ocean states may have exclusive economic zones where 
appropriate. 
5The CFP consists of policies for structures, markets, external fisheries and 
conservation [for more information the reader is referred to Holden (1994)]. There are 
two reasons why formulation and implementation of the CFP did not immediately follow 
the establishment of the Community sea. There was a time-consuming debate between 
the UK and France about an exclusive zone for England and it took several years before 
matters concerning the determination of TACs and their allocation were settled in a 
politically acceptable way for all member states. 
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vessel construction to reducing fishing capacity in Union waters (Holden, 
1994). 
According to Schmidt (1993), measures taken to halt overfishing and 
make fisheries efficient have been largely unsuccessful. Recent research has 
provided evidence for this proposition. According to estimates of the F.A.O 
of the United Nations, the global revenue loss because of inefficient fisheries 
is in the order of US$ 15-30 billion per annum. The income foregone because 
of suboptimal fisheries management in the European Union alone amounts to 
about US$ 2.5 billion annually (Schmidt 1993). Holden (1994) argues that the 
CFP suffers from four major defects. First, the CFP has not been conceived 
as a coherent, integrated policy. Conflicting objectives arose, for instance, 
between the structural and conservation policies. Second, the policy has no 
specific objectives which hampers effective implementation. Third, the 
fundamental basis has been biological rather than economic, and fourth, the 
policy suffers from the decision-making processes of the Union where every 
decision is a political compromise. The importance of ineffective and ineffi-
cient regulation is demonstrated by Dupont (1990). Dupont (1990) analyzed 
three sources of rent dissipation along the west coast of Canada, namely 
capital stuffing, fleet redundancy and fleet composition, and found that 
potential resource rents had dissipated to a great extent. 6 
In this chapter, we discuss a small aspect of the CFP. The effective-
ness of regulation in terms of return of rent in Germany is analyzed. The 
main objective was to test whether shifting from an open access management 
regime to a common property regime enhanced intertemporal efficiency. It 
should be observed that, in contrast to most of the analyses of rent dissipati-
on, this paper on rent return was based on empirical data. No attempt was 
made to model processes of production and consumption of the resource. 
Instead, resource scarcity issues were dealt with exclusively by regarding the 
outcomes of the underlying processes. Observations of prices (which reflect 
the outcome of harvesting and demand) were combined with assumptions 
6Capital stuffing implies that restricted inputs in the harvest process are replaced by 
unrestricted inputs, which increases harvesting costs and reduces rent. Fleet redundancy occurs 
when more than the optimal number of vessels (i.e., the number that minimizes costs) is allowed 
to participate in the harvesting process. Finally, rents may dissipate because harvesting does not 
take place by the most efficient vessels. 
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regarding harvesting costs, in order to draw conclusions about scarcity rent 
over time. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 7.2, the notion 'scarcity 
rent' is explained briefly. In addition, the method applied to test the main 
hypothesis is described. Section 7.3 is a case study of German fisheries. The 
results illustrate that government policies produced some beneficial effects. In 
section 7.4 conclusions are drawn. 
7.2 Scarcity rent in fisheries 
Under the assumption of constant extraction costs per unit of fish and 
constant demand for fish, implementation of effective policy will result in a 
U-shaped price path. First, in the absence of governmental control and with 
abundant stocks, a profit is made. Then, as more and more new entrants 
appear, dissipation of rent occurs until price per unit equals harvesting costs 
per unit (phase 1 in Figure 7.1). For a certain period of time, prices are 
expected to equal marginal costs. During this period possible future benefits 
of harvesting are completely disregarded and "overfishing" is likely to occur 
(phase 2). If the government intervenes successfully, prices will go up and 
rent may return (phase 3) . 7 Finally, the rent increase will tail off and settle at 
a level determined by marginal costs and government regulation (this phase is 
not included in Figure 7 .1 , but see section 2.2 for steady state analysis). 
Under these (strong) assumptions, testing of effective government policy is 
straightforward, and essentially comes down to analyzing whether such a U-
shaped pattern actually exists. 
The shaded area indicates scarcity rent. The assumption of constant 
marginal harvesting costs, however, may be too simple. First, it can be ex-
pected that technological developments constantly reduce the cost per unit of 
catch (bigger trawlers, new technologies for detecting and harvesting fish). 
Second, it can be expected that as the stock of fish declines, the costs of har-
7 It is possible that, after a certain period of time, effective policy implementation results in 
an increase in the in situ stock, such that harvest quotas can increase. Increasing supply will 
result in lower prices, counteracting the process described above. 
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vesting a unit of fish go up. These are countervailing effects. Therefore some 
additional assumptions are needed to empirically analyze policy effects.8 They 
are discussed below. 
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Fig. 7.1: Constant marginal harvesting cost and a U-shaped price path 
implies increased efficiency. The shaded area indicates scarcity rent. 
In fisheries theory, it is common to distinguish between schooling 
fisheries and searching fisheries. Some fish populations have a propensity to 
school in large numbers during the course of migration or reproduction 
activity, or as a defence against predators. Well-known examples are salmon, 
mackerel, anchovies and herring. The widespread use of modern fish-finding 
devices makes locating schools easy and cheap, even when (because of 
overfishing) the stock is smaller. From this follows that in the case of 
schooling fisheries, the marginal harvesting costs decline over time, though at 
a decreasing rate. 
Note that marginal harvest costs will only be constant under stock depletion if 
technological change exactly offset the increasing difficulty of harvest as the stock 
shrinks. 
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In the case of searching fisheries the stock of fish (the population 
level) contributes significantly to the harvesting costs. Examples are plaice 
and sole. In this case there are two opposing tendencies. First, ongoing 
innovations constantly reduce the cost of effort9 (although possibly at a 
declining rate), which lead to a constant downward pressure on marginal 
harvesting costs. Second, there is the increase in harvesting costs owing to 
increased scarcity. The resulting marginal harvesting cost curve is likely to be 
U-shaped. The marginal harvesting costs of both schooling and searching 
fisheries are depicted below in Figure 7.2. 
cost/unit 
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time 
Fig. 7.2: Marginal harvesting costs for searching and schooling fishe-
ries. 
The assumptions made so far about marginal harvesting costs enable us 
to say something about the price path. For searching fisheries, it is U-shaped 
because of the U-shaped pattern of marginal costs. If scarcity rent returns 
because of successful policy intervention, the rate of price increase must be 
sharper than can be expected on the basis of the "naturally" increasing 
marginal costs, since the rent drives a wedge between price and (rising) 
'Note that as a result o f regulation, ships will spend more time idle in the harbour, 
which will enhance the opportunities for investment. 
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marginal harvesting costs. This is illustrated in Figure 7.3, where the moment 
of policy intervention is indicated as t*. If the parameters of the harvesting 
cost function are assumed to be constant over t ime, 1 0 the policy effect can 
simply be measured by comparing the actual price increase in the common 
property period with the price increase on the basis of the "natural" develop-
ment (as estimated for the open access period). 
Fig. 7.3: Price and marginal harvesting cost for a searching fishery 
For schooling fisheries, increased scarcity is expected to have a minor 
effect on harvesting costs. Therefore prior to policy implementation, the price 
is expected to fall constantly, although possibly at a declining rate, implying a 
convex, downward price path. Because of shifting from open access towards 
common property, policy intervention, if successful, will drive a wedge 
between price and marginal harvesting costs. The resulting price path can thus 
be convex downward, horizontal and U-shaped, but it should be upwardly 
biased compared with the pre-policy period (see Figure 7.4 for an example). 
l 0 T h i s issue will be discussed in section 7 .3 . 
1 6 4 Chapter 7 
marginal cost 
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Fig 7.4: Price and marginal harvesting cost for a schooling fishery. 
The most general function describing a U-shaped price path is (1), 
where a, is negative and a2 positive. 1 1 
Pt = a 0 + af + a2t2 0) 
The simple model is applied to both schooling (herring, mackerel) and 
searching fisheries (cod, haddock, plaice and flounder). Based on the above-
mentioned considerations with respect to marginal harvesting costs, a2 is 
expected to be smaller for the schooling species. 
" T h e simple quadratic model was also applied by Slade (1982) , who attempted to 
reconcile the theoretical predictions of exponentially rising prices with empirical findings 
of falling prices of exhaustible resources. It should be observed that in contrast to Slade, 
the purpose of this paper was not to demonstrate the possibility of an exponentially rising 
rent path accounted for by a U-shaped price path, but rather that the time path of 
scarcity rent was U-shaped itself. 
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The hypotheses formulated in the previous section were tested for 
Germany, which was selected because of the availability of data. 1 2 The 
analysis was confined to six important commercial species: herring, mackerel, 
plaice, flounder, haddock and cod. Annual national statistics for the period 
1967 - 1991 served as sources of data. The German fishery sector experien-
ced some major changes in the 1980's. More specifically, the sector shrank 
by about 60%, partly because harvesting in the Northern Atlantic was 
restricted after implementation of the 200-mile exclusive zone. 
The period considered might seem strange at first sight. After all, open 
access has long existed, which would support the hypothesis that a substantial 
part of the rent had vanished before 1967. A closer examination of the history 
of fishing, however, shows that global fish catch really increased from the 
fifties onward (see World Resources Institute, 1993). This also holds for 
Germany. The short period under consideration might thus be justified by the 
fact that large scale fishing operations are a relatively recent phenomenon. In 
addition, the increase of global fish catch from 1967 to the late eighties 
indicates that marine fisheries were profitable and attracted new capital 
continuously. This suggests that, in particular in the beginning of the 1967-
1991 period, it must have been possible to capture a rent. 
The policy effect will be analyzed by estimating model (1) on the basis 
of the data set for the open access period (1967-1982) and by comparing the 
actual p(t) and predicted pit) for t after 1983 in terms of the studentized 
residuals, pit) is predicted on the basis of model (1) estimated for the open 
access period only. 1 3 A studentized residual smaller than 2 in absolute value 
'-This does not imply that the conclusions drawn relate to Germany only. They may 
also apply to European developments if trade in fish is free, and prices equalize. A more 
appropriate approach to test the success or failure of the European policy would be to do 
a similar analysis for each of the Atlantic European member states or by pooling cross 
section and time series data for all these member states. Lack of data makes this 
impossible. 
l 3 Analys i s of the autocorrelation indicated a first order autoregressive model 
(AR(1)) . Maximum-likelihood was used to handle this problem. 
7.3 Case study: German fisheries 
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is taken as an indication of no policy effect. Since there was no clear-cut 
moment of policy intervention and because of possible time lags for biological 
reasons (see Holden, 1994), policy effects are not expected to materialize 
immediately after 1983 when the CFP took shape. This uncertainty about the 
timing of the policy effects will be dealt with as follows. For each observation 
beyond 1982 with a studentized residual smaller than 2 in absolute value, it is 
assumed that the policy effect has not yet materialized. The observation is 
added to the open access data set and the procedure is repeated for the next 
observation. If from a given year onward a sequence of studentized residuals 
larger than 2 shows up, we will conclude that significant policy effects have 
materialized in that particular year. 
The following results were obtained. First, estimating model (1) for 
the entire period gives significant negative coefficients for aY and significant 
positive estimates of a2 for all the species selected (this result is not reported 
in a table). The expected U-shape as described in the previous sections is thus 
found. (It is of interest to note that the implied U-shape does not materialize 
for the coefficient as estimated for the open access period, as reported in 
Table 7.1.) 
Second, Table 7.1 shows the estimated quadratic price paths for the 
selected fish species in Germany. Figures in brackets below the coefficients 
are t-values. A t-value larger than two in absolute value is considered to be 
significant. Log.lik indicates the value of the log likelihood function, which is 
a goodness of fit indicator, SR is short for studentized residual, and the figure 
in brackets following SR is the year concerned, p indicates the autocorrelation 
factor of the data set, and * indicates the year that a significant SR showed up 
for the first time. The models shown in the upper part of Table 7.1 relate to 
the pre-invention period and hence need not follow a U-shaped pattern which, 
as argued in section 7.2, is expected to hold for the period as a whole. All 
models given in the Table show a downward sloping trend for the pre-
invention period, which is consistent with the arguments spelled out in section 
7.2. 
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Herring Macke-
rel 
Had-
dock 
Cod Plaice Floun-
der 
0.51 
(7.56) 
0.54 
(8.37) 
0.12 
(15.5) 
1.53 
(11.2) 
1.18 
(14.1) 
1.16 
(13.7) 
«1 0.03 
(2.35) 
0.005 
(3.60) 
0.002 
(1.24) 
-0.099 
(-3.35) 
0.025 
(1.28) 
-0.026 
(-1.31) 
«2 -0.002 
(-3.71) 
-0.002 
(-3.91) 
-0.002 
(-1.91) 
0.004 
(2.72) 
-0.002 
(-1.91) 
0.0005 
(0.56) 
P 0.34 
(1.32) 
-0.023 
(-0.91) 
0.18 
(0.65) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
0.25 
(0.96) 
0.29 
(1.25) 
Log.Iik. 41.9 30.8 19.8 92.4 36.0 29.2 
SR(83) 0.29 1.94 0.33 0.30 0.73 -1.42 
SR(84) 0.03 0.53 0.59 0.04 0.25 0.69 
SR(85) 0.76 -0.40 2.57" 0.95 2 .02' 0.46 
SR(86) 2.70' 0.35 6.01 2.73* 5.17 3.28" 
SR(87) 4.68 3.13" 8.52 3.80 8.69 6.14 
SR(88) 4.04 5.68 7.88 3.16 7.16 4.87 
SR(89) 4.58 5.07 6.28 3.38 6.38 5.03 
SR(90) 4.34 5.69 6.85 3.98 6.23 3.79 
SR(91) 3.70 6.91 6.70 3.40 8.96 N.A. 
DW 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.8 
The results for all the species concerned described in the lower part of Table 
1 are clear: price development in the common property period was "upwardly 
biased". For haddock a number of outliers showed up starting in 1985. For 
Table 7.1: Regression estimates for the price paths of selected fish species in 
Germany 
168 Chapter 7 
herring, cod, plaice and flounder the starting point was 1986. For mackerel a 
number of outliers were found from 1987 onward. Hence, for all species a 
wedge was developed between actual price and expected marginal harvesting 
costs, which we have interpreted as the return of rent as a component of 
prices. The analysis clearly indicates that there was a time lag (because of 
several reasons mentioned above) before policies became effective. 
Conclusions with regard to policy effectiveness, however, should be drawn 
with caution. Since policy intervention and other relevant variables are not 
explicitly included in the model, factors other than policy may have contribu-
ted to the U-shaped price path. The price of gasoline, for instance, is a factor 
that has great influence on marginal harvesting costs and hence the price of 
fish. Gasoline price, however, did not rise in the period in which the increase 
in price was most profound. On the contrary: real prices fell, especially from 
1987 onwards (Salz 1991). This is additional support for the conclusion that 
policy has been effective, since falling gasoline prices result in an underesti-
mation of the true increase of the rent. Another factor that should be taken 
into account in the context of rent underestimation is increasing stock levels 
(as a result of the quota system) that could possibly mitigate the stock effect 
on harvesting costs. Since the analysis assumed constant coefficients for the 
harvesting cost function, the true increase in marginal harvesting costs was 
overestimated, which automatically implies that the true increase in rent was 
underestimated. 
Another factor that should be taken into account is product specific 
capital and non-salvageable costs. Product specific capital implies capital that 
can be used only for one or a limited number of activities. If these activities 
cease, the fixed costs associated with the capital cannot be salvaged by 
shifting these to other activities (see Munro and Scott, 1985). If applied to 
fisheries, and if non-salvageable fleet costs exist, fleet redundancy becomes 
important. This might imply that implementing a quota system results in a 
temporary excessive capacity and hence excessive costs. These might be 
reflected in a rise in the price (higher costs/unit of fish). However, because of 
the earlier-mentioned stepwise reduction in quota which made structural fleet 
adjustments possible, this effect is likely to be small. Harvesting costs could 
also rise in the short run because of investment in new technologies and 
power capacity as a consequence of more time spent idle in the harbour, 
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thereby possibly increasing harvesting costs in the short run (i.e capital 
stuffing, see section 2.5). One way to investigate both claims is to analyze the 
net returns of German fisheries. Under the assumption of excessive harvesting 
costs because of product specific capital or new investments, one would 
expect a falling, or at best a stable net income. It appears, however, that net 
income has developed positively in recent years (Salz, 1991). In addition, Salz 
(1991) argues that the size of individual vessels has been relatively constant, 
thereby further reducing the validity of the second claim. The claim that 
government and Union policy has resulted in more efficient harvesting does 
not seem to be invalidated by this category of factors. However, it is recogni-
sed that it would be useful to supplement the analysis as presented in this 
paper by explicitly modelling and estimating harvest technologies, along the 
lines of Dupont (1990). 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the effects of policy implementation, 
that followed declaration of sovereignty in a 200 miles zone, in terms of the 
return of rent in German fisheries. The method employed consisted of 
estimating a model on the basis of a time series of prices for the open access 
period and to estimate studentized residuals for the following common 
property period. Studentized residuals larger than 2 were taken to imply 
significant policy effects. 
The results show that for all six species selected, studentized residuals 
exceeded 2 for a series of observations. Scarcity rent was found to have 
returned as a component of prices. There are even reasons to expect that the 
true increase in rent was underestimated in this analysis, although this is far 
from sure because we have not modeled (and analyzed) the production side of 
fishing explicitly. 
Despite this finding of increased intertemporal efficiency, there is 
evidence that the outcome achieved is not yet fully efficient, so that potential 
rent is still dissipated to a certain extent. Large potential gains in income can 
be made by more radical changes of the sector (see section 1 and Schmidt 
170 Chapter 7 
1993). 1 4 According to a report from the Cornmission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the Common Fisheries Policy (cited in Schmidt 
1993), the income foregone through sub-optimal fisheries management in the 
E.U. has been calculated at around $2.5 billion annually. In addition, it can 
be severely doubted whether over-fishing has been successfully halted. 
An interesting topic for further research may be to analyze whether 
similar results also hold for other member states of the European Union. 
According to Salz (1991), the fisheries sector in many countries (Belgium, 
Ireland, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, France, the Netherlands) has 
performed well in recent years, at least those sectors that are not dependent 
on fisheries rights in other parts of the world. 1 5 On the other hand, there 
have been great differences among countries in species harvested, techniques 
applied, organization of the sector and national policy, so some differences 
are expected to arise. Especially with respect to rent dissipation due to 
implementation of inefficient and ineffective policies, resulting in capital 
stuffing, fleet redundancy and sub-optimal fleet composition, substantial 
differences between various member states are expected to exist. Detecting 
these differences, however, requires a more elaborate model than the one 
applied in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT1 
Abstract 
Models of optimal fishery management traditionally assume social welfare 
optimization as the goal of the managing agency. However, public choice 
theories suggest that politicians do not choose policies to maximize welfare 
for society. Instead, policies reflect the interests of politically powerful 
groups. In this paper, we examine fishery management under alternative 
political preferences. We find that the steady state values in the political 
optimum may be both greater and smaller than steady state values in the 
efficient case, varying according to the relative weight of different interest 
groups. 
8.1 Introduction 
After implementation of exclusive economic zones in the late 1970s, 
de jure open access for many fisheries came to an end (see chapter 7). 
Typically, a national regulatory agency or supra-national organization deter-
mines harvest levels and is responsible for enforcement of regulations. A 
common assumption in the normative economic literature on fishery manage-
ment is that this organization chooses instruments to maximize the net present 
value of economic benefits accruing to society as a whole. In the case of a 
fishery, these benefits would include scarcity rent due to the fishery, con-
sumer surplus, and rents for factors of production that are not supplied at a 
'This chapter is based on Horan R.D., E.H. Bulte and J.S. Shortle (1996), Political 
Preferences and Fisheries Management, Penn State University Working Paper. It is part of a 
more elaborate paper: Horan R.D. J.S. Shortle and E.H. Bulte (1996), Fishing for Dollars: the 
Impact of Political Preferences on Fisheries Management, Penn State University Discussion 
Paper. 
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constant cost to the fishing industry (with exogenous prices for inputs and 
outputs, this amounts to maximizing rent to the fishery). Examples include 
Bjorndal (1988); Clark (1990); Neher (1990); Boyce (1995) and several 
chapters in this thesis. Models along these lines determine economically 
optimal-, or efficient harvests and stocks. 
However, other possible benchmarks exist. Typically, agencies 
consider the welfare of politically powerful interest groups as well as equity 
issues (Gardner 1987; Shortle and Laughland 1994; Mueller 1989). Anderson 
(1984) discusses trade-offs between producers and consumers of fish which 
may be taken into account by policy makers. Clark (1985, p . 144) also lists 
many possible objectives of fisheries regulation and adds that "in real life 
there is no question that distributional questions tend to dominate the decisions 
of management agencies, which must deal face to face with the people whose 
livelihoods are affected by regulations." In particular, legislation may be 
developed to increase the well-being of those who provide labour services in 
the fishing industry. Hartwick and Olewiler (1986, p.292) write that "much 
existing regulation in the fishery is designed to sustain the fishery and 
increase the income of fishermen, not to reach a socially optimum equilib-
rium." Decision making with respect to the allowable catch is undoubtedly a 
political process (Holden 1994), with a range of interest groups involved. 
Coull (1993) argues this point, showing how politically set quotas for haddock 
by Norway and the European Union have consistently exceeded the advice of 
scientists in past years. 
In this chapter, we examine fishery management under alternative 
political preferences. In particular, following previous literature on regulation 
in other sectors [e.g. Bullock (1994); Rausser et al. (1982); Peltzman (1976); 
Becker (1974); and Shortle and Laughland (1994)], we consider the design of 
policy and steady state outcomes when the regulating agency seeks to maxi-
mize a political preference function (PPF). 2 The underlying argument is that 
2Broadly speaking, public choice models can be divided in so called "voting models" and 
"interest group models" (van der Zee 1997). According to Potters and van Winden (1996), the 
latter class of models can be subdivided in 4 types of models: (i) models with an influence 
function; (ii) campaign contribution models; (iii) models with asymmetric information; and (iv) 
models with a composite utility function. The political preference function approach adopted in 
this chapter is one possible specification of the latter type, and has been applied most extensively 
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the agency's preferences are an equilibrium outcome of the interaction of 
interest groups and political decision makers in political markets. We define 
politically optimal levels of harvest and stock as levels maximizing this PPF. 
The influence-generating activities of the different interest groups and the 
process of competition for influence amongst these actors remain a black box. 
In this chapter, one politically optimal policy scheme is presented: we 
have (rather heroically) assumed that the government has direct control over 
the factors of production in the fishery [for a more elaborate model that 
includes a two stage game between the government and the sector, and that 
includes economic incentives, see Horan, Shortle and Bulte (1996)]. We also 
assume that policy makers have an understanding of biological productivity 
and current stock levels. For "search" fisheries (fisheries with the biological 
stock as an argument in the harvest production function, see Neher 1990), we 
find that the relationship between steady state values in the political and 
economic optima is ambiguous. Politically optimal steady state values may be 
larger or smaller than economically optimal values, depending on the agency's 
preferences over the interest groups. This sheds new light on the often heard 
claim that many resource stocks are over-fished [FAO (1992)]. "Overfishing" 
(or underfishing) as measured by traditional benchmarks may be deliberate 
and the result of politically rational policies. 
Interestingly, we find that political preferences with respect to different 
groups within the economy do not affect stocking decisions for "schooling" 
fisheries: the economically and politically optimal stock sizes coincide here, 
provided public and private discount rates are the same. However, investment 
and labour employment decisions will differ from the economic optimum. 
Finally, in addition to favouring some politically powerful interest 
groups over others within the current generation, politicians that aim to be re-
elected may also favour the current generations over future generations. This 
implies the rate of time preference applied by politicians may exceed the 
market or social discount rate [Oehmke and Choe (1991)]. We will not return 
to this issue in the remainder of this chapter. 
in the literature to study the policy making process. 
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8.2 The Model 
Suppose that a fishing agency seeks to maximize a political preference 
function for a fishery, defined over consumer surplus (CS), resource rents 
(R), labour rents (LR), and net government transfers to the fishery (G). The 
PPF is written as U(CS,R,LR,G). Uis assumed to be increasing in CS, R, and 
LR, and decreasing in G. In addition, U is strictly quasi-concave. Thus the 
agency values the economic well being of consumers, producers, and labour 
employed in the fishery, while at the same time exhibits disutility from 
transfer payments (or conversely, utility from receipts such as taxes). These 
groups do not necessarily share the same interests. We assume that the 
agency's preferences will reflect the outcome of the interplay of these groups 
in political-economic markets. The resulting preferences are represented by 
the PPF. Unlike Niskanen (1977), we do not assume that the agency is 
concerned with maximizing revenues for its own welfare. Instead, following 
Peltzman we assume the agency values changes in its budget because of the 
effects this has on taxpayers. We do not explicitly model the process by which 
the agency incorporates taxpayers' welfare into the PPF. Instead it is assumed 
that this is the result of interactions in the political arena. Net government 
transfers may be financed by a reduction in spending on other government 
programs or an increase in taxes. In either case, there is a loss of welfare for 
some political constituency. 3 
Let h represent harvests per boat, with n being the number of boats. 
The inverse demand for fish is p(Q) (p'<0). Let / represent labour per boat 
and let L be the aggregate quantity of labour supplied with labour supply 
given by w(L) ( w / > 0 ) . Capital investment per firm is denoted by / and C(T) is 
the cost of investment (C'>0, C">0). Capital is denoted by k. Under these 
specifications, we have the following definitions for the arguments of U: 
3 The source of funding can have economic efficiency implications. We do not explore this 
issue here. 
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Q 
cs = P(y)dy - P(Q)Q (1) 
R = P(Q)nh - w(nL)nl - nC(I) (2) 
L 
LR = w(L)nl - w(y)dy (3) 
The argument G will equal net transfer payments in the fishery. For example, 
in the case of a per unit tax on harvests, G=-mh, where T is the per unit tax 
rate. 
The partial derivatives of the PPF with respect to its arguments are the 
marginal political utility associated with the different interest groups. Define: 
where MRS^ is the marginal rate of substitution of political utility between 
sectors i and j. The marginal preferences for sectors (i.e. e-^ will be an 
equilibrium outcome of the model when the PPF is nonlinear in its argu-
ments. However, marginal preferences are invariant with respect to economic 
welfare when the PPF is linear in its arguments. 
If e y > 0 , the agency exhibits a marginal preference for sector j relative 
to i. Alternatively, the agency has a marginal preference for sector i relative 
to j if g y < 0 and a neutral marginal preference between the two sectors when 
^ = 0 . Political preferences will be to some extent a response to lobbying 
efforts and other political pressure by each group. 
Due to free rider effects and increasing transaction costs associated 
with large group sizes, it is reasonable to assume that large, organized groups 
such as firms will be able to exert more political pressure than larger, but 
unorganized groups such as consumers [Mueller (1989); Olson (1965); 
Peltzman (1976)]. This would suggest the agency may have pro-firm marginal 
1] = [\MRSU\-1 ] V i J = CS,R,LR, G 
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preferences relative to consumers. Conversely, it is more difficult to say 
whether firms or organized groups of fishing labour have more political 
influence. 
8.3 The Politically Optimal Steady state 
The PPF is an expression of the goals of fishery management. What is 
accomplished depends, in practice, on the instruments the agency chooses to 
use (e.g. tradeable quotas vs. tax on the catch), the ways in which it uses 
them (e.g. high tax rates or low tax rates), the competitive structure of input 
and landed fish markets, and the property rights in the fishery. In this chapter 
we assume that government intervention takes the form of imposing direct 
control on all the firm's choice variables (h, I, and /), leaving firms with no 
degrees of freedom in operation decisions. The agency also controls access to 
the industry, thus regulating the number of vessels operating in the fishery 
(«). 4 [In reality, intervention might take the form of mixtures of price con-
trols, quantity controls, taxes, and subsidies. For an overview of fishery 
management instruments and political preferences, see Horan, Shortle and 
Bulte (1996)]. With price taking in labour and landed fish markets, market 
clearing implies nl = L, nh = Q, p = p(nh), and w = w(nt). 
Given the above specifications of the model, the agency will choose 
harvests, the number of boats, labour, and investment to maximize the present 
value of the PPF subject to the growth of the fish and capital stocks: 
In practice, inputs may be controlled through quotas on input use and restrictions on the 
type of technology in use. Vessels may be limited through the sale of licenses or administration of 
costless permits. We will assume the latter situation and so the analysis is simplified as there are 
no transfer payments to consider. 
(5) 
subject to 
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x = g(x) - nh 
k = I - yk 
h<f(k,l,x). 
(6) 
where x is the stock of fish, 7 e [0,1] is the constant rate of depreciation for 
capital, and f(K,L,x) is the harvest production function. Following Neher 
(1990), for a schooling fishery/ x = 0 and for a searching fishery / x > 0. The 
production function is increasing in all arguments and is strictly concave. The 
growth function for the stock, g(x), is assumed to have the usual properties 
(positive and strictly concave over the domain (0,X), with g(0) = g(X) = 0 
and where X is the maximum stock which can be supported by the ecosys-
tem). The rate of time preference is given by r. Note that the agency's 
problem reduces to a standard normative (efficient) economic model when the 
PPF is linear in its arguments, the weights on the arguments are equal, and 
the rate of time preference is the social rate. 
The agency's problem can be simplified by substituting f(k, l,x) in for h 
and thus eliminating one of the choice variables. This assumes that harvesting 
is technically efficient, which is what is to be expected in the optimum. 
Having assumed identical firms, we can aggregate over the costate variable 
for capital. The current value Hamiltoman for this problem is therefore: 
H = U(CS,R,LR,G) + \[g(x)-nf(k,l,x)] + n\(I-yk). (7) 
By the maximum principle, the necessary conditions for an optimal solution 
are: 
\ = -[Ucs-URynf+ UR[p-™} + [ULR-UR] w 
<nl (8) 
h ft 
wl + C(I) 
f 
I-yk 
f 
(9) 
\ = ~[Ucs-UR]p>nf+UR\p- ]+[ULR-UR] 
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(10) 
\Hr-g'+nfx)\ + [Ucs-UR\p'n*f(-)fx - URpnfx (11) 
X, = ( r + 7 ) X 2 + [ucs-UR]p'nf(-)fk - UK\pfJ * X/, (12) 
as well as the equations of motion for fish stock and capital. 5 
These conditions reveal several interest-group trade-offs facing the 
agency. Equation (8) requires labour employment in the fishery such that the 
political marginal net benefit of additional employment (the RHS) is equal to 
the political marginal opportunity cost of the additional harvest X,. The first 
term on the RHS is the political value of the price reduction induced by 
additional employment, -[[/ c s~[/ R]///z. In particular, other things equal, 
additional labour increases the harvest. Price must fall for the market to clear. 
Consumers benefit from reduced prices while producers are made worse off. 
The willingness of the agency to pursue additional employment therefore 
depends, in part, on the relative political value of consumers and producers 
(i.e. Ucs-Un). The second term on the RHS is the additional rent received by 
producers due to the increased harvest brought about from additional labour, 
weighted by marginal utility, UR\p-w/j\\. This term would be zero in a 
competitive market with open access. However, it is positive here due to the 
intertemporal cost associated with harvesting that would not taken into account 
by the market. The agency's willingness to sacrifice current labour income to 
conserve the resource for future use is motivated by the political value of 
future harvests. Finally, the last term reflects the wage bill effect from hiring 
of additional labour, [J7 L R-i7 R]w ////. The wage may be driven up as more 
labour is hired, making labour better off but firms worse off. Accordingly, 
agency choices about employment will depend on the relative political value 
of labour and producers as well as the political value of labour and con-
sumers. 
5These optimality conditions are derived respectively from the following conditions: H,=0, 
H„=0, H,=0, X, = r\, - H„, and X2 = r\2 - H„. 
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Equation (9) requires that the number of licenses be such that the 
marginal net benefits from an additional boat (the RHS) are equal to the 
political marginal opportunity cost of an additional harvest. The first term on 
the RHS has the same interpretation as its counterpart in (8). The second term 
on the RHS is the political value of the per unit profit to an additional boat, 
UK\p-(wl+C(i))lf\. This term would be zero in a competitive market equilib-
rium with open access. The third term is the political value of the increase in 
the wage bill from the addition of another boat, [ULR-UR]w'nl/f. An additional 
boat increases the amount of labour demanded. If w / > 0 , then wages must rise 
for the market to clear, reducing producer profits. Accordingly, the agency's 
willingness to pursue additional labour employment will depend on the 
relative marginal political value of labour and producers. Finally, the last 
term represents the benefit associated with the per unit net investment from 
the introduction of another boat into the industry. The agency must weigh the 
political gain from profits to additional licenses with the forgone profits to 
existing licenses which would result as a consequence of additional entry into 
the fishery. 
Equating (8) and (9) yields the following relationship defining the 
optimal scale of production: 
The term w/fi is the marginal cost of production (MQ for a representative 
firm. Therefore, the LHS is the difference between a firm's MC and average 
cost (AC). An economic efficiency requirement is that this difference be zero. 
To see this, recall that economic efficiency dictates that the marginal weights 
applied to each sector be set equal to one. The agency therefore would exhibit 
neutral marginal preferences between sectors (i.e. e R L R = % , c s = 0) and the 
RHS of (13) vanishes. In other words, firms would operate at minimum 
average costs (MAC). In this model, it may not be politically optimal for 
firms to operate efficiently. 
It is possible to infer relative political weights according to the PPF by 
observing actual policies. Suppose that the equilibrium solution to the model 
is such that AOMC. Assuming that the system is in (or near) the steady 
(13) 
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state and that (l//j - I If) > 0, the agency will thus exhibit a marginal prefer-
ence for firms relative to labour at the political optimum (i.e. e R L R < 0). 
Alternatively, if (l/f-l/f) < 0, the agency will exhibit a marginal preference 
for labour relative to firms at the political optimum (i.e. e R L R > 0). In the 
absence of output restrictions, firms would not choose to operate at such a 
point as they would be earning an economic loss. However, if output per 
firm, total output, and entry into the fishery is restricted such that P>AC, 
then firms would be willing to operate at this point. 
If ^R.LR = 0 at the optimum (i.e. the agency has a neutral marginal 
preference between firms and labour), firms should operate at MAC. How-
ever, while firms operate at an efficient scale, the politically determined 
equilibrium will still not be economically efficient unless it is also true that 
e R C S = 0. The final case to consider is when MO AC. An equilibrium 
outcome will require that c R L R > 0. Here, labour is valued more than firms 
at the margin. There are political benefits to expanding output per boat, 
thereby reducing the rent per boat, because other things equal, increasing 
output per boat requires more labour per boat. 
Setting A, = A2 = x = k = 0, the following set of equations along 
with (13) defines the political steady state, denoted x*, k", h", n, I *, and /* 
(assuming one exists): 
nwfx w'n% 
r = g'(x) + (14) 
- eRCS\p'nf\ + \p 
w'nl 
ft 
(r+ 7 ) ^ ( 7 ) 
w'nlfk (15) 
•R.LR 
Jl 
g(x) = nh (16) 
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The political optimality conditions (14) and (15) reduce to the econ-
omic optimality conditions (see below) when the agency exhibits neutral 
marginal preferences (i.e. e* R L R = e* R C S = 0) and the agency's rate of time 
preference is the social rate. 6 Equation (14), equates the agency's rate of time 
preference with the marginal product of the in situ resource stock in fish 
production plus a term which we will refer to as the resource stock term. The 
resource stock term for the political optimum is the rate of substitution 
between the marginal political cost savings from leaving a fish in situ (since 
less effort will be needed when the stock is large) and the marginal political 
benefits of harvesting. The larger the resource stock term, the higher the 
optimal steady state stock level should be (since g"<0). Thus higher cost 
savings have a positive impact on the size of the stock while current rents 
have a negative impact. When (14) reduces to the economic optimum, it is a 
general formula for the golden rule that is commonly derived in fisheries 
literature [e.g., see Clark (1990); Neher (1990)]. 
The larger the marginal political preference of consumers relative to 
firms in equilibrium, e " R L R , the larger is the denominator of the resource 
stock term in (14), other things equal. Given g"<0, this suggests that x" 
moves inversely with e* R C S . The political value of harvesting is larger with 
higher values of e* R C S since additional harvests (at lower prices) increase 
consumer welfare. 
The larger the marginal political preference associated with labour 
relative to firms, e*R L R , the larger is the denominator and the smaller is the 
numerator of (14). The denominator is larger because of lower marginal costs 
in terms of the PPF associated with increasing the amount of labour used in 
harvesting fish. The numerator is smaller because the marginal political cost 
^When the marginal political utility across sectors are equal (i.e. C/LR = UR = Ucs) the 
political and economic steady states coincide. However, this is not equivalent to the economically 
efficient case in which the marginal political utility in each sector is constant and equal to one in 
all periods (i.e. (7^ = UR = Ucs - 1). Although both situations will lead to the efficient steady 
state, only the latter will cause the system to approach along an optimal path (see chapter 6). 
/ = yk <17> 
184 Chapter 8 
savings of leaving fish in situ will be smaller since a positive weight is 
applied to the workers who catch fish. A larger stock left in situ means that 
less labour will be required in the future for a given harvest, lowering future 
wages and representing a loss of welfare to the agency. The net effect of a 
greater marginal political preference for labour relative to firms is a smaller 
* 7 
X . 
Equation (15) basically equates marginal political costs of capital with 
marginal political costs of labour. The larger is e R LR, the smaller will be the 
RHS of (15), other things equal. Given C " > 0 , (13) implies that investment 
and capital will be reduced. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to make any general comparisons 
between the politically optimal and economically efficient outcomes without 
further specification of the model. As is readily derived, the economically 
efficient counterparts of equations (14) and (15) are: 
fx 
r = g'(x) + tL (18) 
w 
(r + y)C'(I) = w JJL - v (19) 
ft 
Equations (18) and (19) along with (16) and (17) determine the efficient 
solution, yf, l€, F, ne, he, and V. If no other changes occurred (or if the 
changes were small), then when Ucs" > UR" and ULR" > UR", it would 
unambiguously be the case that x" < xf and k* < k*. Conversely, when Ucs" 
< UR" and ULR" < UR, then we would have x" > x? and kf > k* with other 
combinations of weights providing ambiguous results. However, the values of 
other variables are not constant: they are free to change in order to return the 
7 Note that x' can never fall below the schooling equilibrium value since the stock term in 
(14) is always positive. To see this, note that the numerator of the stock term can also be shown 
to equal [(r+7)«C/]f x// k , which is always positive as is the denominator, X,. 
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system to equilibrium, and since the production function relies on three 
inputs, it is impossible to know how these variables interact with specifying 
more fully the substitution effects in production. Therefore, we cannot say in 
general whether or not the political steady state will exhibit larger or smaller 
steady state fish stocks, nor can we comment on the extent of capitalization 
relative to the efficient case. Since the relative size of the fish and capital 
stocks are uncertain, so are harvest and investment levels. 
In a schooling fishery w i f h £ = 0 , we have that x" = xf from equations 
(14) and (18). However, steady state levels of capital, investment, and labour 
still differ between the two equilibria. Since x is defined by (14), comparison 
of (15) and (19) shows that when ULR > UR*, we have some combination of 
k* < kf, f < Ie, l" > le or n > ne. The reverse situation holds when ULR" 
< UR". Thus the politically optimal equilibrium of a schooling fishery is, 
ceteris paribus, overcapitalized relative to the efficient solution when firms 
are valued more than labour at the margin. However, without further specifi-
cation of the production function, the degree of capitalization in the fishery is 
ambiguous. 
8.4 Conclusions 
The standard assumption in normative fishery economics is that 
governments implement regulations in order to maximize the present value of 
net benefits to society. This is unrealistic. Public choice theories suggest that 
governments may maximize a political preference function with unequal 
weights attached to the economic objectives of various interest groups. In this 
paper we recognize that, in addition to resource rents, governments may 
consider labour rents, consumer surplus, and their own costs or revenues 
associated with regulations when designing fishery policy. 
The politically optimal steady state fish stock equilibrium for a 
searching fishery is shown to differ from the efficient equilibrium. The 
difference depends on the relative political welfare placed on each sector 
valued by the agency at the margin. Depending on the structure of the PPF, it 
is argued that the efficient capital and fish stock may be greater than or less 
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than the political stock. For a schooling fishery, the fish stock levels will 
coincide. However, labour and capital may be employed at inefficient levels. 
In Horan, Shortle and Bulte (1996), we have demonstrated that the 
implementation of certain policy instruments requires significant restrictions if 
a steady state equilibrium is to occur under general conditions in the context 
of a decentralized economy. The use of policies which provide an efficient 
outcome in the efficient model no longer produce a first best solution in the 
political model. Additional instruments must be used to insure that the firms, 
who are the ultimate decision makers in the fishery with respect to input 
choices, take into account the economic welfare of other sectors which the 
agency values. For example, with a conventional quota system the govern-
ment is (theoretically) able to control harvesting and "set" a steady state x", so 
that the firm's problem reduces to minimizing costs, given the quota. How-
ever, the political cost in terms of unsatisfied consumers and labourers may 
be so high that the government may be better of setting quotas at a different 
level. In contrast, with a combination of a tax on capital and a subsidy on 
labour costs and the cost of investment, it is demonstrated that the government 
can mimic the command optimum. Interestingly, political inferiority because 
of imperfect control over the factors of production may correspond with 
model solutions that are closer to the economic steady state than the command 
optimum of the political model. 
Although the model presented in this chapter is more general than 
standard fisheries models, it is by no means complete. For example, argu-
ments for environmental pressure groups and preservation values attached to 
wild stocks might also be added to the PPF. Inclusion of all relevant actors is 
especially relevant for future empirical work. 
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CHAPTER 9 
OVERFISHING, FISHING RIGHTS AND FUTURES MARKETS1 
Abstract: 
Introducing a futures market for fishing rights would increase utility for risk 
averse fishermen. We use the EV model to analyze possible reductions in 
(expected) profits for futures trading that would make fishermen indifferent 
between the situation with and without futures markets. It is found that a 
futures market for fishing rights enables policy makers to pursue substantial 
cuts in the size of annual quotas without hurting fishermen. In light of current 
overfishing and pressure from the sector to avoid dramatic cutbacks in effort, 
this is an important policy result. 
9.1 Introduction 
After implementation of exclusive economic zones in the late 1970s, 
de jure open access for many fisheries came to an end. It has been well 
documented that this did not imply that over-harvesting of fish resources came 
to an end (FAO 1992). De facto, many fisheries still exhibit features of open 
access management. 2 Conrad (1995) writes that approximation of open access 
conditions can arise if management regulations are ineffective, for instance 
because fishermen are adaptive and eliminate or reduce the effect of regula-
tions. Another reason for overharvesting exists. Interest groups pressure 
governments or supra-national organizations to set quotas at too high levels 
(see for instance Holden 1994). For example, in 1995 the European Commis-
'This chapter is based on Bülte E.H. and J.M.E. Pennings, A note on Overfishing, Fishing 
Rights and Futures Markets, European Journal of Law and Economics, In Press 
2Bulte et al. (1995) found that establishing property rights to end conditions of open access 
in Europe has contributed to increased efficiency of exploitation for German fisheries. However, 
the current situation is still far from optimal, according to many authors (e.g. Schmidt 1993). 
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sion proposed drastic reductions of fish quota to protect fish stocks, but after 
a process of negotiations these propositions were substantially mitigated to 
achieve a balance between ecological and socio-economic considerations (de 
Graaf 1995). In this paper we recognise that revision of European fisheries 
policies without particular attention for the (financial) consequences for the 
sector may fail. 3 We demonstrate how, under an individual transferable quota 
(ITQ) scheme, harvest levels can be reduced without reducing utility of (risk 
averse) fishermen. 
The European Union annually determines total allowable catches 
(TACs) for the European fishery sector. Total allowable catch is divided 
among the member states, who distribute the national quota among their 
fishermen. Member states have a certain freedom to formulate national 
fisheries policies, as long as total catch does not exceed the national quota, 
and the policy does not conflict with European legislation. There are consider-
able differences in national fisheries policies between different member states. 
The Dutch government, for instance, decided to implement an individual 
transferable quota system (ITQ). Initially this system was implemented just 
for flatfish, but in recent years also for demersal species. Under an ITQ 
scheme, fishermen are allocated an individual quota, based on their historic 
catch. Fishermen are allowed to trade their fishing rights, so that, in theory, 
fish are caught by the most efficient fishermen in the sector: they are able to 
"outbid" the other fishermen on the quota market, hence quota gravitate 
towards the most efficient fishers.4 The price for fishing rights have fluctu-
ated widely in recent years. 
Trading quota implies trading judicial harvest capacity. In addition, 
fishermen invest in vessels and gear, the so called physical harvest capacity. 
In the short and medium run, these investments result in fixed costs for the 
fishermen. For that reason, fishermen are committed, to a certain extent, to 
buy, sell or lease quota to achieve some balance between physical harvest 
3 The reader is referred to the vast literature on interest groups and public choice (e.g. Olson 
1965, Mueller 1989) for more information. 
4 For an overview of different policy instruments applied for fisheries, see Hartwick and 
Olewiler (1986). 
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capacity and judicial harvest capacity. (That is, unless the quota that is handed 
out to the individual fisherman is just equal to the desired harvest capacity.) 
Since quota prices are known to be volatile, fishermen face a price risk on the 
quota market. By introducing futures markets for quota, the fishermen can 
reduce this risk. In the framework of the certainty equivalent model, we 
demonstrate that this will increase the utility of harvesting for risk averse 
fishermen. This implies that, to restore utility neutrality, there is room for the 
government to combat over-harvesting by reducing the size of the quota 
allocated to the fishermen. This is just the measure of equivalent variation 
applied to fisheries management. In the next section we will briefly explain 
the underlying model. In section 3 the model is empirically applied to the case 
of Dutch fishing under the ITQ system. The conclusions ensue. 
9.2 The model 
Consider a fisher who can lock in the price risks regarding fishing 
rights with the help of fishing rights futures. The fisher is risk averse and 
wishes to maximize the expected revenue in the next time period adjusted for 
risk, where risk is measured by the variance of the expected revenue. We 
assume that the objective function of this fisherman can be reasonably 
approximated by the expected value-variance (EV) model (Peck 1975, Kahl 
1983, Robison and Barry 1987). 5 The objective function can be expressed as: 
irce = E(ir) - Xvar(ir), (1) 
where irce is the certainty equivalent, E(ir) is expected revenue and var(ir) 
represents the variance of revenues. In (1), X denotes the risk parameter 
which, for risk-averse decision makers, is positive, thus demanding compen-
sation for risk bearing (Pratt, 1954). 
5 For the conditions that justify the use of the EV model and the discussion on the use of the 
EV model and the general expected utility model the reader is referred to Bigelow (1993); Pulley 
(1981); Coyle (1992); Meyer and Rasche (1992); Pope and Chavas (1994); Robison (1996); and 
Tew et al. (1991). 
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If uncertainty in determining the profit is caused by fluctuations in the 
price of fishing quota P and the output price z, then profit can be expressed 
as: 
n = zQ - [P(Q - h) + Pfh] - C(Q) - F, (2) 
where Q is the quantity harvested (assumed equal to the size of the quota, 
which is a good assumption for sole fishing in the Netherlands); z is the spot 
price for the output with expected value z and variance a,2; P is the spot price 
of the fishery right with expected value P and variance a2; and h is the 
quantity of hedged fishery rights, i.e., the quantity bought or leased on the 
futures market for known price Pf. It is assumed that there is no basis risk; 
C(Q) are variable costs and F are fixed costs. 
Expected profit is: 
£ ( 7 t ) = zQ - [P(Q-h) + Pfh] - C(Q) - F. (3) 
The variance of profits is 
var(%) = Q2a2z + (Q-hfo) - 2Q(Q - /z)<V ( 4 ) 
where azr is the covariance between the price of fish and the fishing right. 
By substituting (3) and (4) into (1), the optimal holdings of futures contracts 
is obtained by differentiating the objective function with respect to h and 
setting the first order condition equal to zero: 
Pf-P a. 
h* = Q - — - - C?P—• (5) 
2A.O-; ° r 
where p is the correlation coefficient between fish prices and fishing rights. 
For Pf > P, there is a trade-off between (expected) revenues and variance 
such that h < Q. The more risk-averse the fisherman and/or the more price 
fluctuations in the spot market of the right, the greater the level of hedging 
for a constant positive difference between Pf and P. 
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Fig. 9.1: Iso-utility curves for various degrees of risk aversion 
In Figure 9 .1 , a is the standard deviation of the revenues of harvest-
ing, E(R) are expected revenues of harvesting and X measures the degree of 
risk aversion: for X = 0, the fisherman is risk neutral. Else, the higher X, the 
more the fisher's risk aversion. Finally CEB is the (initial) certainty equival-
ent. The lines diverging from CEB are iso-utility curves, indicating a constant 
utility level for varying expected revenues and standard deviations. Increasing 
volatility 6 (i.e. moving from left to right in the graph) indicates how much 
expected revenues should rise to keep utility constant. Obviously, the more 
risk averse, the higher the risk premium demanded by the individual to make 
him not worse off with an increased spread, hence the steeper the iso-utility 
^ h a t is, increased the spread of the price distribution while keeping the mean constant. 
The effect of futures markets on fish quota is graphically illustrated in 
Figure 9 .1 . 
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line. Risk neutral fishermen (X = 0) do not require additional expected 
revenues to compensate for increased fluctuations, hence the iso-utility line is 
horizontal. 
By buying or selling (part of) the judicial capacity on the futures 
market instead of the future spot market, the price risk of this capacity is 
reduced and so is over-all volatility of revenues. Suppose trading quota at a 
futures market reduces over-all volatility from aB to aA. This implies that a 
fishermen with degree of risk aversion X2, moves from B to A'? This makes 
him undoubtedly better off (given a degree of risk aversion X2, the new 
certainty equivalent is CEA > CEB). To restore utility neutrality, the policy 
maker next decreases expected revenues with the interval (RB - RA) so that the 
fisherman moves back to the initial iso-utility curve, hence from A' to A. 
Given a certain price per unit of fish, this reduction in expected revenues can 
be translated in a reduction of quota allocated to this fishermen. This model is 
applied for the Dutch situation in the next section. 
9.3 Empirical results 
Equation (4) in the previous section is used to find expressions for the 
variance of profits with and without hedging. For example, without hedging 
we find: 
w w ( x ) = Q2oj + Q2a) - 2Q\r. (6) 
Similarly, with hedging we find: 
7 Note that in this graph we assume that the futures price is equal to the expected future spot 
price. If trading on a futures market implies bearing some cost (for instance because Pf > P), 
then A' will be located below B. As long as the new position of the individual is in the interval 
(RB - RA), however, his utility has increased and the (qualitative) result is unaffected. Note that 
the individual would not decide to trade on the futures market if the futures price is so much 
lower than the expected future spot price that revenues fall below RA. 
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varH(ir) = Q2aj + (Q - h ')2a) - 2Q(Q - h •>,_,. (7) 
In this section we will calculate the reduction in var(ir) that results 
from optimal hedging for the Dutch sole fishery. We have assumed that, if 
fishers buy a quota, they expect to use it until the Common Fisheries Policy is 
open for revision, which is in 2003. This implies that they depreciate their 
quota in this period (we have assumed a discount rate of 10%), and we have 
used the capital recovery factor to determine annual quota costs. Prices of 
sole and fishing rights are from Produktschap voor Vis (1994) and Banning 
(193), respectively. Estimated parameters of interest are as follows: z = 15.4; 
P = 12.35, rjz = 2.6, ar = 3.0 and p = 0.56 (implying that az_r = 4.37). 8 
We have defined y as P/P, which is a measure for the divergence between 
the expected spot price and the futures price of the fishing right. 
The reduction in supply of fish may increase the price per unit of fish, 
although we assume constant prices. Similarly, we have assumed that harvest-
ing costs are unaffected by quota cuts. The assumptions of constant prices and 
constant harvesting costs are for computational convenience and are both 
conservative: If in reality prices would rise and/or costs would fall when 
fishing rights are curtailed, the fisher is (partly) compensated for the reduction 
in quota by high prices and/or cost savings, and even larger quota cuts are 
possible while keeping utility of fishermen constant. For that reason the 
results provided in Table 9.1 can be considered as underestimates of the true 
potential to cut quota. 9 
It is of interest to note that we have used yearly observations from 1987 onwards. Prior to 
1987 enforcement of catches and landings was poor, hence the value of official fishing right was 
relatively modest. This was reflected in very low prices for quota. After the announcement and 
implementation of additional enforcement, the price of the right to harvest a kilo of sole rose 
from fl. 17 to approximately fl. 100. Observations prior to this announcement have therefore 
been ignored. The development of quota prices over time clearly indicate that there may be 
considerable differences between de facto and the jure fisheries management. 
'We argue that the assumptions of constant prices and costs are not very restrictive. First, 
since we focus on modelling the effects for the Netherlands, the assumption of constant prices is 
relatively harmless, as trade in fish products among member states will reduce price effects. 
Second, with respect to constant harvest costs, we refer to Davidse and Beijert (1995), where it is 
reported that fixed costs, on average, account for more than 75% of total costs. 
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As a sensitivity analysis we have varied the values for Pf and X, in 
accordance with reasonable values as indicated in the literature (Peck 1975, 
Robison and Barry 1987). 
Table 9.1: Possible "utility neutral" reduction in fish quota under various 
conditions. Pf = yP. 
1 
X = 
1 
0.01 
1.1 
X = 
1 
0.025 
1.1 
X = 
1 
0.05 
1.1 
Q 100 100 100 100 100 100 
h' 51 44.1 51 48.3 51 49.6 
Avarfir) 23817 23333 23817 23730 23817 23788 
11.3 11.5 34.5 34.5 73.0 73.0 
We have assumed that a fisher initially has the right to catch 100 units 
of fish. If, for example, this fisher has a degree of risk aversion equal to 
0 .01 , it is optimal for this fisher to hedge 5 1 % of his fishing rights on the 
futures market. This would reduce the variance of revenues with 23817. This 
makes the fisher better off, which enables the policy maker to cut his quota 
by more than 1 1 % . Given his hedged quantity of 51 units, this cut will take 
the fisher back to his original utility level. We conclude that the possible 
reductions in quota are substantial. For modest measures of risk aversion, 
significant utility-neutral reductions of fishing rights are possible, when those 
reductions are accompanied by the implementation of a futures market for 
fishing rights. 
Three caveats should be mentioned. First, the analysis is based on an 
economic analysis, where quota handed out by the government or rights 
purchased in previous periods represent an opportunity cost for the owner (see 
also Hannesson 1996). However, if new policy is aimed at being truly 
"utility-neutral", the correct basis for the analysis might not be economic 
accounting but the perception of fishermen. It may be so that fishermen do 
not consider the fishing rights in their possession as costs. If fishers 
exclusively consider the costs associated with obtaining new quota, then 
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possible quota cuts would be much more modest. For instance, under the 
assumption that the share of total quota that changes hands annually (either on 
the sellers or leasing market) is 15%, and these are the only rights considered 
as costs by the fishers, the possible reduction in quota size for the parameter 
values as specified in Table 9.1 ranges from 0% to 5%. 
Second, even with modest measures of risk aversion as applied in 
Table 1, we may obtain negative values for 7 r c e . 1 0 One possible explanation, 
consistent with findings in agricultural economics, is that in addition to 
revenues, fishermen derive utility from the fishing process itself. In other 
words, fishing may be considered a way of life, yielding benefits outside the 
scope of simple economic accounting (for example, see Feeney et al. (1996) 
for an elaborate treatment of motivations of fishermen). However, when this 
additional utility is approximately constant, i.e. not affected by the size of the 
quota, the results displayed in Table 9.1 are still valid. For relatively large 
reductions this assumption is probably violated. If utility associated with the 
fishing process is increasing in the size of the quota allocated, Table 9.1 
overestimates the true utility-neutral reductions. 
Finally, the analysis is based on the assumption that fishermen are 
myopic in the sense that they do not recognize that hedging influences the 
quota cut that is inflicted upon them later: they first determine h", taking Q as 
given, and are next surprised by the government's decision to cut their quotas. 
There may be reasons for myopic behaviour. For instance, quota cuts will 
typically be based on hedging performance of the sector as a whole. This 
implies that optimal hedging for a rational fisherman requires developing 
expectations of (optimal) hedging for the other fishermen in the sector, which 
may be costly and cumbersome. In addition, it should be recognized that there 
is always uncertainty associated with the quota size, even in the absence of 
considerations brought forward in this paper. Depending on scientific advice 
on stock size in situ, the size of annual quota fluctuates. It may be difficult to 
estimate the "extra" uncertainty associated with the new policy. It is possible, 
'"without futures trading and with a very low degree of risk aversion (X = 0.01), we find a 
positive value: ir„ = E(ir) - 0.01 var(ir) - 682. But for higher levels of risk aversion, such as X 
= 0.025, we find ir„ = E(ir) - 0.025 var(ir) = -333. Note that negative values for ir,r do not 
imply that fishermen earn a negative income. 
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however, to imagine what the effect is of allowing a sequence of rounds of 
hedging and quota cutbacks, until an equilibrium is reached. Suppose that it is 
optimal for a fisherman to hedge 51 units of his initial quota of 100 (see 
Table 9.1), and that the government calculates that utility neutrality is restored 
when the quotum is reduced to 89. In the next period, the fisherman is able to 
increase his utility by hedging less than 51 units. For example, assume that, 
given Q equals 89, it is optimal to hedge 45 units. In order to restore utility 
neutrality, the managing agency should cut the quota further. This implies that 
Q should be reduced below 89, although the second cut will be more modest 
that the first one. Again, the fisherman will respond by hedging less to 
increase his utility, which will provoke further quota cuts by the government, 
until eventually an equilibrium is reached. (It is important to recognise that 
strategic actions of fishermen are completely disregarded in this reasoning.) 
For that reason, rational expectations will cause larger quota cuts than the 
ones predicted in Table 9 .1 . Formally incorporating rational expectations and 
strategic actions in the current model will be one of the possible extensions 
for future research. 
9.4 Conclusions 
Despite the implementation of exclusive fishing zones that formally 
ended the era of open access fisheries management, there is still evidence that 
current fishing effort is excessive. However, combatting overfishing is likely 
to result in resistance from the sector. Public choice theories predict that a 
small, well-organized group as the fishery sector may develop sufficient 
political pressure that it is able to resist painful reorganizing. This implies that 
an important question for policy makers is how to reduce fishing effort 
without "hurting" the sector. 
In this paper we have analyzed the possibility of cutting quotas 
combined with implementation of a futures market for fishing rights. A 
futures market for fishing rights reduces price risk for fishermen, and thereby 
makes risk averse fishermen better off. Using the EV model we find that 
considerable quota cuts are possible to bring the fisher back to his original 
utility level, even with modest measures of risk aversion. The reason is that 
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the price of fishing rights have fluctuated widely in the past, hence there is 
ample possibility for improvement. The results have been obtained under the 
conservative assumptions that (i) fish prices do not increase after the reduction 
in quota size, and (ii) total costs of fishing effort do not fall after the reduc-
tion in quota size. If one of these assumptions, or both, is violated, quota size 
could be reduced even more. Some caveats of the model are recognized and 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 10 
UNCERTAINTY AND FOREST LAND USE: VAGUE PREFERENCES 
AND IMPRECISE COEFFICIENTS 
Abstract 
Recently, increasing weight has been placed on non-timber values in forest 
management. Both the multiple objectives and the parameters that support 
decision making in forestry are often imprecise and vague. In this chapter, the 
concepts of fuzzy set theory are explained and then applied to the problem of 
allocating public forest land on Vancouver Island among competing land uses. 
Two principal sources of fuzziness are identified—those related to uncertainty 
in classification (specification of management objectives) and those related to 
uncertainty concerning how actions affect objectives (imprecise technical 
coefficients). By comparing the results of classical and fuzzy decision models, 
we conclude that the latter approach can be judged an improvement over the 
former. The fuzzy land-use allocation appears to be more consistent with the 
political decision making process, which relies on consultation and consensus 
seeking among various interest groups, that has evolved in British Columbia. 
The analysis also yields insights into the robustness of outcomes and suggests 
priority areas for further research. 
10.1 Introduction 
The Government of British Columbia in Canada owns more than 95 
percent of the forest land in the province. In the past, these lands had been 
managed primarily for production of commercial timber from mature stands. 
During the late 1970s and 1980s, re-planting of denuded, not sufficiently 
restocked forest lands took precedence over other environmental concerns, but 
'This chapter is based on: Ells A. , E.H. Bulte and G.C van Kooten, Uncertainty and Forest 
Land Use in British Columbia: Vague Priorities and Imprecise Coefficients, Forest Science, In 
Press. 
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during the early 1990s the Government introduced several initiatives to 
address additional environmental objectives. These initiatives included a 
Protected Areas Strategy (PAS), Timber Supply Reviews, the Commission on 
Resources and Environment (CORE) process, a Forest Practices Code, a 
Forest Renewal Plan, and a Forest Land Reserve (see van Kooten 1995). The 
policies reflect growing public recognition that forests are more than a source 
of industrial output. While the importance of commercial timber production to 
the provincial economy is not in doubt, managing land for multiple uses 
requires trading off different objectives in forest land management. In this 
chapter, we examine a particular aspect of land management, namely that of 
allocating forest land under uncertainty using a zoning instrument. To address 
uncertainty, we employ fuzzy set theory. 
Allocation of forest lands, including protected areas, has defaulted to 
the CORE, which is charged with finding consensus among various stakehol-
der groups. The philosophy that emerged during the CORE process was to 
treat each of the multiple objectives of land use as equally important, so that 
economic efficiency in the sense of maximizing discounted welfare was not 
necessarily given preeminent status. Under this condition, traditional multiple 
objective decision making (MODM) is the most appropriate tool of analysis. 
The usefulness of classical MODM models is limited, however, because of 
the following characteristics inherent in the land-use decision making process: 
• the objectives of society are ill-defined; 
• the values that society attaches to various forest activities (such as 
recreation or preservation of biodiversity) are imprecise at best, or 
simply unknown; 
• the effects of silviculture and other forest management decisions are 
uncertain, both from a biological and socioeconomic perspective; 
*• land-use and silvicultural decisions often pertain to an uncertain and 
distant future; and 
• there is uncertainty about forest tenures, the macro economy, future 
product prices, and the ability of, or need for, governments to reduce 
deficits/debts. 
In this chapter, we address uncertainty. Uncertainty has to do with the 
degree of belief or faith in the validity of a particular proposition or datum 
(Kruse et al. 1991). It arises from many sources, including measurement 
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error, lack of judgement, imprecision, unreliability, variability, vagueness, 
ignorance and ambiguity. The theory of fuzzy sets is used in this study to deal 
with vagueness. Vagueness is said to occur when an object is known comple-
tely but its classification is in doubt because the set to which it may belong is 
poorly defined (Barret and Pattanik 1989); vagueness refers to the lack of 
clear-cut boundaries for the set of objects to which the symbol or meaning is 
applied (Fedrizzi 1987). Or, in the words of Munda, Nijkamp and Rietveld 
(1992), "fuzzy uncertainty does not concern the occurrence of an event but 
the event itself, in the sense that it can not be described unambiguously". In 
addition to this interpretation (which will be elaborated upon in section 10.2), 
we will use the theory of fuzzy sets to deal with imprecision in parameter 
values. While there is not necessarily something "vague" or "ambiguous" 
about these parameters or their interpretation, fuzzy set theory is employed 
because there is not sufficient support for a proper probability distribution. 
Applications of fuzzy set theory in the field of forestry and land-use 
planning are expanding. Mendoza and Sprouse (1989) proposed a two-stage 
approach to forest planning, and developed a fuzzy model for more flexible 
and robust generation of alternatives. The uncertainty in their model arose 
from imprecise coefficients and was modeled by tolerating some constraint 
violations. Hof et al. (1986), Pickens and Hof (1991) and Bare and Mendoza 
(1992) compared classical (i.e., crisp) and fuzzy models for describing 
optimal harvest over time. They found that, by relaxing the constraint of non-
declining harvest volume over time, net present value (NPV) could be signifi-
cantly increased (see also Hof 1993, pp. 103-14). Mendoza et al. (1993) 
developed a fuzzy multiple objective linear programming model for forest 
planning that accommodated uncertainty in the objective function by making 
coefficients interval-valued. Finally, Tecle et al. (1994) developed an interac-
tive fuzzy multi-criterion decision model in which the decision maker is 
allowed to search the frontier of efficient solutions instead of being confronted 
with a uniquely preferred solution. Fuzzy set theory was used to deal with a 
vague objective and constraint. 
This chapter differs from previous ones because its scope is broader. 
In Bare and Mendoza (1992) and Pickens and Hof (1991), for instance, the 
focus is on timber yield only. We have a social orientation in which timber is 
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but one of many services provided by forests. 2 Obviously, extending the 
analysis to allow for recreation and preservation benefits requires data that are 
less precise comparatively than similar data for timber, because they are 
unobservable in markets and are difficult to measure. While Bare and 
Mendoza (1992) argue that imprecise (timber) coefficients are better viewed 
as stochastic rather than fuzzy, in this paper we address imprecision in 
coefficients as fuzzy measures. 
The broader scope also implies that the impact of fuzzifying a crisp 
model is different. If fuzzifying simply amounts to relaxing a binding con-
straint of a NPV maximization model, then the predictable result is that NPV 
will increase! Relaxing a binding constraint will always have this effect. In 
our analysis, fuzziness actually affects the allocation of land among uses; this 
is a less than trivial result of the fuzzy approach. 
Finally, this is the first chapter in the field that actually combines the 
existence of vague objectives and constraints, as in Tecle et al. (1994) and 
Pickens and Hof (1991), and imprecise coefficients, as in Mendoza and 
Sprouse (1989), Bare and Mendoza (1992), Hof et al. (1995) and Mendoza et 
al. (1993). Moreover, imprecise coefficients are dealt with explicitly by 
modelling them as fuzzy numbers instead of incorporating them implicitly in 
the analysis as admissible violations of constraints, as in Mendoza et al. 
(1993). The approach taken in this chapter gives more insight into the effect 
of the various sources of uncertainty on land allocation and makes better use 
of available information. 
The purpose of the current research is to capture the uncertainty 
inherent in describing the socioeconomic impacts of land-use and forest 
management decisions on Vancouver Island. The major objectives of this 
study are threefold: (1) to develop a fuzzy multiple objective decision-making 
model that incorporates uncertainties both in objective specification and 
parameter values; (2) to contrast the fuzzy models to a classical multiple 
objective approach where uncertainty is not considered; and (3) to demonstra-
te the usefulness of fuzzy set theory in the context of a multiple objective 
decision-making model for land use on Vancouver Island. Vancouver Island 
2 The papers by Mendoza et al. (1993) and Tecle et al. (1994) deal with multiple objectives, 
but are based on NPV maximization models. 
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was selected because it is a region where land-use conflicts are intense and the 
recent CORE (1994) land-use recommendations (subsequently adopted by 
government) have been controversial. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 10.2, we 
provide a brief, formal description of fuzzy logic, followed in section 10.3 by 
the development of three fuzzy decision support models. The derivation of the 
required parameters for the models are presented in section 10.4, while the 
empirical results are provided in section 10.5. Our conclusions ensue. 
10.2 Uncertainty and Fuzzy Set Theory 
Current literature concerned with modelling uncertainty provides a 
wide range of definitions both for the concept of uncertainty itself as well as 
the various types of uncertainty that may be addressed (see, e.g., Krause and 
Clark 1993; Kruse et al. 1991). In this regard, fuzzy set theory has become a 
particularly fruitful line of research for dealing with vagueness and ambiguity 
(e.g., Cox 1994; Zimmerman 1991; Barret and Pattanik 1989; Fedrizzi 
1987). Dubois and Prade (1993) and Kosko (1992, pp.264-68) have shown 
that there is a clear distinction between probability theory and fuzzy set 
theory—that the fuzzy approach to uncertainty is valid in its own right, and 
that it is different from the Bayesian approach of probability theory. Kosko 
(1992) provides a formal proof that Bayes theorem is simply a special case of 
the Subsethood theorem of fuzzy sets. The proof is based on the fact that in 
probability theory an element is either in that set or not in that set (see 
below), while in fuzzy set theory it can be an element of both a set and its 
complement, each with some degree of membership. 
In this section, we provide a formal treatment of fuzzy logic by 
considering membership or indicator functions for fuzzy sets (objective 
targets) and fuzzy numbers for imprecise values of the technical coefficients 
in the decision model. This background constitutes the formal foundation for 
the fuzzy MODMs, without and with imprecise coefficients, that are develo-
ped in the next section. 
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An element x of the universal set X is assigned to an ordinary (crisp) 
set A via the characteristic function juA, such that: 
MAW = 1 if x G A C X. ( 1 ) 
ptA(x) = 0 otherwise. 
The element has either full membership (juA(x) = 1 ) or no membership (^A(x) 
= 0 ) in the set A. The valuation set for the function is the pair of points 
{ 0 , 1 } . A fuzzy set A is also described by a characteristic function, the 
difference being that the function now maps over the closed interval [ 0 , 1 ] . 3 
Formally, a fuzzy set A of the universal set X is defined by its 
membership function 
« : X - [ 0 , 1 ] , ( 2 ) 
which assigns to each element x G A a real number /xA(x) in the interval 
[ 0 , 1 ] , where the value of n~A at x represents the grade or degree of members-
hip of x in A (Sakawa 1 9 9 3 ) . While membership functions can take on a 
variety of functional forms, linear specifications are often employed. 
An example of fuzzy membership is the set of "natural forests," where 
it is clear that old-growth forests belong to this set with a degree of members-
hip equal to 1. As we consider progressively heavier logged forests, the 
descriptor "natural" becomes less apt. Partly logged forests are assigned a 
partial degree of membership in the set "natural forests," something less than 
one. This is an example of a one-sided fuzzy set, with membership in the set 
approaching zero as the exploitation pressure increases. A two-sided fuzzy set 
might be the set of "ponds". A "pond" ceases to be one when it becomes so 
large that it is better conceived of as a "lake", or when it becomes so small 
that it is better thought of as a "puddle." It is the researcher's task in these 
3 The characteristic function should not be confused with probability. Probability deals with 
the quantification of an uncertain event, while fuzzy set theory deals with the quantification of the 
uncertainty of the description of the event (see, e.g., Kosko 1992). 
Fuzzy sets and membership functions 
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cases to construct the relevant fuzzy sets for the sets "natural forests" or 
"ponds" by specifying threshold values and membership functions, as will be 
explained below. 
The preceding definitions of membership employed the concept of a 
normalized fuzzy set. A fuzzy set A, defined over a finite interval, is said to 
be normal if there exists an x G X such that JKA(X) = 1. and MAOO ^ 1 V X 
G X. A subnormal fuzzy set is normalized by dividing /^(x) by its height or 
greatest membership value. 
Set theoretic operations are defined for fuzzy sets. Among these are 
the concepts of containment, complement, intersection and union. Fuzzy set A 
is a subset of (contained in) B if and only if the membership function of A is 
less than or equal to that of B everywhere on X: 
A £ B p.~A(x) < /xi(x) for all x G X. (3) 
The complement of A (written as A) is defined as: 
/ x S (x) = 1 - mix) (4) 
The intersection of the fuzzy sets A and B is defined as: 
A fl B & n(Xni) = min{itA(x), MBW} for all x G X, (5) 
and the union as: 
A U B t t j i ^ ; ^ max{^ (x ) , MlOO} f o r all x G X. (6) 
Hence, the intersection A D B is the largest fuzzy set contained in both A 
and B, and the union A U B is the smallest fuzzy set containing both A and 
B. 
While both union and intersection of fuzzy sets are commutative, 
associate and distributive, as is the case for ordinary or crisp sets, fuzzy logic 
deviates from crisp logic because, if we do not know A with certainty, then 
its complement A is also not known with certainty. Thus, A Pi A does not 
produce the null set as is the case for crisp sets (where A c Pi A = <p). Thus, 
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fuzzy logic violates the "law of noncontradiction". It also violates the "law of 
the excluded middle" because the union of a fuzzy set and its complement 
does not equal the universe of discourse—the universal set X. Thus, A is 
properly fuzzy iff A n 0 and A U A ^ X (Kosko 1992, pp.269-272). 
Fuzzy numbers and alpha cuts 
A fuzzy number describes the situation where a parameter value is 
"approximately m" or "about n." Fuzzy numbers are approximations of a 
central value and can be represented by "bell" curves, triangular functions, 
trapezoids, and so on (Cox 1994). A standard form of fuzzy number that 
allows for computational efficiency is that of the L-R (left-right) fuzzy 
number. A fuzzy L-R number M is fully characterized by three parameters-
—m is the mean value of M and a and 8 are the left and right spreads, 
respectively. It is defined as: 
L(—) x < m a > 0 
R(zJL) x > m 8 > 0 
and written as (m,o-,/3)LR. Operations for fuzzy numbers of the L-R type have 
been provided by Sakawa (1993, pp.26-30). Given the fuzzy numbers 
M=(m,o-, |8) L R and N = ( n , 7 , 5 ) L R , the basic L-R fuzzy operators for symmetric 
fuzzy numbers (where 8=a and 7 = 6 ) , are as follows: 
Addition: (m,8)Sym® ( n , 7 ) S y m = (m+n , 8+y)Sym (8) 
Subtraction: (m,/3)Syme (n ,7 ) S y m = (m-n, 8+y)Sym (9) 
Multiplication: (m,/3) S y m® (n ,7 ) S y m = (mn, n j3+m 7 ) S y m , i f f m,n > 0(10) 
Scalar multipl.: k ® (m,8)Sym = (km,k/3) S y m (11) 
The fuzzy number M=(m, |S) S y m resembles a membership function in 
appearance and is used to describe a continuous symmetrical quantity distribu-
tion about an imprecise parameter. While m is the central value of the fuzzy 
number M, the width of the spread defined for the set is an indication of the 
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reliability of the estimate. Typically, narrow spreads correspond with 
"reliable" values for the imprecise parameter. 
Although the class of fuzzy numbers discussed above assume symme-
try, this does not presuppose symmetry in solution sets. The response in any 
one parameter value to a change in the fuzzy quantity is strictly a function of 
the spread (/3y) defined for that number. The spread completely defines the 
slope of the linear possibility distribution and thus the rate of change in value. 
It is the net result of all such independent movements that determines the 
ultimate solution. 
Another concept required for model building with fuzzy sets is that of 
the cv-level set. The a-level set A„ is simply that subset of A for which the 
degree of membership exceeds the level a , and is itself a crisp set (an element 
either meets the required level of a or it does not). 
A a = { x | M A ( X ) > a}, a G [0,1]. (12) 
A a is an upper level set of A. The use of ce-level sets provides a means of 
transferring information from a fuzzy set into a crisp form. Defining an a-
level set is referred to as taking an a-cut, cutting off that portion of the fuzzy 
set whose members do not have the required membership. Taking different a-
cuts allows the decision maker to consider different "realizations" of the 
problem, based on how much uncertainty he wishes to consider. 4 
A fuzzy multiple objective decision making model with vague prefe-
rences and imprecise coefficients can be formulated as a crisp linear program 
(LP), as illustrated in this section. We acknowledge that classical formulations 
exist that closely resemble the fuzzy model developed here—the class of 
"mimmum distance models" bears some resemblance. However, the set-up of 
the problem would be different, and so is its conceptualization in the context 
of uncertainty. 
If an a-cut is taken for several coefficients individually, then the overall output uncertainty 
associated with this a-cut is unknown. If the decision maker is more concerned with total output 
uncertainty than with uncertainty levels in individual model coefficients, this may be an important 
omission. We thank John Hof for pointing this out to us. 
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Fuzzy multiple objective linear programming 
In the fuzzy MODM model, we are concerned with uncertainty 
surrounding the definition of satisfactory solution values for each of the 
objective functions. Although a precise value for each objective is provided by 
the model, it is unclear as to how well that value represents the concept of a 
fully satisfied objective. The term satisfactory solution is defined vaguely; it is 
a fuzzy set. Thus, a goal G(x) or constraint C(x) may be completely satisfied 
by choice of the solution vector x (/*5(x) = l or /*c(x) = l ) , completely unsatis-
fied (HG(X)=0 or /t£(x)=0), or somewhat satisfied (0<HQ(X), /XC(X) < 1 ) . 
Crisp goals and constraints are accommodated in this framework by defining a 
crisp set as a specialized case of a fuzzy set. 
The decision space, n?,, is the fuzzy set defined by the intersection of 
the fuzzy goal and the fuzzy constraint, and is characterized as 
The decision space is illustrated in Figure 10.1. 
It follows that, in order to maximize the minimum degree of satisfacti-
on of the goals and constraints, the objective function for the fuzzy linear 
programming model is: 
This maxmin operator is but one of several ways to represent the decision. In 
the absence of evidence for ranking operators, maxmin was chosen because it 
is simple and linear, but it may fail to capture the true decision-making 
process. The weights are implicitly determined by the parameters of the 
membership functions (because the goals are incommensurable, it is not 
immediately clear what set of membership functions would imply equal 
weights). The solution is obtained where the minimum membership value has 
been maximized, or the lowest level of satisfaction has been raised as high as 
possible. This decision mimics the situation where there are multiple interest 
groups involved on Vancouver Island, and the strength and viability of the 
/*5(x) = min. (/i£(x), ^ ( x ) ) . ( 1 3 ) 
max. IJ.Q(X) = max.min. ( j irj(x) , M £ ( X ) ) , X G X (14) 
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Fig. 10.1: Illustration of a fuzzy decision. 
consensus solution will be largely influenced by the level of commitment 
(satisfaction) of the least committed (satisfied) group. 
Model construction places implicit values on outputs, because it is 
impossible to make a decision or rank alternative scenarios unless such values 
are assigned. By employing the fuzzy approach, as represented by maxmin, it 
is possible to avoid translating the objectives into common, perhaps unnatural 
or inappropriate, units of measurement as doing so can derail a multi-group 
negotiation problem. Through iteration and continued revision of the mem-
bership functions, one would expect to arrive at some set of implied values, 
although not necessarily measured in dollar terms. Since iteration has not been 
possible in the case of the Vancouver Island decision, this study can merely 
suggest a framework for arriving at group consensus or decision. Therefore, 
despite its limitations and in the absence of good evidence to argue for 
another operator, the maxmin approach is used here; it is also favoured in the 
literature (e.g., Hof, Pickens and Bartlett 1986; Hof 1993). 
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The decision model can now be written as a crisp LP. Suppose that the 
original fuzzy MODM is as follows: 
find x 
s.t. AjX > bi i = 1,2,...,N (15) 
x > 0, 
where N is the number of goals plus constraints, A, refers to the crisp para-
meter values, and > refers to fuzzy objective or constraint sets. Assuming 
linear membership functions, Zimmerman (1991) has shown that (15) can be 
written as: 
Max X 
s.t. Aj x - ^ - dj( X - 1) > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N (16) 
X G [0,1], and 
x > 0. 
where X = / i D (x ) and ds is the spread of a one-sided fuzzy set—for fuzzy set Z 
this implies that /x z (x)=0 for x < b r d i and /i z(x) = l for x > b j . This is the 
maxmin formulation of the fuzzy MODM. Other formulations exist, some of 
which employ a composite objective function, which is usually additive (see 
Mendoza and Sprouse 1989). 
Fuzzy programming with imprecise coefficients 
Now consider the situation where the elements of the matrix A are not 
precisely known. The j - th element of A b ay, is described by a fuzzy number. 
Furthermore, assume that these fuzzy numbers are triangular and symmetric, 
allowing a y to be written as (my, j3y) with degree of membership: 
M(a y ) = 0 ; ay < mij - Btj 
/*(ay) = 1 + (ay - my)//3y ; my - j8y < ay < my 
Ai(ay) = 1 ; ay = my (17) 
/X(ay) = 1 - (my - ay)//3y ; my < ay < my + /3y 
Kay) = 0 ; m y + Bn < a r 
This fuzzy number is depicted in Figure 10.2. 
214 Chapter 10 
To capture the effect of uncertainty in the model parameters, we 
employ an a-cut. This allows the definition of a crisp parameter value derived 
from the characteristics of the underlying fuzzy set, and permits the use of a 
standard LP format. From Figure 10.2, an a-cut gives two possible realizati-
ons of ay (a! and a 2), which represent, respectively, the lower and upper 
bounds of the parameter. Consider the lower bound first. The imprecise 
nature of the technical coefficients is incorporated into model (16) to give the 
following structure (Lai and Hwang 1994): 
Max X_ 
s.t. [Ai - (l-a)j3Jx - b, - d,(X - 1) > 0, i = 1,2,...,N (18) 
X G [0,1], a G [0,1] and 
x > 0. 
M<(a) 
1 / '\ 
/ 1 \ 
H ( a u ) 
/ ' \ 
/ 1 \ 
/ 1 \ 
/ 1 \ 71 1 : \ 
0 / ! \ 
mu - Pu a. m , aa m , + p,, a 
Fig. 10.2: Fuzzy number with (mv, By). 
Model (18) permits each element in the parameter matrix to be adju-
sted to reflect the membership level being considered. Each element ay is 
transformed so that /t(aij)=a, the degree of membership of ay is a. When a 
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= 1, this MODM formulation is identical to the fuzzy MODM discussed 
previously. As a decreases, parameter values move away from the centre 
value, my, to values lying below my on the defined interval. The solution is 
now derived using parameter values with a lower degree of membership. 
This case reflects the situation where the parameters considered most likely 
are greater than the true parameter values. The model in (18) sets all impreci-
se parameters to the same degree of membership, one distinct point in the 
range of possible solutions. The justification for doing so was discussed 
above. 
If we replace Aj - (l-a)B t in (18) by A, + (l-a)B „ then the model 
uses higher values for the parameters that have the same degree of members-
hip. This represents the situation where the most probable values lie below the 
true values. 
Jointly, these two models provide an upper and lower bound for 
possible solutions by considering the two extreme points of the fuzzy numbers 
defined by n(ati)=a. As the decision maker is less confident that the central 
value of the fuzzy number is a correct representation of the true value, the a-
cut is lowered (this can be visualized by lowering the horizontal line in Figure 
2) and the length of the interval separating these bounds increases. This 
interval identifies the range of possible solutions. Model (18) is restrictive in 
that it considers only the endpoints of this interval, the extreme cases. By 
comparing the change to the solution with respect to a change in the a-cut, 
one can perform a type of sensitivity analysis with respect to uncertainty in 
the definition of parameters. 
The parameters X and a have a special interpretation. Parameter X is 
the degree to which the least satisfied objective has been met. Given the 
models (16) and (18), and considering a degree of uncertainty specified by a, 
the least of the objectives is satisfied to degree X. Parameters a and X are 
related in that the level of uncertainty helps determine the solution, but they 
are not similar concepts; X deals with satisfaction of objectives—they are 
vague and remain so in any outcome—while a addresses the problem of 
imprecise coefficients and allows one to control the level of uncertainty to be 
considered in a particular trial. If one abandons the strict requirement that 
imprecise coefficients are described by symmetric, triangular functional 
forms, it is possible that a = l yields a solution that is itself a fuzzy number 
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(e.g., in the case of trapezoidal functional forms) rather than crisp as in our 
case. 
The maxmin approach developed above will have a solution in which it 
will be impossible to increase the membership value of one objective without 
reducing the membership value of another. In this sense, the resulting solution 
is somehow efficient. The model is now applied to land-use allocation on 
Vancouver Island. 
10.3 A Decision Model for Land Use on Vancouver Island 
Vancouver Island consists of nearly 3.35 million hectares (ha), of 
which 2.4 million ha is publicly owned and has been classified according to 
timber production potential. During deliberations, the Vancouver Island 
CORE employed the land use categories "high-intensity resource use", 
"integrated resource use", "low-intensity resource use", "protected areas" and 
"settlement" (van Kooten 1995). As public lands are the focus of this analysis, 
"settlement" lands and other private lands are ignored. 
Goals reflecting the general public's expectations regarding forest land 
use in B.C. are taken from the 1989 Parksville Old-Growth Workshop (B.C. 
Ministry of Forests 1990). They are as follows: (1) achieve a high revenue 
from timber harvest; (2) create additional benefits from forest recreation 
activities; (3) obtain the greatest possible nonuse benefits from forests, as 
measured in monetary terms; (4) maintain forest employment; (5) collect 
substantial direct revenues from the forest industry; (6) achieve a high 
contribution of the forest sector to provincial Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
and (7) expand wilderness protection. 5 Vague terminology renders each of 
these objectives fuzzy, and therefore the values for each cannot be known 
precisely. As discussed earlier, fuzziness is a measure of how well an instance 
or value conforms to a semantic ideal or concept. Hence, vagueness can be 
5 A n additional objective mentioned was maximizing long-ran sustained yield (LRSY). 
However, since this does not seem a worthy objective in itself (rather it supports the 6 objectives 
listed in the text), it is not included in the analysis. 
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modeled through the specification of (one-sided) fuzzy objectives, while 
imprecision about parameter values can be modeled using fuzzy numbers. 
Three types of MODM models for land-use decisions on Vancouver 
Island are compared to evaluate the usefulness of fuzzy MODM. The first is a 
crisp NPV maximizing formulation of the multiple goal problem. 6 The 
second is a fuzzy multiple objective decision model that incorporates the 
fuzziness of objective values. Finally, a fuzzy multiple objective decision 
model with both fuzzy objectives and imprecise parameters is considered. The 
models are static and assume a planning period of 100 years—the assumed 
rotation age of the working forest. The first step in the modelling process is 
specification of the parameters. 
Description of imprecise parameters 
Logging benefits 
Logging benefits per hectare are calculated as the difference between 
the price and the cost of a cubic meter (m 3) of delivered wood. Harvest 
volume is assumed to be a function of two harvest site attributes: site quality 
and management intensity. 
Site quality is characterized as good, medium or poor. Average harvest 
volumes by stand age, species and site class, for the B.C. coastal region, are 
taken from the FOREST6.0 model (Phelps et al. 1990a, 1990b). Uncertainty 
as to the realized harvest from a particular site is captured by specifying a 
range of possible harvest volumes based on consideration of extremes provi-
ded by species composition and consideration of a 20-year spread in harvest 
age. 
In this chapter, an area is assigned to the "high intensity management" 
category if intensive silviculture (spacing, pruning and pre-commercial 
thinning) is to be practised. Under "integrated management", it is assumed 
that basic silviculture (site preparation and replanting) will be performed. 
^ h i s approach is standard practice in forest economics to cope with multiple objectives 
Maximization of social welfare or NPV is achieved by summing the various accounts (e.g., Tecle 
etal. 1994; Mendozaef«/ . 1993). 
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Land allocated to "low intensity" management provides harvest volume from 
naturally regenerated stock. No harvest is available from "protected" areas. 
Harvest volumes available from each of these nine land allocation 
categories (3 site qualities and 3 management categories) are described by 
symmetrical triangular fuzzy numbers of the form (mtj, 0 U ) . The centre value 
m(j is the arithmetic mean of the extreme values. 
Ranges for wood prices, based on species, age and management, are 
also taken from the FOREST6.0 simulation model, and fuzzy numbers for the 
price parameters are calculated as for wood volume. These distributions are 
scaled to reflect the average 1992 wood price of $70.71 /m 3 for the Coast 
region (see Price Waterhouse 1993). 
Calculation of delivered wood costs follows the methodology outlined 
above, with the exception that costs vary with management intensity but are 
constant across site qualities. Two cost values are reported for the B.C. 
coastal region, one for low cost and another for high cost sites. The fuzzy 
numbers are based on the mean of the two cost figures and are scaled to 
reflect an average cost of delivered wood after stumpage fees, rents and 
royalties of $65.13/m 3 (Price Waterhouse 1993). These costs do not include 
costs of silviculture. The Ministry of Forests (1992) provides average cost 
data for silvicultural activity in 1992. Basic silviculture was applied at a cost 
of $21.20/ha, while incremental silviculture represented an added expense of 
$20.00/ha. These costs are added in the appropriate management categories. 
Net logging benefits are calculated as the difference of total revenue per 
hectare and total costs per hectare. Using the definitions of fuzzy addition, 
subtraction and multiplication provided in equations (8)-( l l ) , we obtain 
symmetric fuzzy numbers. The results are summarized in Table 10 .1 . 7 
Recreation values 
Recreation benefits are identified as a goal of land use planning. 
Recreation plus recreation option value for the Vancouver forest region are 
estimated at $111.11 million per year (B.C. Ministry of Forests 1991), for an 
The negative value associated with harvest of poor sites is consistent with the current 
situation: most of the current harvest is obtained from the better quality sites, and there is no 
margin to allow harvest of the inferior site class. 
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average recreational value of $33/ha/yr. This value was obtained under the 
current management, which is denoted as integrated management in this 
study. Land under low intensity management is assumed to offer little in 
increased recreational opportunities compared to integrated management, with 
the same recreational activities being pursued and logging ongoing. Land 
under intensive management is assumed to produce only 50% of the benefits 
attainable under integrated management as intensive forestry practices com-
promise recreational opportunities. Protected areas, with potentially more 
stringent guidelines as to appropriate recreational activities, will provide only 
40% of the benefits received from the integrated management regime. Centres 
for the fuzzy numbers are scaled to preserve the gross average of $33/ha/yr, 
with distribution spreads arbitrarily set at $10/ha/yr for all classes. The results 
are summarized in Table 10.1. 
Preservation values 
Estimation of preservation or nonuse benefits are based on a survey 
conducted by Void et al. (1994) that determined the values that B.C. residents 
place on wilderness protection in the province. The mean maximum annual 
willingness to pay for a doubling and tripling of wilderness area from a base 
of 5% were $136 and $168 per household, respectively. We assume that the 
number of households on Vancouver Island corresponds to the size of the 
labour force (one labourer per household). Each household on the Island is 
then prepared to pay $32/yr ($168 minus $132) to increase the amount of 
protected area to 495,000 ha (15% of the total) from the current 10% level, 
corresponding to an average annual payment of $26.69/ha of protected area. 8 
Clearly the value of nonuse attributes falls with increasing manage-
ment intensity, but there is little information for quantifying this relationship. 
The assumption is that low intensity management provides preservation 
benefits at 50% of that of protected areas, integrated management areas at 
25% the level of protected areas, and land under high intensity management is 
Preservation values are underestimated if part of the benefits accrue to people off Vancou-
ver Island. On the other hand, they may be over-estimated because the marginal value of nonuse 
attributes is assumed constant while the study by Void et al (1994) indicates that these values may 
well be declining. 
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assumed to provide no nonuse benefits. Distribution spreads for these fuzzy 
numbers are set to allow the range of possible values to begin at 0 and extend 
to twice the hypothesized value. The results are summarized in Table 10.1. 
Forest sector employment 
Forest related employment may be generated both by the forest 
industry and the forest-related tourism and recreation industry. Price Water-
house (1993) reports 1.18 jobs/1,000 m 3 of wood harvested for the coastal 
industry. This estimate is reduced slightly to 1.16 jobs per 1,000 m 3 to reflect 
the fact that some of the jobs associated with the Island harvest are located in 
mainland mills. The spread for this fuzzy number is set at 0.07, consistent 
with the variation reported by Statistics Canada (see COFI 1992) for the past 
decade. 
There is little information about the relationship between employment 
and other uses of the forest. Regionally-based studies yield estimates of 
0.0001 to 0.0003 jobs/ha (see Matas 1993; Clayton Resources Lt. and 
Robinson Consulting & Associates Ltd. undated). The latter figure is used to 
anchor the job fuzzy number with relatively large spreads to reflect the high 
degree of uncertainty regarding their genesis. 
Direct and indirect government revenue 
In 1992, the provincial government and municipalities received 
$5.27/m 3 of harvest, while the province collected $9.05/m 3 in stumpage fees 
for a total revenue of $14.32/m 3 (Price Waterhouse 1993). It is assumed that 
revenues can vary by as much as $5/m 3 . 9 
Indirect revenues are examined by looking at the contribution of 
forestry to provincial GDP. Forestry accounts for a substantial proportion of 
provincial GDP, indicating a high dependence on forest operations. Each 
cubic meter of harvest contributes about $70 to GDP. An interval of $20/m 3 
is chosen. The results are summarized in Table 10.1. 
9In this analysis, direct revenues to the provincial government do not include employee taxes 
paid as a result of indirect and induced employment, and revenues accruing to the federal go-
vernment are ignored. 
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Expansion of Wilderness Protection 
There is nothing uncertain about the contribution of a hectare of land 
towards the objective of wilderness protection. It is a crisp parameter—one 
hectare of land allocated to protected area provides one hectare of protected 
area. 
Table 10.1: Fuzzy Parameter Values, Mean and Spread, in $C per Hectare (except employment in 
jobs per 1000 cubic meters) 
Site Logging 
Quality benefits 
Recreation Preservation 
values values 
Employment Direct 
G.Rev. 
Indirect 
G. Rev. 
High Intensity Management 
good (197, 324) (21.9, 10) (0,0) (0.0138, 0.0045) (170, 150) (833, 343) 
medium (31, 164) (21.9, 10) (0,0) (0.0100, 0.0027) (123, 69) (603, 215) 
poor (-26, 104) (21.9, 10) (0,0) (0.0058, 0.0029) (71,49) (349, 167) 
Integrated Use Management 
good (62,211) (43.9, 10) (6.7,6.7) (0.0131, 0.0040) (162, 96) (792, 304) 
medium (9, 143) (43.9, 10) (6.7,6.7) (0.0087, 0.0026) (107, 63) (525, 199) 
poor {-23.75) (43.9, 10) (6.7,6.7) (0.0044, 0.0023) (54, 45) (266, 163) 
Low Intensity Manaj cement 
good (61, 160) (43.9, 10) (13.4,13.4) (0.0101, 0.0028) (124, 71) (608, 221) 
medium (19, 95) (43.9, 10) (13.4,13.4) (0.0061, 0.0018) (75, 44) (368, 141) 
poor (-4,53) (43.9, 10) (13.4,13.4) (0.0033. 0.0015) (41, 30) (202. 104) 
Protec-
ted 
(26.3, 10) (26.8,26.8) - - -
Objective target values 
The objectives [i.e., the b{ in model (15)] are all modeled as fuzzy 
"greater than constraints". Thus, the degree of satisfaction increases as the 
value of the objective function increases. The value deemed to be the lowest 
possible to generate any satisfaction of the objective defines the lower limit of 
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the constraint interval (b rdj). The value deemed to be the lowest value at 
which complete satisfaction of the objective is attained defines the upper limit 
of the interval (b,). The degree of membership in the fuzzy objective set is 
given by a one-sided fuzzy number. 
Two approaches can be used to determine the upper and lower values 
for the objectives. The levels may be provided by a decision-maker or an 
expert in the area, relying on a subjective understanding of both the limits 
inherent in the system as well as what would constitute a satisfactory level of 
achievement. In this paper, "employment" is incorporated using this approach. 
A second approach is to define the upper and lower bounds as the maximum 
and minimum levels that the system can provide when each objective is 
considered in isolation. This method may be especially suitable when objecti-
ves are less sensitive politically and not restricted to a narrow range a priori. 
It is an objective means to defining the fuzzy constraints and is appropriate 
when there is little information available regarding the problem, preventing 
initial specification of unrealistic objectives. In the current analysis, the 
objective "logging benefits" is incorporated using this approach. 1 0 
For logging benefits, the level for complete satisfaction is set as the 
maximum available from the model if only logging benefits are considered. 
The minimum represents the amount generated from a working forest of 
700,000 hectares, even though such a scenario was rejected by CORE as too 
low. The lower and upper bounds for logging benefits are $48.1 million and 
$72.0 million, respectively. Recreation and preservation benefit intervals are 
defined by the maxima and minima available from the system. The lower and 
upper bounds for recreation are ($49.9 million, $90.1 million), and for 
preservation ($8.6 million, $60.0 million). 
Employment is a politically sensitive issue. We assume that the 
current level provided by the forest industry is fully satisfactory, even though 
it will be difficult to maintain current employment in the future as technologi-
cal developments lead to a decreasing number of jobs per unit of harvest. 
In theory, it would be preferable to use the second method to set initial parameters, and 
then use feedback information from users to refine the objective intervals, thereby incorporating 
new information on values or preference structure. The specification of satisfactory levels of 
achievement for this model employs a combination of the two approaches, without the benefit of 
any interactive procedure. 
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Jobs related to recreation are also considered satisfactory at current levels, 
although, in actual fact, it would probably be less than satisfactory if current 
levels were simply maintained. However, recreation contributes only a very 
small number of jobs compared to those related to timber harvest; requiring 
an increase in this component has little impact in the model. The lower bound 
for job provision is set arbitrarily at 15% below the current level (i.e., 
13,500), on the assumption that it would be politically unwise for government 
to allow employment levels to drop below this figure. The upper bound is 
15,700 jobs. 
Maximal values for both direct and indirect revenue are determined 
by the ability of the system to generate revenues and timber-related GDP. 
Lower bounds again reflect the political nature of these objectives. It is 
assumed that a decrease of more than 20% in direct revenues, or of 25% in 
indirect revenues (i.e., forestry's contribution to GDP), would be politically 
unsatisfactory. The bounds are ($139.2 million, $174.0 million) for direct 
revenue and ($640.5 million, $854 million) for indirect revenue. 
The final objective is that of wilderness expansion. Any increase in 
protected areas will most likely come from Crown land. A doubling of 
protected area on the Island would mean that 660,000 ha would be removed 
from the working forest, or about 30% of total Crown land. It is assumed that 
protecting almost a third of the public land on Vancouver Island would allow 
all PAS objectives to be met; thus, the decision maker is assumed to be 
satisfied completely at that level of wilderness protection. The lower level for 
the fuzzy objective is defined as the current area under protection (341,000 
ha), a level below current legislated requirements and thus considered unac-
ceptable. 
10.4 Empirical Results 
A crisp MODM (in the form of an NPV maximizing model), a fuzzy 
MODM and a fuzzy MODM with imprecise coefficients were constructed and 
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solved." First, the results of the crisp formulations are compared to the 
fuzzy MODM with crisp parameters, which is then compared with the model 
where the coefficients are imprecise. 
Fuzzy and crisp MODM 
The crisp MODM model (or CRISP) maximizes net present value 
subject to employment and wilderness conservation constraints. NPV is 
defined as the sum of logging benefits, recreation benefits, nonuse values and 
direct government revenues. The fuzzy MODM (FUZZY) considers all 
objectives of the previous section as independent and equal in terms of 
priority. The land allocations resulting from these models are presented in 
Table 10.2. 
Table 10.2: Simulation Results for Fuzzy and crisp MODM: Land Allocation (hectares). 
Site Management Model 
Quality Intensity CRISP FUZZY 
High 223845 209848 
Good Integrated 0 13994 
Low 0 0 
High 891016 363747 
Medium Integrated 0 527269 
Low 0 0 
High 0 0 
Poor Integrated 0 0 
Low 754644 658671 
Protected 341000 436976 
The CRISP model concentrates good and medium quality sites into 
high intensity management regimes, and allocates all poor sites to the low 
intensity system. In contrast, the FUZZY model places the larger proportion 
of medium quality forest land under integrated management as well as a small 
Although linear, the models were solved using a nonlinear approach within EXCEL. 
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amount of good quality area. Total area assigned to the high management 
regime is less, and protected area is greater. Given that the B.C. Government 
has indicated recently that logging should take better account of non-timber 
benefits, it is interesting to note that the outcomes of the fuzzy model are 
more in line with government policy than the outcomes of the crisp model. 
On the other hand, it must be noted that there is very little movement (if any) 
of high quality land into protected areas in both the crisp and the fuzzy 
models, which is at odds with the philosophy and intent of the Protected 
Areas Strategy. 
Differences in the allocation schemes are evident in the levels 
attained for each of the objective functions (see Table 10.3). The logging 
benefits are greater under the crisp formulation, and as a consequence so are 
direct government revenues and employment, but logging benefits are of such 
a magnitude that they dominate other forest services when weighed equal-
ly . 1 2 The fuzzy model provides a higher return on the other accounts. 
Table 10.3: Simulation Results for Fuzzy Possibilistic MODM: Monetary and Employment 
Benefits. 
Benefits LOWER FUZZY 
UPPER 
CRISP a =0.95 a = 1 a =0.95 a =0.9 a =0.80 
Logging ($ mil.) 68.6 54.2 55.3 56.3 57.3 66.1 
Recreation ($ mil.) 66.5 64.7 76.7 79.9 82.9 88.1 
Preservation ($ mil.) 19.1 21.7 24.0 26.2 28.4 32.6 
Direct revenue ($ mil.) 179.2 163.2 166.7 170.0 173.3 179.7 
Indirect revenue ($ mil.) 875.9 806.3 814.8 822.7 830.6 846.0 
Employment (jobs) 15,066 13,948 14,054 14,151 14,250 14,445 
Interestingly, both models provide an annual harvest that exceeds the current LRSY of 
11.0 million m 3 . This is largely due to the application of intensive silvicultural practices to a 
substantial portion of the Crown land base, contrary to current conditions. 
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There is a membership function associated with each of the 
objective functions indicating the level of satisfaction attained for each 
objective. Focusing on the FUZZY model, the minimum degree of satisfacti-
on is attained for four of the seven objectives (this table is not reported here). 
Given that the model provides an efficient solution, the interpretation is that it 
is impossible to increase the satisfaction level for any one of these four 
without compromising that of at least one of the other three. The standoff is 
between logging benefits and employment on the one hand, and preservation 
values and protected areas on the other. This situation reflects the reality of 
the conflicts identified in the Vancouver Island land use debate. 
Perhaps the difference in performance between the crisp and fuzzy 
models can be explained by the fact that the former resembles a cost-benefit 
analysis whereas the latter is more like a true MODM. However, it is impos-
sible to conclude to what extent the divergence between the crisp and the 
fuzzy models is caused by the difference between crisp and fuzzy modelling 
per se. Interpretation is blurred by the different nature of both models: 
maximizing NPV subject to constraints in the one and balancing objectives in 
the other. 
A fuzzy MODM with imprecise coefficients 
Symmetric fuzzy numbers are used to model the uncertainty surroun-
ding the precision of the parameters in the model. One purpose is to gain 
some understanding about the sensitivity of the solution to uncertainty in 
parameter definition. By lowering the value of a (the fuzzy MODM has an 
implicit a value of 1), the effect of this uncertainty upon optimal land allocati-
on can be explored. At any value of a< 1 there are two solutions to consider. 
The first is from the lower-bound version of model (18), where parameter 
values take on a less-likely and lower value (the LOWER results); the second 
is from the upper-bound version of (18), generating a solution based on 
parameter values that have the same degree of membership in the fuzzy 
number but higher value (the UPPER model results). The results from the 
two models are provided in Tables 10.3 and 10.4. 
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Table 10.4: Simulation Results for Fuzzy MODM with Imprecise Coefficients: Land Allocation 
(hectares). 
Management 
Intensity 
LOWER 
or =0.95 
FUZZY 
a = l - a =0.95 
UPPER 
a =0.9 a =0.80 
Good Site Quality 
High 223,842 209.848 136,697 69,680 0 
Integrated 0 13,994 87,145 154,162 223,842 
Low 0 0 0 0 0 
Medium Site Quality 
High 753,259 363,747 330.668 300.593 213,323 
Integrated 137,757 527,269 560,328 590,423 677,693 
Low 0 0 0 0 0 
Poor Site Quality 
High 0 0 0 0 0 
Integrated 0 0 0 0 0 
Low 543,453 658,671 645,434 632,048 605,625 
Protected Area 552,194 436,976 450,213 463,599 490,022 
The most obvious result obtained from the variation of the degree of 
membership is in the asymmetry of the feasible solution space. While soluti-
ons may be obtained for any value of a using the UPPER model, feasible 
solutions do not exist below a degree of membership level of 0.92 for the 
LOWER model. Parameter values are unable to provide any level of satisfac-
tion of at least one of the objectives; in this case, the limiting objective is 
timber benefits. 
An unexpected result is that the LOWER model, with a = 0.95, 
provides for over 10% more protected area than does any of the other scena-
rios considered. The minimum amount is provided by the FUZZY model. The 
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rationale for this is that the LOWER model concentrates the good and medi-
um quality sites into the high intensity management category, a massive shift 
of almost 400,000 ha as compared to the integrated management allocation 
level of the FUZZY model. This occurs in response to the lower estimation of 
both wood yield and wood value. This causes a large reduction in nonuse 
benefits as the high intensity management category does not contribute to this 
objective. The shortfall is replaced by the allocation of poor quality area, with 
it 's negative logging value, into the protected area category. 1 3 Harvest 
volume declines under this LOWER scenario and job numbers fall slightly 
(Table 10.3). Monetary benefits are also slightly lower with the largest change 
observed in recreation benefits; logging benefits are virtually unchanged 
(Table 10.3). 
It is our opinion that the dramatic effects of small parameter adjust-
ments provides an additional reason to model the imprecision associated with 
parameter estimates explicitly. 1 4 The evidence from Table 10.4 indicates that, 
if there is indeed imprecision in the parameters but it is not modeled as such 
[i.e., imprecise parameters are modeled as if they are crisp, possibly by 
tolerating small violations of constraints, as in Bare and Mendoza (1992), or 
Mendoza and Sprouse (1989)], then the results may be distorted. The analysis 
conducted here enables decision makers to identify sources of imprecision 
when it comes to land allocation. As information gathering is costly and with 
limited funds available to overcome parameter imprecision, there is a definite 
value in knowing which areas to research first. Under the current conditions it 
seems that it is most crucial to address imprecision in the logging benefit 
parameters. 
The results obtained from the UPPER model as a is decreased are as 
expected. All parameters of the model increase in value as ot decreases, 
resulting in a higher provision of benefits from each hectare of land conside-
red. Increasing yields and wood values allow less area to be allocated to the 
This is likely an unacceptable result if quality of protected areas is important. 
I 4 In this specific analysis, the solution provided by the FUZZY model is sensitive to 
overestimation of the true parameter values. If values are realized at a generally lower level than 
those judged most likely, a large shift in resource allocation is required to obtain the best solution 
as judged by the maximization of minimum objective satisfaction. 
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high intensity regime and more to integrated management. The result is an 
increase in both recreation and nonuse benefits. Harvest volume rises and job 
provision increases, evidence of the less possible higher per ha yield estimates 
and a greater number of jobs per unit of harvest. 
10.5 Conclusions 
Increasing weight is placed on non-timber values in managing forests 
or making allocation plans for woodlands. The public is also becoming more 
involved in the planning process. Both trends are evident in British Columbia 
in the new forest management policies aimed at environmental concerns and a 
CORE process the relies on stakeholder participation. In most instances, 
economic efficiency is only one of many competing considerations, with cost-
benefit analysis often relegated to a status below that of other concerns, such 
as employment. Hence, decision models need to be sensitive to the existence 
of multiple objectives and the fact that the objectives themselves are vague 
and the parameters that characterize them are imprecise. This study applied 
fuzzy MODMs with and without incorporating imprecise coefficients, to the 
problem of allocating public forest land on Vancouver Island, comparing the 
results of the fuzzy models with a more traditional, crisp approach. 
Given the nature of the process that is to be modeled, our conclusion 
is that the fuzzy approaches can be judged a distinct improvement over the 
traditional approach of constrained maximization of net present value. For 
example, the fuzzy MODM allocated about 25% of the land base to integrated 
timber management, while the traditional (crisp) model concentrated land into 
the extreme categories of low (natural regeneration) and intensive timber 
management intensity. Given the intensity of the land use conflicts on Van-
couver Island and the context of consensus seeking interest groups, moderati-
on of management intensity seems desirable. The area assigned to the 
protected category was greater in the fuzzy MODM than in the crisp model, 
as was the number of direct jobs provided in the forest sector. We conclude 
that the decision by CORE not to rely on maximization of NPV is confirmed 
by comparing the results of the crisp and fuzzy models. The fuzzy solution 
was obtained without needing to specify precise values for objectives, and 
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without an explicit ranking or weighing of the objective functions. The fuzzy 
MODM also clearly identified those objectives that were in direct conflict 
with each other, and thus the areas where compromise is required if satisfacti-
on levels are to be increased. 
The results from the fuzzy MODM model with imprecise coefficients 
suggest that the approach of combining fuzzy parameter specifications with 
fuzzy objectives constitutes an improvement over the fuzzy MODM. Howe-
ver, the model specified in this study was very sensitive to the possibility of 
lower realizations of parameter values, but this only highlights the importance 
of modelling imprecise parameters using fuzzy numbers instead of as flexible 
constraints. The analysis provides insight into what kind of additional infor-
mation is especially valuable for obtaining robust land allocations—robust in 
the sense that small mis-specifications of parameters will not cause massive 
shifts from one land use option to another, which in practice may be costly to 
achieve. 
Finally, areas for future research suggest themselves. The most 
important of these is that of getting stakeholders/decision makers involved in 
the development of both fuzzy objectives and fuzzy numbers for the technical 
coefficients of the decision model. Fuzzy set theory offers a means of combi-
ning information from various stakeholders. Research is required to determine 
how information can be updated when those involved in the decision process 
are presented with results and, just as importantly, how natural language can 
be used to develop the required fuzzy measures. 
References 
Bare B.B. and G.A. Mendoza (1992), Timber Harvest Scheduling in a Fuzzy 
Decision Environment, Canadian Journal of Forest Resources 22, 
pp. 423-428 
Barret, C.B. and P.K. Pattanik (1989), Fuzzy Sets, Preference and Choice: 
Some Conceptual Issues, Bulletin of Economic Research 4 1 , pp. 229-
253 
Economics of Renewable Resources 231 
B.C. Ministry of Forests (1990), Towards An Old-growth Strategy: Executive 
Summary of Old-growth Workshop Recommendations. Summary of 
the Parksville workshop of November 3-5, 1989, Victoria, B.C 
B.C. Ministry of Forests (1991), Outdoor Recreation Survey 1989/90. How 
British Columbians Use and Value their Public Forest Lands for 
Recreation. Recreation Branch Technical Report 1991-1, Victoria: 
Queen's Printer for British Columbia 
Clayton Resources Lt. and Robinson Consulting & Associates Ltd., undated. 
Economic Impacts of Land Allocation for Wilderness Purposes: A 
Retrospective Analysis of the Valhalla Park in British Columbia. 
Study prepared for the B.C. Forest Industry Land Use Task Force. 
Vancouver 
Cox, E. (1994), The Fuzzy Systems Handbook, Cambridge (MA): Academic 
Press 
Commission on Resources and Environment (1994), Vancouver Island Land 
Use Plan. Volume 1, Victoria: Government of British Columbia, 
February. 260 pp. , Maps 
COFI (Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia) (1992), British 
Columbia Forest Industry Statistical Tables, Vancouver, B.C. 
Dubois, D. and H. Prade (1993), Fuzzy Sets and Probability: Misunderstan-
dings, Bridges and Gaps, Proceedings of IEEE International Confe-
rence on Fuzzy Systems Vol. 2 
Fedrizzi, M. (1987), Introduction to Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory. In: 
J. Kacptzyk and S.A. Orlovski, eds., Optimization Models using 
Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory , Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Co. 
Hof, J .G., J.B. Pickens and E.T Bartlett (1986), A MAXMIN Approach to 
Nondeclining YieldTimber Harvest Scheduling Problems, Forest 
Science 32, pp. 653-666 
Hof, J.G. (1993), Coactive Forest Management, San Diego: Academic Press 
Hof, J. G., M. Bevers and J. Pickens (1995), Pragmatic Approaches to Opti-
mization with Random Yield Coefficients, Forest Science 4 1 : 501-
512 
Klir, G. and T. Folger (1988), Fuzzy Sets, Uncertainty, and Information. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 
232 Chapter 10 
Kosko, B. (1992), Neural Networks and Fuzzy Systems, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall 
Krause, P. and D. Clark (1993), Representing Uncertian Knowledge: An 
Artificial Intelligence Approach, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 
Kruse, R., E. Schwecke and J. Heinsohn (1991), Uncertainty and Vagueness 
in Knowledge Based Systems, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag 
Lai, Y-J. and C-L. Hwang (1994), Fuzzy Multiple Objective Decision Ma-
king, Berlin: Springer-Verlag 
Matas, R. (1993), In the beginning there was Moresby, Globe and Mail 
Saturday, Nov. 13. p.D3 
Mendoza G.A. and W. Sprouse (1989), Forest Planning and Decision Ma-
king Under Fuzzy Environments: An Overview and Illustration, 
Forest Science 35, pp. 481-502 
Mendoza G.A., B.B. Bare and Z. Zhou (1993), A Fuzzy Multiple Objective 
Linear Programming Approach to Forest Planning Under Uncertain-
ty, Agricultural Systems 4 1 , pp. 257-274 
Munda G., P. Nijkamp and P. Rietveld (1992), Multicriteria Evaluation and 
Fuzzy Set Theory: Applications in Planning for Sustainability, Serie 
Research Memoranda 1992-68, Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit 
Phelps, S.E., W.A. Thompson, T.M. Webb, T.M., P.J. McNamee, D. Tait 
and C.J. Walters (1990a), British Columbia Silviculture Planning 
Model: Structure and Design, Unpublished Report, Victoria: B.C. 
Ministry of Forests 
Phelps, S.E., W.A. Thompson, T.M. Webb, T.M., P.J. McNamee, D. Tait 
and C.J. Walters (1990b), British Columbia Silviculture Planning 
Model: User Manual, Unpublished Report, Victoria: B.C. Ministry 
of Forests 
Pickens, J.B. and J.G. Hof (1991), Fuzzy Goal Prograrnming in Forestry: 
An Application With Special Solution Problems, Fuzzy Sets and 
Systems 39, pp. 239-246 
Price Waterhouse (1993), The Forest Industry in British Columbia, 1992. 
Report Tables, Vancouver: Price Waterhouse. 
Sakawa, M. (1993), Fuzzy Sets and Interactive Multiobjective Optimization. 
New York: Plenum Press. 
Economics of Renewable Resources 233 
Tecle A., L. Duckstein and P. Korhonen (1994), Interactive Multiobjective 
Prograrnrning for Forest Resources Management, Applied Mathema-
tics and Computation 63, pp. 75-93. 
van Kooten, G.C. (1995), Modelling Public Forest Land Use Tradeoffs on 
Vancouver Island, Journal of Forest Economics 1, pp. 189-215. 
Void, T. , B. Dyck, M. Stone, R. Reid and T. Murray (1994), Wilderness 
Issues in British Columbia: Preliminary Results of a 1993 Province-
wide Survey of British Columbia Households, Victoria: BC Forest 
Service, BC Parks and BC Environment, mimeograph, 30 pp. 
Zimmerman, H.J. (1991), Fuzzy Set Theory and Its Applications, Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 
CHAPTER 11 
OPTIMAL HARVESTING AND THINNING WITH STOCHASTIC 
PRICES1 
Abstract: 
This chapter rigorously incorporates optimal winning decisions for an even-
age stand into an optimal harvesting model with fluctuating stumpage prices. 
The model optimally determines how often and at what ages to thin. In 
addition to theoretical results that are analogous to optimal harvesting models 
without thinning, new theoretical results include increases in the net present of 
land, stumpage and for some harvest reservation prices. The model is numeri-
cally simulated using parameters estimated from Dutch data for Pinus 
sylvestris. The simulation results suggest that the gains from incorporating 
thinning are significant, when compared to the Faustmann approach, and at 
least modestly important, when compared to optimal harvesting models 
without minning. The simulation results also indicate that expected thinning 
age may decrease significantly while the expected harvest age increases, when 
compared to the Faustmann approach. 
11.1 Introduction 
Thinning is an integral part of forest management. Thinning decisions 
determine which trees will be left for final harvest, and how much competi-
tion these trees will experience. Standard practice for even-aged stands is to 
initially plant several-fold more trees than eventually will be optimal to 
'This chapter is based on: Brazee R.J. and E.H. Bülte (1996), Optimal harvesting and 
Thinning With Stochastic Prices, Working paper. It also builds on Bülte E.H., J.E. Pennings and 
W.J.M. Heijman (1996), Managing Resource Price Risk: Futures Markets, Sustainability and 
Efficiency, Environmental and Resource Economics (8), 351-366. 
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harvest. 2 There are several biological reasons for a high level of initial 
stocking, followed by thinning. A high stocking level followed by thinning 
decreases competition for limited resources which may increase stand volume, 
wood quality and diameter of the remaining trees, as well as reduce wind 
damage (Schutz and van Tol 1982). 
Thinning decisions must be made without perfect information of the 
future. Due to well-documented volatility (Haight 1990; Haight and Smith 
1990; Haight and Holmes 1991; Lohmander 1987; Lohmander 1992; Slangen 
1987), stochastic stumpage prices are an important source of uncertainty. 
Fluctuating stumpage prices impact both the commercial and pre-commercial 
aspects of thinning decisions, and highlight the difficulties associated with 
evaluating thinning regimes. For example, it was recently suggested that 
forest owners in the Netherlands are thinning their stocks at a sub-optimally 
low level in response to low stumpage prices (Biersma 1994). With stochastic 
stumpage prices, the validity of this and related claims regarding optimal 
thinning decisions are unresolved issues. 
The purpose of this chapter is to rigorously incorporate thinning deci-
sions into optimal harvesting models with fluctuating stumpage prices. First, 
we present a model that includes both optimal harvest and optimal thinning 
responses to fluctuating stumpage prices. Solving this model using dynamic 
programming extends the theory of optimal harvesting under stochastic prices 
to the include thinning of even-aged single species stands. The model allows 
us to optimally determine how often and at what ages to thin. 3 We present 
new theoretical results that arise from the inclusion of thinning. We then use 
2 In the Netherlands, for instance, standard silvicultural practice for Pinus sylvestris 
prescribes planting about 3000 trees per hectare initially and thinning this stock back to 300 trees 
as the stand matures (Schutz and van Tol 1982). 
3 W e rely on a fixed thinning intensity at every age. That is, the question of optimal thinning 
intensities is not addressed. The theoretical extension to include thinning intensities is straight-
forward. However, since the inclusion of N possible thinning intensities requires the inclusion of 
N-l additional states at every age, and these states must be accounted for each at succeeding 
harvest age, simulating N thinning intensities adds N- l to the power of the length of the planning 
horizon minus one. This generates a particular severe case of the "curse-of-dimensionality." 
Fortunately, the fixed thinning intensity is consistent with standard practice as virtually all 
silvicultural prescriptions explicitly or implicitly assume fixed thinning intensities. 
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the model to simulate quantitative results for parameters estimated from Dutch 
data on pine, the most important commercial species in the Netherlands. 
Some of the theoretical results with minning are analogous to previous 
qualitative results without thinning. Other qualitative results arise only when 
thinning is allowed. Analogous results include the existence of an optimal 
reservation price policy for both harvesting and thinning, and that the net 
present value of both land and stumpage increases with the spread of the 
stumpage price distribution as do most reservation prices. The new theoretical 
results from incorporating thinning include increases in the net present value 
of both land and stumpage, increase in some harvest reservation prices and 
demonstration that harvest reservation prices are always at least as high as 
thinning reservation prices. The impact of spread and discount rate on optimal 
thinning reservation prices is ambiguous, depending on whether commercial 
or pre-commercial considerations dominate. The simulation results suggest 
that with the introduction of optimal minning, the gains in the net present 
value of land and stumpage may be significant, and that the relevant reserva-
tion prices for harvesting may increase significantly. 
11.2 Optimal Harvesting and Thinning Model 
Key thinning decisions are at what age to thin, how often to thin, and 
what proportion of stems to cut. Thinning decisions are usually characterized 
by the existence of both commercial (or short-term) and pre-commercial or 
(long-term) investment objectives. The commercial objective of thinning is to 
maximize the short-run profits from selling thinned timber. The pre-commer-
cial or investment objective is to improve the quality of the residual stand to 
increase long-run profits. When a stand is young, revenue from selling 
thinned trees is usually low, costs are often relatively high, and net revenues 
are sometimes negative. Pre-commercial objectives are more important than 
commercial objectives, i.e. owners thin to increase future profits. As a stand 
ages, revenue from selling thinned trees increases, and commercial objectives 
become more important, i.e. owners are more likely thin to increase current 
rather than future profits. 
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Over the past decade several papers analyze the effects of fluctuating 
stumpage prices on optimal harvesting decisions. An important omission to 
date is the inclusion of thinning responses to fluctuating stumpage prices in 
single-species, even-aged stands. Previous research that addresses fhirming 
with fluctuating stumpage prices focuses on species selection in a mixed-
species stand (Carlsson 1992, Lohmander 1992) and thirming intensity for 
uneven-age management (Haight 1990). 4 The only previous paper that 
addresses an even-aged, single-species stand (Teeter and Caulfield 1991) 
presents simulated thinning results for loblolly pine stands in the southern 
United States, when sawnwood prices fluctuate. The authors find that there 
exist circumstances in which the thinning regime with stochastic stumpage 
prices is different from the thinning regime when stumpage prices are deter-
ministic, and other circumstances in which the thinning regimes are similar. 
An important limitation in this analysis is the assumption of a fixed, rather 
than optimally determined rotation age. 5 
The forest owner's objective is to maximize NPV per hectare of land 
for every age of stumpage. We adopt several simplifying assumptions com-
mon to optimal harvesting models. We assume that the land will be used for 
forestry forever; when one rotation is harvested another is replanted. The 
''The primary theoretical and empirical results for multiple species analysis is that mixed 
species stands are preferred to single species, when species prices are not perfectly correlated and 
more information about relative prices at harvest age is available at the thinning age (For 
empirical results, see Carlson 1992; and Lohmander 1992. For theoretical results, see Lohmander 
1992). The empirical results for uneven-age stands are that more (and younger) age classes should 
be thinned more at higher realized prices (Haight 1990). 
5 In particular the question, what would be the optimal timing of thinning if optimal 
harvesting responds to realized prices, is not addressed. This is a potentially significant omission. 
Since volume at harvest is usually larger than volume at a thinning, the potential gains from 
allowing harvest age to respond to realized prices are likely to be much larger than the potential 
gains from allowing thinning decisions to respond to realized prices. Given the reported size of 
the potential gains in the NPV for some of the previous simulations, this is a potentially 
restrictive assumption. Also, the omission may be unusual; most other papers in this line of 
research on stochastic prices allow harvest age to respond to realized prices. 
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(risk neutral) 6 forest owner faces exogenous stumpage price fluctuations. 
Even-age growth and yield functions including volume responses to thinning 
are known with certainty. T is the maximum harvest age. At age T, which 
may be arbitrarily large, stumpage that has not previously been harvested, 
will be harvested regardless of stumpage price. In addition, we assume that 
the land owner is able to thin or harvest at any of a range of biologically 
determined ages, 0 to T. Therefore at every age between 0 and T-l, the 
owner has the option of harvesting, minning or waiting. For every age k the 
owners objective can be formulated as a dynamic programming problem: 
V(k | = MAX [p (*) Y(k! + V(0) , 
p{k)Z{k\xk_x)+BV{k+\\xk_vl) , 0V(*+1 |*,_„())] 
where, 8 is the discount factor; xk indicates the state of the stand at age k, i.e. 
it indicates the previous thinning record ( c b c 2 , ckA) (where 0 represents 
no thinning, and 1 represents minning); k is current stumpage age; p(k) is 
stumpage price at age k; V(0) is the value of bareland; V(k+l\xkA) is the 
value of land with stumpage age k+l, with previous thinning record xkA; 
lW*k-i) is volume available for harvest at age k, with previous thinning 
record xk4, and Z(k\xkA) is volume available for thinning at age k, with 
previous thinning record xkA. 
If the land owner harvests at age k, she receives a revenue from 
harvest of p(k)Y(k\xk.{) (stumpage price times volume harvested) plus use of 
the bare land which has value, [V(0)]. If the land owner thins at age k, she 
receives a revenue from thinning of p(k)Z(k\xkA) (stumpage price times 
volume thinned) plus the discounted value of a thinned stand age k+1 in the 
next period, 8V(k+l\xk.u 1). If the land owner neither harvests nor thins, 
^ u l t e et at. (1996) have used an analogue of this reservation price approach for a mining 
problem with risk averse resource owners. In recent years, there has been an increase in the use 
of price risk management instruments (e.g. futures) in natural resource markets, which is 
expected to result in more stable spot prices around a Hotelling-style trend. Using an expected 
value-variance (EV) model, Bulte et al. (1996) demonstrated numerically that this stabilizing 
effect has ambiguous results for the (expected) time of depletion and the utility of exploitation for 
risk averse resource owners. An important variable here is the degree of risk aversion of resource 
owners; the less risk averse, the less beneficial price stabilization is. 
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then she retains the discounted value of an unfhinned (at age k) age k+1 stand 
in the next period, j3V(Jfc+l |x k.,, 0). Given the historical record of previous 
thinning within the rotation at every age k, the land owner chooses the option 
that maximizes the NPV of land for age k stumpage. 
We assume prices are drawn randomly from a known and stationary 
distribution. As we discuss in section 11.3, the Dutch data that we base our 
simulation on supports this assumption of a stationary distribution. However, 
characterizing the underlying structure of stumpage price fluctuations for 
different species and regions is an active area of research. As demonstrated in 
previous research the structure of stumpage prices determines the magnitude 
of potential gains from optimally incorporating stumpage price fluctuations 
into harvesting decisions. The underlying structure of stumpage price fluctu-
ations can be broadly characterized as three types: random walk, auto-regress-
ive, and random draw. 7 The reported potential gains to landowners from 
including stochastic prices in optimal harvesting decisions by a reservation 
price approach vary from none (random walk, but see Thomson 1992) to 
substantial (random draw). Two important implications of having a random 
draw rather than random walk or auto-regressive specification of price 
fluctuations are mathematical tractability and the magnitude of potential gains 
from optimal management. With a random walk or auto-regressive formula-
tion, future stumpage price distributions are conditional on current prices 
(random walk) or current and previous prices (auto-regressive). 8 Although it 
is possible to incorporate thinning into these models, more complex notation 
7 For details of this characterization, see Haight and Holmes (1991); and Lohmander (1992). 
In a random draw model the stumpage prices uncorrelated over time and the stumpage price 
distribution is stationary (Brazee and Mendelsohn 1988; Haight 1990; Hultkrantz 1995; 
Lohmander 1987). In a random walk the stumpage distibution is unstationary and conditional on 
the current price (Washburn and Binkley 1990; Thomson 1992). If prices are auto-regressive, the 
stumpage price distribution is conditional on both current and previous prices; the distribution 
may be stationary or unstationary (Carlsson 1992; Clarke and Reed 1989; Haight and Holmes 
1991; Lohmander 1992; Teeter and Caulfield 1991; Washburn and Binkley 1990). 
8 An explanation for autoregressive prices on wood markets may be that there is a time lag 
between the decision to sell timber, the harvesting and the final sale. This argument is less valid 
for stumpage prices, which is what we consider in this chapter. 
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and analysis is necessary, and the number of states to simulate rises expo-
nentially with the number of conditional stumpage price distributions. 
In previous models with randomly drawn fluctuating stumpage prices, 
a reservation price policy for harvesting is proved optimal. 9 That is, for 
every age of stumpage the owner determines the reservation price for harvest-
ing. If the actual price is above the reservation price, the owner harvests and 
replants. If the actual price is below the reservation price, the owner does not 
harvest that period. The intuition underlying the optimality of a reservation 
price is that for every stumpage age an owner will either accept or reject any 
actual price, i.e. for a given age of stumpage, the landowner will never accept 
a particular price in one rotation, and reject the same price in another rota-
tion. Based on the same reasoning, and using the same techniques, it is 
possible to demonstrate the optimality of a reservation price policy for both 
thinning and harvesting. 
In Appendix 11.2. A we show by contradiction that for any given 
stumpage age, the thinning reservation price will always be less than or equal 
to the harvesting reservation price. This implies that the objective function in 
(1) can be re-formulated for every stumpage age k as: 
V(k\xkJ = f flp)\P(k)Y{k\xk_x) + V(0)]dp + 
/H*R-,) 
f ^ ) r j ^ z ^ | i w ) + BV{k+\\xk_v\)]dp + (2) 
<*C*T-*,.,) 
« » | x w ) 
B j ./(p)V(* +l| *,_,,())<//> 
where at age k, A(k) and a(k) are the optimal reservation price for harvesting 
and thinning, respectively, and f(p) is the probability density function of 
stumpage prices. 
9Proofs of the optimality of a reservation price policy are provided in Brazee (1987) and 
Lohmander (1987). 
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The first integral is the benefits of harvesting at age k, which is the 
sum of timber revenues and the value of bare land. Timber revenues are the 
realized stumpage price multiplied by stumpage volume harvested. Stumpage 
volume harvested at age k is determined by previous thinning decisions x k . If 
the actual price in period k exceeds the harvest reservation price, the land 
owner harvests the stand. The second integral is the benefits of thinning at age 
k, and harvesting the stand later. If the price is lower than A(k), the harvest 
reservation price but higher than a(k), the thinning harvest reservation price, 
the owner should thin the stand. The commercial component of thinning is the 
revenue from thinning, which is the realized stumpage price multiplied by 
stumpage volume thinned. Similar to harvesting, stumpage volume thinned at 
age k depends on previous thinning decisions. The pre-commercial component 
of thinning is the change in discounted future revenues due to changes in 
wood, tree or stand quality from thinning. The third integral is the benefits of 
not thinning and not harvesting, and having stumpage age k+1, next period. 
If the realized price is lower than a{k), the land owner neither harvests nor 
thins. 
The 2k(r-l) necessary first order conditions are found by differenti-
ating equation (2) with respect to a{k) and A{k) for every k such that 0 < k 
< T-l:ia 
-/(«(* |*,_,))!>(* | xk_,)Z{k\xk) + 8V(k+l\xk_vl)] + 
|8 / (a(* | *,_,)) V(*+l | *,_„()) = 0 
and 
f{A(k\xk_,))[A{k\xk_)Z{k\xk^) + BV(k+l 1x^ ,1 ) ] -
f(A{k\xkj)[A{k)Y(k\xk_x) + V(0)] = 0 
These 2k(r-l) first order conditions simplify to: 
Sufficient second-order conditions for a maximum are met by the concavity of V(k\cu c,, 
c k.J in both a(k\cu c 2 , c k . ,j , and A(k\cu c2, . . . . ck.,J, and the zero cross-partial deriva-
tives. 
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ot(k\xkJ = /3V(ft+i K-„o) - fly(*+iixt_lti) Z ( * | * t . , ) 
(5) 
and 
A(k\xkJ = 
BVjk+llx^l) - 7(0) (6) 
The reservation price a(k) is the price at which the sum of the commercial 
benefits from thinning and the expected present value of future harvesting a 
thinned stand are equal to the benefits of future harvesting and thinning an 
unthinned stock. The reservation price A(k) is the price where the revenues 
from current harvesting are equal to the expected present value of future 
harvesting and possible thinnings. 
This implies that the present value of all future expected revenue 
starting with bare land is given by the complex formula: 
where C is planting cost, xj is the / h state of the i2A possible states for 
stumpage at time and $ is the probability of occurrence, i.e. 
where F(w g) is the probability of the action taken at time g for thinning 
history x-J, that is: 
V*(0) = - C + fl'5£; SCr/.,) * 
[f " , M(pY{i\xL) + W))dp + \A9^mWi\xl-ù)dp], 
(7) 
(8) 
«tel*/..) 
(9) 
if the stand is not harvested or thinned at time g for x M J , and 
Economics of Renewable Resources 243 
ftp) dp (10) 
if the stand is thinned at time g for xuK The 2T-1 necessary conditions of 
(5), (6) and (7) must be solved simultaneously. 
Analogous to optimal harvesting models incorporating stumpage price 
fluctuation without thirming, a reservation price policy is optimal for both 
harvest and thinning decisions, the net present value of both land and 
stumpage and most harvest reservation prices increase with the spread of the 
stumpage price distribution. Several other new qualitative results which have 
no analogues without thinning also hold. 
First, we have shown that for every age of stumpage the thinning 
reservation price is less than or equal to the harvesting price. Second, the 
introduction of minning increases the expected net present value of both land 
and stumpage. The rationale for this result is straightforward. Since thinning 
is optional, introducing thinning increases flexibility through increasing 
choices. Thinning offers the possibility of increasing future stand values, and 
realizing early revenues. The landowner will only choose to thin if it 
increases expected net present value. Third, the introduction of thinning 
increases harvest reservation prices for some ages. An explanation of this 
result rests on the previous result, that is, the possibility of future thinning 
increases the expected net present values of both land and stumpage. For ages 
near the maximum harvest age, T, optimal harvest reservation prices decrease 
as the increase in the expected value of bare land from thinning outweighs the 
increase in the expected value of harvesting at older ages. For younger ages 
the increase in the expected value of harvesting at older ages dominates the 
increase in the expected value of bare land, and optimal harvest reservation 
prices increase. The ranges for higher and lower reservation prices varies 
from species to species and across price distributions. 1 1 Finally, the impact of 
"Our simulation results indicate that for optimal harvest reservation prices increase for all 
but the largest ages, and for all relevant harvest ages. For a more detailed description of 
increasing and decreasing harvest reservation prices without thinning, see Brazee and Mendelsohn 
(1988). 
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increasing the spread of the stumpage price distribution on thinning reserva-
tion prices is ambiguous. This ambiguity arises from the opposing impacts on 
the commercial and pre-commercial aspects of thinning. Increasing the spread 
increases both the expected revenue from thinning and from the expected 
revenue at harvest. The increase in thinning revenues tends to postpone 
thinning to capture gains from larger thinning volumes (that is, as long as 
these gains outweigh the effect of discounting). Higher harvest prices encour-
age earlier thinning to increase average stem size at harvest. Which of these 
impacts dominate is an empirical matter. 
11.3 Data description 
To examine the importance of the qualitative results, we present a 
numerical simulation. To simulate conditions (5), (6) and (7) requires infor-
mation on the stumpage price distribution, stumpage volume functions and the 
responses in stumpage volume and stumpage prices from thinning. Although 
these information requirements are extensive, adequate data on Dutch forests 
exist on which to base the simulation. 
As discussed previously, the structure of stumpage prices over time is 
an important determinant of the size of potential gains from incorporating 
stochastic stumpage prices. To address this issue, we analyze real annual 
Dutch stumpage prices for pine during the period 1975-1991. 1 2 The autocorr-
elation function (ACF) shows two isolated significant autocorrelations at high 
lags. These can be ignored (SPSS/PC + 1990). The partial autocorrelation 
function (PACF) showed no significant autocorrelations at any lag (see 
Appendix 1). These results support application of the random draw model. 1 3 
Additional data for 1969-1974 are available. However, due to heavy storms in the early 
seventies, market conditions during this period were quite different from the period 1975-1991. 
Also, the available price data does not distinguish between different species of pine. We simulate 
volume for the predominant species, Pinus sylvestris. 
1 3 A nonstationary series would have an ACF that remains significant for half a dozen or 
more lags. Autoregressive processes would have an exponentially declining ACF and spikes in 
the first one or more lags of the PACF, where the number of spikes indicates the order of the 
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For simplicity we construct a model with a constant mean and standard 
deviation. 1 4 
In empirical research to date for optimal harvesting models, attention 
has focused on models that have a constant mean unit price. With a constant 
mean price thinning serves no pre-commercial purpose. However, the 
assumption of constant unit prices is unrealistic: as forests mature and stem 
size increases, the price per unit of wood rises. For the simulation we 
estimate the relation between diameter and price from data of the Dutch State 
Forestry Service and the Central Bureau of Statistics (see Slangen 1987). 
Data were collected through questionnaires sent to forest owners and timber 
merchants during the period 1969-1981. About 11,000 transactions were 
reported. For most of the transactions information includes tree species, price, 
sale volume, average diameter, wood quality, phase (stumpage or felled) and 
location (comparable data are not available after 1981). For simplicity, a 
linear specification of the relation between price and diameter is estimated. 1 5 
The number of stems per cubic meter (CT) serve as a proxy for diameter. The 
relation for pine species is (in 1985 US$): 
autoregression. Neither are consistent with the ACF and PACF for pine. 
1 4 For the period considered, pine prices exhibit a slight downward trend over time. This 
trend could be incorporated into the model by reducing the mean of the distribution over time. In 
the interests of simplicity, we will not include this trend. 
1 5Linearity is a crude approximation, as the actual relationship will include jumps in prices 
as product class changes. However, inclusion of higher order terms failed to capture the effect of 
product classes. Stumpage quality is assumed to be good. Sale volume and location were 
statistically insignificant and omitted from the simulation. 
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P{t) = 17.0 - 0.3 CT 
(42.4) (-25.4) (ID 
R2 0.22, F = 191 
t-statistics are between brackets. A Breusch and Pagan test (see Maddala 
1992) did not reject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity across the diameter 
distribution. 1 6 
To simulate forest growth for Firms sylvestris, we use OPTAB, a 
Dutch growth and yield simulator (see Faber 1989). 1 7 In OPTAB thinning 
does not change future stand volumes much, a trait shared by many growth 
and yield models. However, since aggregate growth is limited to fewer trees, 
the stand produces more valuable trees. This captures the pre-commercial 
element of thimring. 
Stumpage volume projections were made for hypothetical stands. 
Starting points for the projections were based on stocking density and volumes 
for stands using standard Dutch practice (Faber 1989, Schutz and van Tol 
1982). The thinning intensity is set at 30%. That is, 70% of the basal area 
remains after thinning. Good soil quality is assumed. The range of allowable 
harvest ages in the simulation is 15 to 65. Although any age range is some-
what arbitrarily chosen, stands are rarely thinned or harvested at ages younger 
than 15 years, and 65 years is almost twice the maximum mean annual 
increment (MAI) for pine in the Netherlands. 
l 6With heteroscedasticity (more variable prices for bigger trees), the pre-commercial aspect 
of thinning for forest owners would gain weight. (Heteroscedasticity can also imply that prices 
vary less for bigger trees, and then the reverse would hold.) 
I 7 The growth and yield functions in OPTAB are based on observations in (Dutch) stands that 
are regularly thinned. It is assumed that the program provides a reasonable approximation of the 
"no thinning" option and the option that only once is thinned. 
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11.4 Simulation procedure 
Simulation of the reservation prices requires simultaneous solution of 
(5), (6) and (7). Given the computational difficulties and computer time 
required to simultaneously solve (T'-1)*2T"1 non-linear equations, we simplify 
the calculations in two ways. First, we limit the number of thinnings. With 
the possibility of thinning at every age, at age k, the stand volume assumes 2 k 
different states, depending on previous thinning decisions cu c2 ckA. This 
also implies at age k there are 2 k different reservation prices for both thinning 
and harvesting. To circumvent this problem we restrict the number of allow-
able winnings to 1 (note that this implies that the important question of how 
often to thin will not be addressed in the numerical simulation). This reduces 
the number of different states at age k from 2 k to £ + 1 . In addition to the 
computational advantages, reducing the number of thinnings also allows 
graphical display of the reservation price paths. Extending the simulation 
further to allow more thinning is straightforward but tedious. 1 8 
The assumption of one thinning implies that for the unthinned stand the 
first order conditions (5) and (6) reduce to: 
a ( k l 0 0 m - fl[y(fc+110,0,...0,0) - y f r + l l O . O - O , ! ) ] ( 1 2 ) 
1 ' " Z(Jfc|0,0...0) 
and 
A(k\0,0...0) = flV(*+H0.0....0,l)-y(q) (13) 
' r(jfc|o,o...o) - z(jt|o,o...o) 
For the thinned stand (6) becomes: 
1 8 W e have simulated the flexible model with two thinnings. This did not provide additional 
insights, except that the marginal gain in NPV of a second thinning is smaller than the gain in 
NPV of the first thinning. This is consistent with our expectations that, given the short rotations 
in the Netherlands, the net benefits of an additional thinning decrease as the number of thinnings 
increases. 
248 Chapter 11 
^ ( ^ | o , o . . . o , i , o , . . . o ) ^ y ^ 1 ! 0 ' 0 - 0 ' 1 ' Q ' - 0 > - v ( Q ) (14) 
' o ,o . . .0 ,1 ,0 , . . .0) 
Secondly, we simplify by using an iterative backwards-recursive 
procedure rather than simultaneously solving all of the first order conditions. 
The procedure is to initially guess the value of bareland; for simplicity we 
start with the Faustmann value of bare land. Then given an initial value of 
bareland, using (12), (13), (14) and (7), we calculate harvesting and thinning 
reservation prices recursively starting from age T-l to age 1. A new value of 
bareland is then calculated using (7). The procedure is then repeated with the 
updated value of bareland. The iterative procedure is continued until the 
updated value of bareland does not significantly differ from the old estimate. 
The proof that this procedure converges to within any arbitrary tolerance to 
the unique optimum is presented in appendix 2.B. 
11.5 Simulation results 
The simulation results of the Faustmann model and the flexible 
management model are presented in Table 11.1. Table 11.1 highlights the 
effect of thinning on expected NPV and expected harvesting and thinning age. 
The rows reflect respectively (1) the Faustmann model with thinning; (2) the 
flexible management model without thinning; and (3) the flexible management 
scheme with 1 thinning. The estimated standard deviation was approximately 
7. Standard deviations of 5 and 9 were reported as an indication of the impact 
of smaller or larger fluctuations. 
Compared to the Faustmann model with thinning, the flexible manage-
ment scheme without thinning increases the expected NPV of bareland 
substantially. These gains range from 14% to 36%, and are consistent with 
gains reported by, for example, Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988). Allowing 
thinning in the flexible management model provides an additional increase in 
expected NPV of approximately 7% for our data. As we discuss in section 
11.2, both of these results are anticipated and arise from increased flexibility 
(the landowner has the option to thin besides the option to harvest, depending 
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on stumpage prices). In Figure 11.1, we have depicted the harvest and 
thinning reservation price paths for a = 7. The thinning reservation price path 
is slightly upward sloping, the harvest reservation price path is downward 
sloping. The paths converge over time. This implies that the probability of 
thinning decreases as stumpage ages. This is consistent with standard 
silvicultural practices. 
Table 11.1: Expected NPV in 1985 US$1 acre, expected thinning age and 
expected harvesting age for Pinus sylvestris, interest rate = 3%, maximum 
harvest age = 65 years. 
N.P.V. Exp.thin.age Exp.harv.age 
Faustmann with 1407 32.0 40.4 
thinning 
Flexible man-
agement without 
thinning: 
a = 5 1597 40.1 
a = 7 1733 - 38.3 
a = 9 1916 - 38.6 
Flexible man-
agement with 
thinning: 
a = 5 1718 19.8 45.9 
a = 7 1860 21.4 46.9 
a = 9 2053 20.5 46.2 
The results in Table 11.1 indicate that the expected thinning age with 
flexible management is earlier than in the Faustmann model, while expected 
harvest age under flexible management is later. An explanation for these 
results is that flexible management increases the expected value of harvest 
revenues, which in turn, increases the importance of the pre-commercial 
aspect of thinning. The increased importance of pre-commercial thinning tends 
to reduce expected thinning age. As discussed in section 11.2, the effect of 
thinning on the expected harvest age is also consistent with expectations. 
Thinning increases the quality of the residual stand. This implies that the 
reservation path shifts upwards, and rotation length is increased. 
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As described in section 11.2, the a priori impact of increasing the 
spread of the stumpage price distribution on thinning reservation prices is 
ambiguous depending on whether the commercial or pre-commercial aspects 
of thinning dominate. The results presented in Table 11.1 provide support for 
this result. For an increase in standard deviation from 5 to 7, the impact of 
increasing stumpage price volatility on the commercial aspect of winning is 
smaller than the impact on the pre-commercial aspect. That is, landowners 
tend to thin later to capture larger tinning volumes at the expense of stumpage 
quality at harvest. The reverse holds for an increase in standard deviation 
from 7 to 9. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 ^ 
Fig. 11.1: Reservation price paths for harvesting and thinning (for a=7). 
To examine the robustness of the results, we investigated the effects of 
varying the price-diameter relationship from thinning by varying the coeffi-
cient for CT in equation (11). The results, not reported in Table 11.1, suggest 
that increasing the coefficient for CT decreases expected NPV of bareland and 
increases expected thinning and harvest ages. The expected NPV of bareland 
decreases because the mean of the price distribution for every stumpage age is 
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lower. Stumpage prices are lower because increasing the coefficient for CT 
"pivots" the price-diameter relationship downward. Also "pivoting" from 
increasing the coefficient increases the expected relative gains in prices from 
producing bigger trees. This increase in expected relative gains impacts both 
the commercial and pre-commercial aspects of thinning. The impact on the 
pre-commercial aspect is to encourage early thinning to produce bigger trees 
for final harvest. Conversely, the impact on the commercial aspect tends to 
postpone winning, as landowners wait to realize higher expected thinning 
revenues. For our data, the latter effect dominates the former. For example 
with a = 7, reducing the coefficient for CT from -0.3 to -0.6 and -0.9 
resulted in new expected thinning ages of 24.9 and 27.8 years. Expected 
rotation ages also increased, to 47.6 and 49.7 years, respectively. 
We also examined the quantitative impacts of changing the discount 
rate. The effects of raising r on NPV and rotation length are consistent with 
expectations. For example, with a = 7, increasing r to 5% and 7% results in 
respective drops of NPV to US$395 and -US$107, and a reduction of the 
expected rotation age to respectively 41 years and 37 years. The effect of 
increasing the discount rate on the expected thinning age is more complex and 
depends upon the opposing impacts of pre-commercial and commercial aspects 
of thinning. The pre-commercial aspect becomes less important when the 
future is discounted more heavily, hence the incentive to thin at early ages is 
reduced. Also, for higher discount rates the incentive to thin for revenue will 
be increased. 1 9 That is, the landowner will attempt to move some of the 
harvest revenues forward to become thinning revenues. This tends to postpone 
thinning. For our data, the first effect dominates the latter. For discount rates 
of 5% and 7%, the expected thinning age decreases to 17.7 and to 15.8 years, 
respectively. 
Increasing the discount rate also shortens the rotation age, which would also tend to 
decrease thinning ages. 
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11.6 Conclusions 
Although winning of even-aged single species stands is standard 
silvicultural practice, there have been few formal treatments of winning in the 
context of optimal forest management with fluctuating stumpage prices. In this 
chapter we derive new theoretical results from the inclusion of winning in a 
flexible management model with stompage prices that are independent random 
variables with stationary means. These results are supplemented by a numeri-
cal simulation using data on Dutch stumpage prices and a Dutch growth 
function that includes the pre-commercial aspect of winning. 
Some of the qualitative results obtained have direct analogues in 
optimal harvesting models without winning. We found that reservation price 
paths for winning and harvesting exist, and that the net present value of land 
and stumpage, and for relatively low discount rates most harvest reservation 
prices, increase with the spread of the sWmpage price distribution. 
Other qualitative results have no direct analogues when winning is not 
permitted. We showed that, for every age of stumpage, the thinning reserva-
tion price is less than or equal to the harvest reservation price. Moreover, the 
reservation price paths converge, such that the probability of thinning reduces 
as the stand matures. The inclusion of thinning increases some reservation 
prices for harvesting, since the possibility of future winnings increases both 
the opportunity cost of current harvesting and the benefits of current harvest-
ing. As expected, the possibility of thinning increases the NPV of bareland. 
Finally, thinning reservation prices may either increase or decrease with an 
increase in the spread of the stompage price distribution, depending on the 
magnitude of the commercial and pre-commercial aspects. 
An important factor in explaining thinning behaviour is the relative 
size of the commercial and pre-commercial aspects of thinning. Typically, the 
pre-commercial aspect tends to accelerate thinning to concentrate as much 
aggregate growth on the remaining trees as possible, while the commercial 
aspect tends to a certain extent to postpone winning such that thinned volume 
is greater. Shifting the spread of the stompage price distribution, the interest 
rate or the price diameter relationship creates opposing incentives in the 
commercial and pre-commercial aspects, with the actual change in winning 
behaviour becoming an empirical question. 
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The simulated numerical results provide an initial evaluation of the 
significance of the theoretical results. For our Dutch data we found that the 
results analogous to previous results in flexible management models without 
thinning continue to be important; that is, a reservation price strategy remains 
optimal and the increases in the net present value of land and stumpage are 
substantial and vary with the spread of the stumpage price distribution. 
The numerical results for thinning are also of interest. Expected 
thinning age decreases sharply while expected harvest age increases under 
flexible management compared to Faustmann management due to an increase 
in the pre-commercial incentives to thin, from an increase in net present value 
of older stands. The harvest and thinning reservation prices converge with 
age, thus the probability of thinning approaches zero as the stand ages, which 
is consistent with standard practice. Although the gains in net present value of 
land and stumpage are relatively modest (about 7%), they may be large 
enough for many landowners to optimally choose thinning age. These gains 
would be larger if the landowner would thin more than once or also choose 
thinning intensity. The simulated numerical results also allow comparison of 
the imposing impacts of pre-commercial and commercial aspects of thinning 
that arise from varying the spread of the stumpage price distribution, the 
price-diameter relationship and the discount rate. 
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Autocorrelation function: 
Auto- Stand. 
Lag Corr. Err. -1 - 75 - . 5 - . 2 5 0 .25 .5 .75 1 Box-Ljung Prob 
1 .449 .228 o********* 3 .863 .04 
2 - .056 .220 ' *° . 3 .929 .14 
3 .156 .212 • * • • . 4 .467 .21 
4 .347 .204 o*****«*. 7 .350 .11 
5 .119 .195 . 7 .724 .17 e - . 1 8 1 .186 ****<> . 8 .669 .19 
7 - . 2 2 8 .177 . *****o , 10 .333 .17 
8 - . 0 0 4 .167 * . 10 .333 .24 
9 .064 .156 °* . 10 .500 .31 
10 - .211 .144 . **»*• . 12 .630 .24 
11 - .331 .132 »*.»***o _ 18 .943 .06 
12 - .124 .118 . *»° . 20 .048 .06 
13 - . 124 .102 . **° . 21 .518 .06 
14 - .243 .083 • • . * « • . 3 0 . 0 2 1 .00 
Plot Symbols: Autocorrelations * Two standard Error Limits . 
Partial Autocorrelation function: 
Pr-Aut- Stand. 
Lag Corr. Err. -1 - 75 - . 5 - . 2 5 0 .25 .5 .75 1 
1 .449 .250 «*****»«**. 
2 - . 3 2 3 .250 ******* 
3 .467 .250 
4 - .022 .250 * 
5 - .017 .250 * 
6 - . 2 3 0 .250 ****•» 
7 - . 1 6 3 .250 ***° 
8 .122 .250 °** 
9 - .034 .250 *° 
10 - .139 .250 ***° 
11 - .056 .250 * ° 
12 - . 0 7 6 .250 **° 
13 - . 2 6 5 .230 *****° 
14 . 081 .250 
Appendix 1: 
Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function for pine prices 1975-1991 
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Appendix 2: 
A. Proof that harvest reservation prices are greater than thinning 
reservation prices, i.e., A(k\xk_,) > a(k\xM). 
Proof by contradiction. If a(k\xk.,) > A(k\xk_,), then there exist two prices 
such that harvesting is optimal at the lower price and thinning is optimal at 
the higher price. Formally, from equation (1) we know that if a(k\xk_,) > 
A(k\xk_;), there exists b > 0 and p\ such that 
pXk)Y(k|xw) + V(0) > p-(k)Z(k|x w ) + /3V(k+ljx k . , ) , and (A.l) 
[pXk)+b]Y(k|x w) + V(0) < [p(k)+b]Z(k |x k.,) + /8VCk+l|x k . ,) . (A.2) 
Rearranging (A.l) and (A.2) provides: 
pXk)[Y(k!xk.,) -Z(k|x k . ,)] > j 3 V ( k + l | x k . 1 ) - V ( 0 ) , a n d (A.3) 
[pXk)+b][Y(kjxw) -Z(k |x k . , ) ] < j f T V ( k + l | x k . , ) - V ( 0 ) , ( A . 4 ) 
which implies 
pXk)[Y(k! x k.,)-Z(k! x w ) ] > [p(k) +b][Y(k J xk.,)-Z(k J x k.,)]. (A.5) 
However, since both b and [Y(k | x k 4 )-Z(k | xk.,)] > 0, then Ê(k)[Y(k I x k.,)-
Z(k|x k_,)] > U(k)+b][Y(k|x k . I )-Z(k|x k . 1 )], and (A.5) is false. Therefore 
a(k\xk.,) < A(k\xkJ. 
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B. Proof that for positive discount rate that the simulation algorithm 
converges to V*(0). 
Using standard comparative statics methodology (Samuelson 1947, Silberberg 
1990) we show that the iterative simulation procedure converges to V*(0). To 
model the iterative process, first-order conditions (5), (6) and (7) can be 
rewritten as: 
a{k\xk_x)Z{k\xkJ - BV{k+\\xk_vQ) + 0V(*+l |*i-„ 1) = 0 , (5') 
A{k\xkJ[Y{k\xk„{) -Z(k\xk_{)] -j3V(*+l I x ^ l ) + [ V ( 0 ) + * 1 =0 (6') 
[v*(0)+b s H ] + - c ~ x^,Bi E;=; *C*/-I) * 
[ [ " t MlpYdlxfOHV* (0) +b$\dp + [ ^f'MipZiilx/^dp] 
.MUM.,) Jo&W-i) (7) 
where [V*(0) + bs] is the net present value of bareland after s iterations, and 
the starting net present value of bareland for the s+l iteration. 
The iterative procedure converges to V*(0) for any tolerance, if the 
lim. ==0. We show for positive discount rates that 0 < dbs+l/dbs < 1, 
which implies that \bs+l\ < \bs\, and the l i m , = 0. 
To show the result using comparative statics methodology, we desig-
nate the A( ) 's , a ( )'s and bs+l as the endogenous variables and using the 
Implicit Function Theorem to define the exogenous variables as implicit func-
tions of the exogenous parameters. Next, we substitute the implicit functions 
into (5') , (6') and (7') and totally differentiate the system with respect to bs. 
Then we solve for d& s + I/d& s. The easiest way to perform these steps is to use 
Cramer's Rule. 
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a, 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 
0 «1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 
0 0 si 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 
0 0 0 «1 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 
J = 0 0 0 0 . . . 7, 0 0 0 . . . 0 (B.D 
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 1 72 0 0 . . . 0 
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 2 72 0 . . . 0 
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 1 73 • • • 0 
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . 1 
= Z(k\xJ) and yj — Y(k\xk_ ,o - m\x J ) , i = 1, 2 . . 2 k- 1 , i.e. 5 
is the quantity thinned in year k given t h e / * thinning record for age k-l, and 
7 k j is the difference between the quantity thinned amount thinned in year k 
given t h e / h thinning record for age k-l. 
The determinant of J equals the product of the elements of the primary 
diagonal, i.e. 
\ J \ = I I L I E Z(k\xi)[Y(k\xl) -Z(k\xl)] > 0 . CB.2) 
(Since the j j j is non-zero the implicit functions defined earlier using the 
Implicit Function Theorem are valid.) 
Differentiating (5') , (6') and (7') with respect to / l() 's , a( ) ' s and bs+l 
provides: 
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3bs 
3(6 ') 
0 
1 and (B.3) 
•nr ' B'V-i ftP)<PW\xi-i)dp 
3(7 ' ) _ 
Substituting the negatives of the partial derivatives of (B.3) into the last 
column of J provides: 
5, 0 0 0 
0 82 0 0 
0 0 b\ 0 
0 0 0 8\ 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
7 , 0 0 0 
0 72 0 0 
0 0 72 0 
0 0 0 73 
0 0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a (70 
db. 
(B.4) 
Solving for dbs+l/ds provides, 
Partially, differentiating (5') , (6') and (7') with respect to bs provides: 
9(50 
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db^ 
db db. (B.5) 
y J/I (l [*/-.) 
Note that the right-hand side of (B.5) is bounded by 0 and 1. (If the interest 
rate equals 0, then 8 = 1 and the right-hand side of (B.5) equals 1. As the 
interest rate approaches oo, then 8 approaches 0 and right-hand side of (B.5) 
approaches 0). Since for positive interest rates, 0 < dbs+l/dbs < 1, then for 
positive interest rates, \bs+l\ < \bs\, which implies that the l i n t s » K = °» 
and for any arbitrary starting value the iterative procedure converges to V*(0) 
as s approaches oo. 
CHAPTER 12 
DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Economics of renewable resources provides a broad field for research, 
and in this thesis I have tried to look at a variety of issues. The field allows 
researchers to become engaged in a wide range of topics, each with its own 
peculiarities, problems and interesting features. Depending on the issue, 
models should try to capture, for example, non-market values (as with whales 
and elephants) or the transformation of different state variables (as with 
primary and secondary forests). Models can be constructed to maximize social 
welfare, profits or a political preference function. In addition to the variety in 
topics, the research field invites analysts to employ many different techniques 
to study the various aspects of resource economics. There is certainly scope 
for more elaborate future work, especially with respect to the institutional and 
public choice aspects of resource economics. Also, rigorous incorporation of 
non-market values, uncertainty and "ecological thresholds" deserves more 
attention. 
Since the separate chapters that constitute the core of this thesis 
include summaries of the main results and end with concluding paragraphs, 
this chapter can be brief. Some of the main findings will be summarized in a 
more general tone than before, and where possible I will try to distil recom-
mendations for future research. 
In chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis I provided an introduction to the 
economics of natural resource management, based on a literature survey. The 
introduction starts with recognizing that two conceptually distinct themes are 
central in this field: sustainability and efficiency. Sustainability relates to 
intertemporal equity, and may be extended to incorporate ethical consider-
ations concerning other species than humans. Although sustainable use is 
perhaps the most important issue of resource- and environmental management 
(potentially much more relevant than efficiency, which is not much more than 
a "no-waste criterion"), the literature suffers from lack of uniformity in its 
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interpretation. The question what sustainability exactly amounts to appears to 
depend for an important part on the analysts (subjective) opinion about the 
current generation's responsibility for future generations and their (subjective) 
estimation of future substitution possibilities between different factors of 
production and technological change. Obviously, there are "objective" limits 
to these subjective beliefs in the form of thermodynamic laws. 
Efficiency, on the other hand, simply defines intertemporal exploitation 
paths that maximize the present value of welfare or profits, depending on the 
context chosen. [Possibly, requirements with respect to sustainability can be 
incorporated into standard efficiency models by adding an additional (subjec-
tive) constraint, or by including an additional argument in the objective 
function that somehow measures future welfare.] In this thesis I have focused 
on efficient solutions to various resource management problems. 
Exploiting a stock of an exhaustible or renewable resource implies that 
possibilities for future exploitation are affected. A key result in resource 
economics due to Hotelling (1931) is that resource owners should be indiffer-
ent to current and future exploitation: an intertemporal exploitation path is 
defined as efficient if it is not possible to increase welfare (profits) by shifting 
exploitation from one period to another. The standard Hotelling result for an 
exhaustible resource, valid under a set of quite stringent assumptions, is that 
along an efficient exploitation path the rate of growth of resource prices 
should be equal to the discount rate. When stock effects exist, such as 
exploitation costs or non-use values dependent on the size of the stock in situ, 
or when exploiting firms have market power, the standard rule should be 
adjusted so that exploitation is more conservative, and a more gently-sloped 
price path located at a "higher level" is the result. 
Renewable resource economics combines economic reasoning with 
biological models of growth and reproduction. Typically, single-aged forestry 
models have focused on optimum rotation ages in the tradition of Faustmann 
(1859), and in fishery models the search is often for efficient steady states in 
the tradition of Clark (1976). Both types of models are briefly discussed in 
chapter 2. At the optimum rotation age for a single-aged stand of trees, the 
land owner is indifferent to harvesting the trees or allowing an extra year of 
growth. Similarly, a stock of fish is at its efficient size when the resource 
owner is indifferent in harvesting an additional unit of fish or leaving them to 
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swim and grow. In models of renewable resource economics, harvesting is 
typically interpreted as disinvestment, whereas refraining from harvesting and 
allowing the stock to grow and reproduce is considered investing in the stock. 
The approach-dynamics in fishery problems have been studied less 
extensively, probably due to the mathematical complexities involved, but it 
has been demonstrated in the literature that a temporary reduction of a popula-
tion below its equilibrium population may be efficient under the condition of 
irreversible investments in harvest capacity. When an interior solution of the 
maximization problem exists, eventually the equilibrium population is reached 
(with the so-called bang-bang models) or very closely approximated (with 
non-linear models). However, there is no guarantee that (positive) equilibrium 
stocks exist and it may be "efficient" to eradicate the entire population, even 
for a single rational resource owner (for some authors this is sufficient 
evidence of the folly of striving for efficient outcomes). The intuition is that 
maintaining positive populations (especially of slowly growing species) may 
be no competitive investment for a rational owner. 
Apart from deliberate extinction, which might occur when investment 
opportunities elsewhere in the economy are favourable, fisheries may be 
threatened by lack of well-defined property rights. Under the condition that 
resources are available to everyone, no single firm will be willing to invest in 
its survival because the benefits of this investment will almost certainly accrue 
to somebody else. Under this condition, harvesting takes place at full force 
and depending on the characteristics of the species and the available technol-
ogy, inadvertent extinction may be the result. Implementation of the exclusive 
200-mile fishing zones has enabled national and supranational policymakers to 
formulate policies aimed at preventing this phenomenon. Various policy 
instruments are discussed in chapter 2. 
However, as demonstrated in the recent past, conflicts over resource 
stocks at the boundary of these exclusive zones will probably be important in 
the near future (think of the troubles between Spain and Canada in 1995). 
Also, the terms of fishing contracts in fishing zones of many developing 
countries will be subject of renegotiation [see Lingsma (1996) for a popular, 
mostly non-economic, discussion], so it is still too early to conclude that 
problems related to property rights are a subject of the past. Finally, it should 
be noted that even under a system of well-defined property rights and with 
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fast growing species that could easily compete with investments elsewhere in 
the economy, interest groups may put pressure on governments that cause 
deviations from "socially optimal" harvesting and threaten populations. This is 
elaborated upon in chapter 8. 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis are about tropical deforestation. In 
section 2.6.2 we have examined the popular misconception that trade in 
tropical timber products is a major direct cause of deforestation. It is easily 
verified that little support for this claim is found: some quick and dirty 
calculations show that less than one percent of tropical deforestation can be 
directly attributed to the timber trade. On average, commercial logging for 
domestic and export markets amounts (directly) to about 10% of tropical 
deforestation. As is well documented, the major cause of deforestation is 
agricultural conversion. The nature of this conversion process can take many 
different forms (e.g., clearing land for subsistence agriculture or for large-
scale cattle raising for export markets), but the results are often identical: 
potential loss of biodiversity, nature values and regulatory functions of the 
forest ecosystem, displacement of indigenous people and squandering of 
scarce assets. On the other hand, it should be recognized that there is still 
much uncertainty about the size of the stock of tropical forest that maximizes 
the present value of welfare for the national (or global) community [for an 
exception at national level, see Ehui and Hertel (1989)], hence how much 
forest should be conserved from an economic viewpoint is unclear. 
In the first part of chapter 3 , the relation between (the threat of) 
agricultural conversion on the one hand and logging and forest conservation 
on the other hand has been worked out in more detail. The reverse relation, 
i.e., the impact of the logging sector on agricultural conversion is well studied 
and described [see e.g. Pearce and Brown (1994)]. Of crucial importance in 
this chapter is the difference between mature, undisturbed primary forests and 
secondary forests that have been subject to selective logging and hence display 
net growth. As mentioned above, agricultural conversion by (shifting) cultiva-
tors on tropical forest concessions (a process called encroachment) is general-
ly considered a primary cause of deforestation in many areas. Therefore, in 
much of the literature on tropical deforestation, authors propose measures to 
reduce the intensity or scale of encroachment. Examples of such policies 
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could include investments in education, agricultural reform and reduction of 
population growth. 
Without mimmizing the potential values of such programs, there is 
another side to encroachment, that we have elaborated upon in chapter 3. 
Empirical support exists for the hypothesis that encroachment is confined to 
accessible logged-over (secondary) forest areas. Therefore we argue that 
encroachment has similar effects as a kind of property tax on owning second-
ary forests: it induces rational forest owners to cut back on their possession of 
this type of forests. With damage due to encroachment positively related to 
the size of the secondary forest area (i.e., damage due to agricultural conver-
sion increases as the area of accessible forest increases), concessionaires will 
respond to the threat of agricultural conversion by reducing the rate at which 
primary forests are harvested. The net effect of encroachment on conservation 
benefits is therefore theoretically ambiguous: losses in nature values from 
enhanced conversion of secondary forests may be balanced by a larger area of 
(more highly valued) primary forest. However, the necessary conditions for 
this "braking- or inhibiting effect" to occur (e.g., loggers should consider 
successive rounds of logging, hence concession rights should be defined for a 
long enough period) are often violated in practice [e.g. Repetto and Gillis 
(1988)]. Future research in this field could include modelling the effect of 
encroachment on optimum encroachment prevention investments undertaken 
by logging firms, and the net effect on deforestation that results. Also, 
empirical research could be directed at the underlying causes of regional 
migration and agricultural conversion. Currently, it is hardly understood 
whether push factors (land scarcity in the traditional agricultural areas), pull 
factors (higher expected income in forest areas) or considerations relating to 
risk aversion [think of pooling the income of a geographically dispersed 
family (through remittances) with uncorrelated fluctuations in harvest levels in 
different production areas, as opposed to pooling income with your neighbour 
who is subject to similar climatic conditions] dominate migration decisions. 
Obviously, these different underlying causes of migration would call for very 
different policy measures to combat deforestation. 
In the last part of chapter 3 we examine the often heard claim that 
excessive deforestation is caused by loggers applying a discount rate that is 
too high (measured with the social discount rate as a benchmark). Such 
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discount rates can be caused by risk premiums or high opportunity costs of 
capital. We demonstrate that with restrictions on supply, for instance in the 
context of a tropical timber concession contract, the general conclusion about 
adverse effects of discounting on resource conservation no longer holds in a 
model that distinguishes between primary and secondary forests. If the 
concession period for logging firms is exogenously determined and fixed, and 
when we recognize that depleting a stock of primary forest automatically 
implies building a stock of secondary forest, then the effect of high discount 
rates on the stock of primary forest is ambiguous. Thus we obtain the 
paradoxical result that for a certain range of values for the discount rate, an 
increase in the discount rate actually postpones depletion of primary forests. 
The intuition behind this result is that high discount rates reduce the marginal 
benefits of converting primary forest into a productive asset, which slows 
down the optimal extraction rate of the stock of virgin forest. 
In chapter 4 we explore the robustness of the standard result that 
international transfers promote conservation of tropical forests. For this 
purpose, we relax the conventional (but restrictive) assumptions of determin-
istic prices and a risk-neutral forest owner. The standard result, lucidly 
described by Barbier and Rauscher (1994), is based on the observation that 
governments have to balance non-use values of forest protection and consump-
tion of certain commodities, which are partly paid by selling timber. With 
constant prices, international transfers enable developing countries to increase 
consumption. Under standard assumptions, this results in a reduction of the 
marginal benefit of consumption which, in equilibrium, corresponds with a 
lower marginal utility of forest conservation. The way to achieve a reduction 
in marginal utility of conservation is through expansion of the forest area. 
Expansion of the forest area is possible in the Barbier and Rauscher model 
because they assume a logistic growth function for the forest stock (in contrast 
to Ehui and Hertel, mentioned above, who model deforestation as an irrevers-
ible process). However, with fluctuating timber prices and risk-averse 
resource owners (of the DARA type), we demonstrate that international 
capital transfers to developing countries to reduce tropical deforestation are a 
less effective instrument to combat deforestation than previously thought, or 
perhaps not an effective instrument at all. The reason is that because of 
increased wealth, governments become less prudent in their harvesting 
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decisions. This effect weakens the above-mentioned effect. In addition, under 
conditions of (mean preserving) stochastic prices, harvesting is less attractive 
for risk-averse resource owners than extraction with constant prices. This 
implies that the steady-state of the forest stock under stochastic prices exceeds 
the steady state stock with deterministic prices. This implies that the marginal 
utility of additional conservation [achieved through provision of (costly) 
transfers] is lower with stochastic prices. Combining these effects leads us to 
the conclusion that the attractiveness of international transfers as an instrument 
to combat deforestation with stochastic prices is reduced. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with (the economic rationale of) strict 
species conservation, and reveal results that may be hard for die-hard 
conservationists to accept. In chapter 6, we address whether a total ban on 
commercial harvesting of minke whales makes economic sense, and in section 
5 we explore the impact of the ivory trade ban on elephant conservation. 
Results with respect to the latter are inconclusive. Banning the trade in ivory 
affects investment and disinvestments decisions of host countries, and we have 
theoretically shown that this could result in either an increase or decrease in 
optimum size of elephant populations. Determinants of the shifts in population 
size are the discount rate applied by the government, agricultural damage (or 
opportunity costs) of having a stock of elephants and the contribution of 
elephants to tourism benefits. While the optimum population size with trade in 
ivory is a declining function of the discount rate (for low rates, the efficient 
population should be large and vice versa, which is easily verified with 
standard fisheries models described in chapter 2 of this thesis), the efficient 
population in the absence of trade reduces to a simple static model of balanc-
ing marginal recreation benefits and marginal agricultural damages. 
Using Kenyan data, we infer that the apparent success of the trade ban 
in protecting elephants may not be permanent, because the critical discount 
rate (i.e., the rate that makes the optimum population with and without trade 
of equal size) is pretty close to what can be considered an approximation of 
the social discount rate. The critical rate is probably (somewhat) lower than 
the discount rate currently applied by governments when deciding on investing 
in elephant conservation, but this condition is unlikely to sustain indefinitely. 
When per capita income in African countries rises it is generally believed that 
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the (social) discount rate falls, and eventually the critical rate may exceed the 
discount rate. Then, elephant conservationists should try to lobby to have the 
trade ban lifted if they want to have more elephants around. Some caveats of 
the model (especially the absence of poaching is a crude simplification) are 
discussed in chapter 5. Future research in this field should try to incorporate 
poaching into formal models. 
The purpose of chapter 6 was to analyze whether the current (commer-
cial) harvest moratorium for minke whales was efficient. Although we do not 
claim that this is per se the most interesting aspect of the annually returning 
whaling discussion (equity issues may be more relevant for policymakers, 
especially the design of mechanisms to transfer public good benefits from 
non-whaling countries to countries that would like to resume whaling) we 
think that it sheds some light on society's preferences. In addition, comparing 
marginal benefits and marginal costs (of harvesting whales, in this particular 
case) is not much less than a professional aberration of resource economists, 
and probably most economists in other fields alike. 
(Minke) whales have been called mixed goods because they combine 
features of private goods (meat and blubber) with features of public goods 
(existence values and so on). We demonstrate, not surprisingly, that the 
existence of public non-use values increases the size of the efficient stock 
beyond the optimal level in the absence of such values. Solving a dynamic 
optimization model, we conclude that the current stock of minke whales is 
probably suboptimally small. An uncertain factor is the marginal value of 
preservation. For most scenarios analysed we conclude that the current stock 
is too small, but it is realized that this result is obtained under the strong 
assumption of constant marginal value of preservation. In other words, when 
society cares less about the 100,000th whale preserved than about number 
500, it could well be the case that the current stock of whales is excessively 
large and should be subjected to harvesting. More work in the field of valu-
ation is needed to address this issue. 
As mentioned above, a major objective of chapter 6 was to verify the 
economic rationale of the whaling moratorium. For the dynamic model, this 
implies numerically solving the optimal approach paths (the so-called stable 
arm) to the steady states of the various scenarios. We conclude that the 
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(temporary) moratorium is an efficient policy if maximizing the present value 
of welfare is the objective of decision makers, and if the restrictive assump-
tion of constant marginal utility of conservation holds. 
An interesting result of chapter 6 is that most of the conclusions 
obtained for the dynamic model are reversed when the management problem 
is approximated by a series of static models, as proposed by Kuronuma and 
Tisdell (1993). With the static model, the current benefits of harvesting and 
conservation are compared at the margin. This model incorrectly suggests that 
the ban on commercial harvesting may be inefficient. We conclude that one 
should be careful to infer policy recommendations from static models for 
problems that are inherently dynamic. 
The step from whale management to fisheries management is easy to 
make for an applied economist. For a long time, the major impediment to 
rational resource use was similar for the whaling and fishing sectors: open 
access to the resource implied that no rational firm was willing to invest in 
stock survival. In the post-Second World War era this resulted in massive 
depletion of fish and whale stocks alike. In chapter 7 we have investigated 
whether the responses of the European Union to overcome property rights 
failure have had a positive effect on fishery management or not. More 
specifically, we have tried to establish if policy implementation that followed 
the declaration of exclusive fishing zones reversed (to a certain extent) the 
well-described process of rent dissipation. 
In chapter 7 we have presented a simple time-series analysis of 
German fish prices to evaluate rent dissipation. The method employed in this 
chapter consisted of estimating a model on the basis of a time series of prices 
for the "open access period" and to estimate studentized residuals for the 
following "common property period". The results for all six commercial 
species selected indicated that studentized residuals were significant for a 
series of observations. We have interpreted this as an indication that scarcity 
rent has returned as a component of prices, which would imply that 
establishing exclusive zones and successive development of fishery policies 
had a positive impact on management of fish stocks in Europe. 
As argued by Dupont (1991), measuring rent dissipation requires 
information about prices and (marginal) harvesting costs over time, where 
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rent is defined as the difference between the two. In chapter 7 we have taken 
a short cut by omitting an explicit analysis of the latter part. Instead, we have 
tried to verbally address the complexities of cost development over time. We 
feel strengthened by the empirical observation that in the late 1980s and early 
1990s the profitability of fishing increased. This implies that (marginal) costs 
have not kept pace with rising prices, which is consistent with our con-
clusions. Yet, we agree that the European Fisheries policies give rise to much 
more work for economists, and we consider this chapter a modest first step. 
Future work could include a comparison of rent return between different 
member states with different national policies. To make this a fruitful exer-
cise, the harvest side of the problem should be modelled explicitly. More in 
general, it seems that multi-species harvesting and simultaneous modelling of 
exploitation and pollution problems provide interesting departure points for 
analysis. 
The conclusion that fisheries policies have contributed to more efficient 
management of fish resources is perhaps encouraging, but there is widespread 
evidence that current harvesting is still far from optimal. Current stocks of 
many commercial species are below their economic (and biological) 
optimums. However, reform of the sector to ensure an increase in future 
income (e.g. Schmidt 1993) will most probably meet resistance from the 
fishermen. 
We have tried to come up with a way to cut quotas without reducing 
utility of fishers, as described in chapter 9. By establishing a futures market 
of tradeable fishing rights, uncertainty for fishers buying, selling, leasing or 
simply owning these rights can be greatly reduced. This would make a risk-
averse fisher better off, which offers scope for a reduction in the size of his 
quota to bring him back to his original "utility level". Yet, translating these 
academic results into a workable format may create problems, as the rel-
evance of concepts such as "utility level" may be questioned outside the realm 
of theoretical economics. (At least, I must admit that I do not feel tempted to 
explain the concept of a utility-neutral quota cut to an audience of the fishers 
concerned.) 
Related to the previous remark is the following: An aspect that has 
been somewhat overlooked in theoretical modelling of resource management, 
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in my opinion, is the public choice side of decision making. It seems that 
every resource economists is able to crank out theoretical models that maxi-
mize welfare for society, but very few have actually attempted to model 
government decision making in detail. Yet, there is much complaining about 
suboptimal fisheries management (and excessive deforestation, to which the 
same remark applies). These decision makers just do not seem to listen! It 
seems to me that a lot of the theoretical work (including most of the work in 
this thesis) may be of little or no value to policymakers. Not only because 
some important variables are omitted in these models for convenience, but 
also because the postulated objective function for the social planner {"maxi-
mize present value of welfare") may be unrealistic. At least, public choice 
theories have clearly indicated that there may be more to policy-making than 
simply doing what is best for the people at large. 
In chapter 8 we have tried to explicitly incorporate some of the 
concerns of public choice theorists into a simple model. We have distin-
guished three different groups in society (consumers, labourers and vessel 
owners) with different objectives. For example, consumers strive for low fish 
prices, labourers in the sector want to earn high wages and vessel owners 
lobby for large profits. Depending on the quantity of pressure they are able to 
generate (which is not explicitly modelled in chapter 8, but will be included in 
future research), they can influence government policies with respect to fish 
resources. In our model, decision making is modelled as a kind of "political 
market", where participants pay with pressure in order to purchase preferred 
policies. It is recognized that this picture is much more complete when the 
pressure generation process is included in the model and endogenous. In the 
current specification we merely develop a theoretical model and consider the 
effects of possible (exogenous) distributions of power or political force among 
the social groups on "optimal" stock size pursued by political planners. It 
turns out that the political stock may be either larger or smaller than the 
(standard) efficient stock, which may explain over-harvesting. Also, we have 
found that the optimal solution may be difficult to attain, and that specific 
combinations of policy instruments are required to end up in a steady state. 
Chapters 10 and 11 are based on forestry models with uncertainty. In 
the latter chapter, uncertainty arises from stochastic stumpage prices with a 
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known mean and standard deviation. We build on path-breaking research in 
this field by Lohmander (1987) and Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988) by 
including thinning in the now standard analysis of reservation prices. Thinning 
is a standard silvicultural treatment in large parts of the world, and it is 
strange that so far nobody has included this aspect before. [Although I should 
add that writing this chapter was a painstaking and sometimes tedious job, and 
that the marginal benefits in terms of scientific insight are relatively few. 
Perhaps we can trust (forest) economists to recognize these high-marginal-
cost/low-marginal-benefit study areas in an early phase and avoid them where 
possible]. Central to the issue of strategic thinning is the balancing of com-
mercial and pre-commercial aspects: thinning yields immediate revenues and 
increases the quality of the residual stand. Among other things, we find that 
the reservation price paths for winning and harvesting gradually approach 
each other (obviously with the former always below the latter) and that inclu-
sion of thinning significantly increases profits for a strategically behaving 
forest owner. 
Chapter 10 is in many ways different from the stochastic price prob-
lem just described. It does not build in a thorough but straightforward manner 
on previous work, but in my opinion is more like a digression from conven-
tional mainstream economics. This chapter is about land allocation on 
Vancouver Island, a heavily debated subject with a host of different interest 
groups involved. Preferences with respect to what the land should provide are 
often conflicting and stated in imprecise form. Moreover, a lot of the techni-
cal information that is needed to support modelling, for example, yield 
functions but also the recreational and preservation values attached to different 
forest types, is lacking. We have employed fuzzy logic to deal with both types 
of uncertainty. For this purpose, we have combined objective information and 
our best professional judgement to specify central values for imprecise 
parameters (or realizations that provide total satisfaction for objectives), 
spreads and membership functions [for the basis of fuzzy logic as we 
employed it, see Zimmerman (1991)]. 
Given the nature of the process that is to be modelled, our conclusion 
is that the fuzzy approaches can be judged a distinct improvement over the 
traditional approach of constrained maximization of net present value. The 
resulting land use allocation with the fuzzy models points much more in the 
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direction of a "compromise" solution (i.e., with integrated forest manage-
ment), as was explicitly sought for in the decision-making process, than the 
conventional model. As a side benefit, from varying the realizations of the 
imprecise coefficients by moving the level of the a-cut, we have obtained 
information about what kind of data are crucial to achieve robust solutions. 
Robust solutions are land use allocations that need no drastic shifts from one 
land use option to another in light of small changes in parameter values. 
Rather surprisingly, it turns out that information with respect to timber 
benefits are a weaker link in this respect than the data on non-market values 
we have employed. 
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SAMENV ATTING 
In dit proefschrift neem ik een aantal onderwerpen die betrekking 
hebben op de economische theorie van beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
onder de loep. Voorbeelden van natuurlijke hulpbronnen zijn visvoorraden, 
bossen en olie. Het onderzoeksveld is breed en biedt keuze uit een scala aan 
onderwerpen, ieder met zijn eigen problemen, eigenaardigheden en interessan-
te aspecten. Aangezien de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift 
afgesloten worden met een concluderende en samenvattende sectie, zal ik deze 
samenvatting kort houden. 
De hoofdstukken 1 en 2 betreffen een inleidend literatuuronderzoek. In 
hoofdstuk 1 wordt het onderzoeksveld afgebakend en worden enkele basisbe-
grippen besproken. Twee centrale fhema's zijn "duurzaamheid" en "effici-
entie". Duurzaamheid heeft betrekking op gelijke toegang tot natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen door verschillende generaties. Efficientie betekent het (intertem-
poreel) maximaliseren van een doelfunctie. Het maximaliseren van "de winst" 
of "het nut voor de samenleving" zijn veel gebruikte voorbeelden van dergelij-
ke functies. Na de Earth summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 zou "duurzaam-
heid" wellicht het belangrijkste thema van de twee dienen te zijn, maar er 
bestaat in de literatuur veel verschil van inzicht over de exacte interpretatie 
van dit begrip. De interpretatie is subjectief en onder andere afhankelijk van 
de inschatting van de toekomstige substitutie-mogelijkheden tussen de verschil-
lende productiefactoren (bijvoorbeeld tussen natuurlijk en fysiek kapitaal), en 
van de mogelijkheden die in de toekomst door technologische vooruitgang 
geboden zullen worden. 
De interpretatie van efficientie is helder, en de mainstream van de neo-
klassieke economen is traditioneel gericht op dit thema. (Van meer recente 
aard zijn modellen waarin de beide thema's gecombineerd worden.) De 
meeste hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift gaan in de eerste plaats over het 
efficient gebruik van (vernieuwbare) natuurlijke hulpbronnen. 
Het exploiteren van een natuurlijke hulpbron heeft invloed op de 
mogelijkheden voor toekomstig gebruik van deze voorraad. In geval van mijn-
bouw, bijvoorbeeld, gaat de huidige extractie van ertsen ten koste van 
grondstofwinning in de toekomst. Dit impliceert dat bij het delven van een 
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eenheid erts, in aanvulling op de pure extractiekosten, rekening moet worden 
gehouden met de zogenaamde opportunity costs. In dit verband wordt met 
opportunity costs bedoeld de mogelijke baten die de eenheid erts in de toe-
komst had kunnen opleveren. Deze "extra" kosten vertagen de optimale 
hoeveelheid die geexploiteerd dient te worden. Een belangrijke regel voor 
efficient gebruik van een niet-vernieuwbare hulpbron, zoals olie of steenkool, 
is dat onder bepaalde voorwaarden de groeivoet van de zogenaamde rent van 
de hulpbron (gedefinieerd als het verschil tussen de prijs en de marginale 
exploitatiekosten) gelijk moet zijn aan de interestvoet. Als deze regel opgaat 
zijn eigenaren van een hulpbron indifferent tussen huidige en toekomstige 
extractie: het rendement van het aanhouden van een voorraad van een bepaal-
de hulpbron is even hoog als het rendement van exploiteren en het verdiende 
geld vervolgens elders investeren of op de bank zetten. Dit is de bekende 
Hotelling regel. 
Voor efficient gebruik van hulpbronnen die zichzelf binnen een 
redelijke termijn kunnen vernieuwen, zoals een voorraad vis of een bos, moet 
de Hotelling regel aangepast worden. In de economie van dit soort hulp-
bronnen worden economische principes gecombineerd met biologische 
groeimodellen. Met behulp van bosbouwmodellen kan dan bijvoorbeeld de 
optimale omlooptijd van een gelijkjarig bos berekend worden. Met behulp van 
visserijmodellen wordt de optimale visstand in een bepaald gebied berekend. 
Het afzien van oogsten, bijvoorbeeld door een hoeveelheid bomen nog een 
jaar te laten groeien of door de jaarlijkse vangst van een bepaalde vissoort te 
Verlagen, kan geinterpreteerd worden als "investeren" in de hulpbron. Omge-
keerd geldt dat oogsten gelijk Staat aan desinvesteren. In hoofdstuk 2 van dit 
proefschrift wordt door middel van een literatuurstudie ingegaan op deze 
materie en op verwante zaken als eigendomsrechten (immers, wie wil investe-
ren in een hulpbron als niet duidelijk is of de toekomstige baten toevallen aan 
hemzelf?) en de rol van overheidsbeleid. 
Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 zijn gewijd aan tropische ontbossing. Het directe 
verband tussen de commerciele kap van tropisch hardhout en ontbossing is 
uiterst zwak. Een veel belangrijkere factor is het "omzetten" van bossen in 
landbouwgrond (ongeveer 80% van alle ontbossing wordt veroorzaakt omdat 
ruimte voor landbouw, inclusief veehouderij, gemaakt moet worden). Zoals 
veel bosbouwers en milieubeschermers benadrukken bestaat er echter wel een 
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sterk indirect verband tussen commerciele, selectieve houtkap en oprukkende 
landbouw. De bosbouwsector zorg namelijk voor het aanleggen van een infra-
structuur in gebieden waar (selectief) gekapt is. Dit maakt het bedrijven van 
landbouw in deze gebieden aantrekkelijker. 
Een veel gehoorde beleidsaanbeveling is dat boeren uit de bossen 
geweerd moeten worden, bij voorkeur door een algemeen ontwikkelingsbeleid 
gericht op het tegengaan van te snelle bevolkingsgroei, het bevorderen van 
alfabetisering en het hervormen van de landbouwsector. Ongetwijfeld wordt 
hiervoor met de beste bedoelingen gepleit. Dit proefschrift toont echter aan 
dat dit beleid niet altijd bevorderlijk is voor natuurbehoud. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de relatie tussen de (dreiging van) oprukkende 
boeren en het kaptempo van bosbouwers onderzocht. Omdat, zoals vermeld, 
conversie van bossen in landbouwgrond met name voorkomt in selectief 
gekapt bos, kunnen bosbouwers met kapconcessies voor meerdere jaren de 
schade door oprukkende landbouwers beinvloeden door hun kapbeslissingen 
{"in welk tempo zet ik mijn ongestoorde, primaire bos om in makkelijk 
toegankelijk, secundair bosT) te veranderen. Het verminderen van schade zal 
overwogen worden indien het bosbouwers is toegestaan na verloop van tijd 
terug te keren naar het opengelegde gebied voor aanvullende kap. Met een 
model waar schade aan het bosbestand van een houtbedrijf positief gerelateerd 
is aan de omvang van het secundaire bos laten we zien dat de dreiging van 
oprukkende boeren twee effecten heeft. Aan de ene kant zullen bosbouwers de 
kap in toegankelijke bossen intensiveren om de brandende boeren voor te zijn. 
Een andere reactie is het vertragen van de omzetting van ongestoorde (en 
ontoegankelijke) primaire bossen in secundaire bossen. We concluderen dat de 
dreiging van landbouwers leidt tot minder secundair en meer primair bos. 
Afhankelijk van de maatschappelijke waardering voor deze verschillende 
bossystemen kan dit uit oogpunt van natuurbehoud een verbetering of een 
verslechtering inhouden. 
Het huidige tempo van ontbossing is volgens velen te hoog. Een 
mogelijke verklaring is dat kapbedrijven een te hoge rentevoet hanteren bij het 
beslissen over de spreiding van kapactiviteiten over de tijd. Immers, veelal 
wordt verondersteld dat hogere discontovoeten (implicerend dat relatief meer 
belang wordt gehecht aan huidige consumptie dan aan toekomstige consump-
tie) ondubbelzinnig negatief uitpakken voor natuurbescherming. Een tweede 
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doelstelling van hoofdstuk 3 is te onderzoeken of dit correct is in de context 
van een model waarin onderscheid gemaakt wordt tussen primaire en secun-
daire bossen en waarin een winstmaximaliserend bedrijf geconfronteerd wordt 
met een overheid die bepaalde eisen stelt. We laten zien dat hoge rentevoeten 
niet noodzakelijkerwijs versneide kap uitlokken. Het selectief kappen van 
primair bos betekent namelijk automatisch dat secundair bos gecreeerd wordt. 
Bij optimaal bosbeheer wordt de winst door kap in beide typen bos in de 
afweging betrokken. We laten zien dat hoge discontovoeten de baten van het 
omzetten van primair bos in secundair bos vertagen. Daarmee wordt het 
tempo vertraagd waarin deze primaire bossen dienen te worden gekapt om de 
winst te maximaliseren. 
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we of het verschaffen van ontwikkelings-
geld aan ontwikkelingslanden een efficient instrument is om tropische onfbos-
sing af te remmen. Op basis van een model waar de overheid van een Derde 
Wereldland de baten van bosbeheer maximaliseert, in dit geval opbrengsten 
uit verkoopbaar hout en niet-gebruikswaarden gekoppeld aan bosbescherming, 
is in het verleden geconcludeerd dat ontwikkelingshulp leidt tot extra bosbe-
scherming. De redenering luidt als volgt: extra geld door middel van internati-
onale transfers leidt tot meer consumptie in het Derde Wereldland, zodat de 
marginale baten van consumptie zullen dalen. Om het evenwicht te herstellen 
moeten de marginale baten van bosbescherming ook dalen, hetgeen alleen 
bereikt kan worden door het bosareaal uit te breiden. We hebben dit model 
uitgebreid en realistischer gemaakt door een risico-mijdende overheid en onze-
kerheid met betrekking tot toekomstige houtprijzen te veronderstellen. 
Uiteraard leidt deze uitbreiding normaliter tot afremmen van de kapinspan-
ning. In aanvulling op dit effect hebben internationale donaties in het uitge-
breide model een tweede effect: de overheid wordt door het extra geld minder 
risico-mijdend en laat zieh in mindere mate door de onzekere prijzen afrem-
men om bos te kappen. De conclusie is dat de effectiviteit van internationale 
transfers als instrument om bij te dragen tot bosbescherming in het verleden is 
overschat. 
In hoofdstuk 5 en 6 behandelen we enkele economische achtergronden 
van het beschermen van bepaalde diersoorten. In hoofdstuk 5 staat het verbod 
op de handel in ivoor centraal. Met de bedoeling om olifanten te beschermen 
is hiertoe, na enkele decennia van grootschalige olifantenslacht, besloten aan 
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het einde van de jaren '80. Tot op heden heeft dit beleid bijgedragen aan 
herstel van olifantenpopulaties. Met een eenvoudig economisch model hebben 
we onderzocht of een handelsverbod altijd dit effect zal blijven hebben. Dit is 
waarschijnlijk niet het geval. Voor een overheid levert het beheren van een 
populatie levende olifanten verschillende baten op: het trekt toeristen aan en, 
na eventuele opheffing van het verbod, zijn olifanten een bron van ivoor en 
andere nuttige producten. Aan de andere kant leveren olifanten schade op aan 
landbouwgewassen en mogelijkerwijs ook aan natuurparken. Zolang het 
handelsverbod gehandhaafd blijft zal een overheid proberen de baten van de 
bescherming van een extra olifant (in dit geval dus inkomsten uit toerisme) 
gelijk te stellen aan de kosten die deze olifant met zieh meebrengt. Dit wordt 
bereikt door regelmatig olifantenpopulaties uit te dunnen, ook al mag het 
aldus verkregen ivoor niet verkocht worden. Dergelijke operaties zijn in 
enkele landen al aan de gang. Indien het handelsverbod wordt opgeheven zal 
de overheid olifanten ook beschouwen als een vernieuwbare bron van ivoor. 
Het bejagen van olifanten voor ivoor levert dan directe baten op en het laten 
leven van een olifant wordt een soort van investering. Met behulp van data 
voor Afrika in het algemeen en Kenia in het bijzonder laten we zien dat de 
optimale populatie olifanten zoals die met een handelsverbod door een over-
heid wordt nagestreefd niet noodzakelijkerwijs groter is dan de optimale 
populatie met handel in ivoor. Een belangrijke factor die de optimale hoeveel-
heid olifanten in de situatie met handel bepaald is de hoogte van de disconto-
voet die de overheid gebruikt. Een hoge discontovoet leidt tot läge olifan-
tenpopulaties wanneer handel in ivoor is toegestaan, en omgekeerd. De 
discontovoet waarbij de hoeveelheid olifanten met handel in ivoor de optimale 
populatie met een handelsverbod overtreft is in de nabijheid van de "sociale 
discontovoet". Als de discontovoet zoals gehanteerd door Afrikaanse overhe-
den lager wordt dan deze break even discount rate, dan zijn olifanten gebaat 
bij handel in ivoor. Aangezien de discontovoet waarschijnlijk niet constant is 
(veelal wordt verondersteld dat de discontovoet een afnemende functie van het 
inkomen is), concluderen we dat olifantenbeschermers in de toekomst wellicht 
zullen moeten pleiten voor opheffing van het handelsverbod. In het model 
hebben we geen rekening gehouden met stroperij. Dit beschouwen we een van 
de noodzakelijke uitbreidingen voor de toekomst. 
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In hoofdstuk 6 bekijken we de economische achtergrond van het 
verbod op de commerciële walvisvaart. We berekenen de optimale hoeveel-
heid dwergvinvissen in het Noordoostelijk deel van de Atlantische oceaan met 
behulp van een model waarin we rekening houden met de niet-gebruikswaar-
den van levende walvissen (de populariteit van organisaties als Greenpeace 
geeft aan dat veel mensen "nut" ontlenen aan levende walvissen). In tegenstel-
ling tot ander onderzoek concluderen we dat de huidige populatie dwergvin-
vissen te laag is. Bovendien blijkt dat het optimaal is om volledig van walvis-
vangst af te zien tot de populatie gegroeid is tot de optimale omvang. Het 
moratorium is dus economisch te verdedigen. In het hoofdstuk demonstreren 
we tot slot dat een simpel statisch model, dat door sommige onderzoekers 
wordt gebruikt om dit soort problematiek te benaderen, ongeschikt is. Het 
model leidt tot beleidsaanbevelingen die diametraal tegenover de beleidsimpli-
caties van een dynamische speeificatie staan. 
De hoofdstukken 7, 8 en 9 betreffen visserijeconomie. Zoals besproken 
in hoofdstuk 2 heeft exploitatie van de zee gedurende een lange tijd plaatsge-
vonden onder condities van open access. Dit betekent dat het niet mogelijk 
was om gemteresseerde vissers te weren van bepaalde visgronden. Omdat 
niemand geweerd kon worden, voelde niemand zieh verantwoordelijk voor 
een duurzaam beheer. Iedereen zal proberen op zo kort mogelijk termijn zo 
veel mogelijk geld te verdienen door vis te vangen voordat een andere visser 
daar aan toe komt. Onder open access verdwijnt de rent volledig: er wordt 
zoveel gevist dat de prijs uiteindelijk gelijk is aan de marginale vangstkosten. 
Aan het eind van de jaren '70 is aan deze toestand een einde gekomen door 
het instellen van exclusieve zones waarbinnen overheden het recht krijgen om 
buitenstaanders te weren en eigen beleid te voeren. We hebben in hoofdstuk 7 
onderzocht of de overgang van open access naar een situatie waar overheids-
beleid gevoerd kan worden heeft geleid tot een beter beheer van visbestanden. 
Op basis van de economische théorie kan voorspeld worden dat overheden 
(net als bedrijven met gegarandeerde eigendomsrechten) rekening houden met 
levende vissen als investering. Dit betekent dat de rent van de hulpbron 
positief moet worden. Empirisch onderzoek met behulp van Duitse data wijst 
uit dat de rent inderdaad positief geworden is na instellen van Europees 
visserijbeleid. 
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De conclusie uit hoofdstuk 7 is zeker niet dat het huidige beleid 
optimaal is. Er werd slechts geconcludeerd dat vergeleken met vroeger de 
hulpbron nu efficienter geexploiteerd wordt. Ander onderzoek heeft aange-
toond dat het huidige beleid verre van optimaal is. Een verklaring voor sub-
optimaal visserijbeheer (die verrassend vaak over het hoofd wordt gezien) is 
dat de standaard-veronderstelling dat overheden proberen "de welvaart voor 
de samenleving te maximaliseren", met opgaat. De overheid wordt bei'nvloedt 
door belangengroepen met bepaalde doelstellingen, die kunnen afwijken van 
wat sociaal wenselijk is. In hoofdstuk 8 laten we zien dat een belangengroe-
pen-benadering, waarin we vissers, arbeiders en consumenten onderscheiden, 
leidt tot beheer dat afwijkt van hetgeen standaardmodellen voorschrijven. De 
observatie dat er onvoldoende vis rondzwemt in de Noordzee hoeft niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs te impliceren dat de overheid haar doelstellingen niet haalt 
door het verkeerd inzetten van bepaalde instrumenten. Het kan even goed 
wijzen op afwijkende doelstellingen als gevolg van lobbyende belangengroe-
pen. 
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt expliciet rekening gehouden met de "macht" van 
de visserijsector. Het is niet realistisch om te veronderstellen dat een overheid 
simpelweg een bepaald beleid kan voeren dat rechtstreeks tegen de belangen 
van bepaalde groepen ingaat. In hoofdstuk 9 laten we zien hoe, in het geval 
van de visserij, een overheid beperkende maatregelen (zoals het verkleinen 
van quota) kan doorvoeren zonder de belangen van de vissers al te zeer te 
schaden. Het instellen van een termijnmarkt voor verhandelbare visquota 
neemt het prijsrisico dat vissers lopen voor deze quota weg. Dit betekent dat 
een risico-mijdende visser beter af is dan voorheen. Dit biedt het perspectief 
om op hetzelfde moment het quotum te vertagen, zodat per saldo de visser 
niet beter of slechter af is. Financiele instrumenten kunnen dus (in theorie) 
leiden tot bescherming van naruurlijke hulpbronnen. 
Het proefschrift bevat tot slot twee hoofdstukken over bosbouw waarin 
onzekerheid een belangrijke rol speelt. In hoofdstuk 10 laten we zien hoe een 
bepaald soort onzekerheid met betrekking tot de (veelal strijdige) voorkeuren 
van beleidmakers (bijvoorbeeld: "werkgelegenheid is heel belangrijk, maar de 
hoeveelheid natuur mag niet veel kleiner worden") geincorporeerd kan worden 
in een landgebruiksmodel. Daarnaast behandelen we onzekerheid die samen-
hangt met gebrekkige kennis omtrent technische coefficienten in bosbouwmo-
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dellen. We gebruiken fuzzy set theorie, gebaseerd op membership functions, 
om onzekerheid te modelleren. Een cruciaal aspect van fuzzy logic is dat 
elementen gedeeltelijk tot een bepaalde set kunnen behoren. We vinden dat de 
resulterende landallocatie te verkiezen valt boven de uitkomsten van een recht-
toe-recht-aan model. 
In hoofdstuk 11 behandelen we een heel ander soort onzekerheid. 
Zoals boven vermeid fluctueren houtprijzen in de praktijk. In tegenstelling tot 
fuzzy set theorie (waarbij niet het plaatsvinden van een gebeurtenis onzeker is, 
maar de gebeurtenis zelf) is de kansverdeling van de stochastische prijs 
bekend. In de literatuur is een zoekmodel met reserveringsprijzen ontwikkeld 
om de baten van een strategisch, flexibel kapbeleid (kappen wanneer de prijs 
hoger is dan de reserveringsprijs, afzien van kappen indien de prijs lager is) 
te kunnen vergelijken met de opbrengsten van het meer rigide Faustmann 
model (zie ook hoofdstuk 2). Uit studies blijkt dat de winsten van boseigena-
ren met ongeveer 30% stijgen wanneer een reserveringsprijs-benadering 
gekozen wordt. In hoofdstuk 11 hebben we dit model uitgebreid door in 
aanvulling op strategische eindkap ook strategisch uitdunnen in ogenschouw te 
nemen. We vinden dat de reserveringsprijs voor uitdunnen altijd lager is dan 
de reserveringsprijs voor kappen en dat een strategisch kapbeleid ten aanzien 
van uitdunnen de winst van een boseigenaar substantieel verhoogd. De extra 
baten van flexibel uitdunnen zijn, in overeenstemming met de verwachtingen, 
minder groot dan de extra baten van het volgen van een strategisch eindkapbe-
leid. 
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